The ontological argument and Russell’s antinomy

Sara L. Uckelman

doi:10.12775/LLP.2009.015

Autor

Sara L. Uckelman Department of Logic, Nicolaus Copernicus University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2009.015

Słowa kluczowe

ontological argument, Russell’s paradox, St. Anselm

Abstrakt

In this short note we respond to the claim made by Christopher Viger in [4] that Anselm’s so-called ontological argument falls prey to Russell’s paradox. We show that Viger’s argument is based on a flawed premise and hence does not in fact demonstrate what he claims it demonstrates.

Biogram autora

Sara L. Uckelman - Department of Logic, Nicolaus Copernicus University

Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation

Bibliografia

Neuhaus, F., “On being perfect”, pp. 665–679 in: H. Bohse, K. Dreimann and S. Walter (eds.), Selected papers contributed to the sections of GAP.6, Sixth International Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy, Mentis, 2007.

Nowicki, M., “Anselm and Russell”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 15 (2006): 355–368. DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2006.020

Scheffler, U., “Is it paradoxical to not be greater than God?”, online at http://www.sodass.net/Texte/SchefflerOnViger.pdf, 2002.

Viger, Ch., “St. Anselm’s ontological argument succumbs to Russell’s paradox”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 52, 3 (2002): 123–128.