Some remarks concerning modal propositional logic of questions

Abstrakt

Recently, it has become a custom to treat questions (or, better, questioning) as a game between two subjects. Unfortunately, one rarely goes beyond the scheme of Questioner-Scientist and Answerer-Nature, although the Interlocutor so conceived displays some undesirable features. This paper argues for the idea that logic of questions can be build as a logic of the game between “knowledge resources” persons or theories, rather than errant Scientist and omniscient Nature. To this end the concept of epistemically-possible worlds is discussed, which is conceived as analogous to that of possible worlds in modal logic. And, furthermore, the concepts of relation of epistemic alternativeness and of epistemically-alternative worlds are introduced. On this basis a version of semantics for propositional, three-valued logic of questions is offered and semantic proofs of some theses are given.