A general principle for purely model-theoretical proofs of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.1998.009Abstrakt
By generalizing Kreisel’s proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem of Gödel I extract a general principle which can also be used for other purely model-theoretical proofs of that theorem.Bibliografia
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