Two new strategies for inconsistency-adaptive logics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2000.004Abstrakt
In this paper I present two new strategies for inconsistency adaptive logics: the reliable sufficient information strategy of ACLuN3 and the minimally abnormal sufficient information strategy of ACLuN4. I give proof theory and semantics for both ACLuN3 and ACLuN4. I also compare them with the well-known inconsistency-adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2.Bibliografia
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