ST’s Meta-Paracompleteness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2026.017Słowa kluczowe
strict-tolerant logic, duality, paracompleteness, metainferences, paraconsistencyAbstrakt
The logic ST [10] has been alternatively identified with classical logic due to its set of valid inferences, and with the logic LP, as demonstrated by Barrio et al. [7], through the ability to translate every valid metainference of ST into a valid inference of LP. Furthermore, [18] have argued that ST and LP are the same logic given their membership in the same equivalence class according to Blok-Jónsson’s theory of consequence. These two results connecting ST with LP have led to the perception of ST as a form of paraconsistent logic, at least metainferentially. In this work, a different characterization of the metainferences of ST is proposed through the inferences of the paracomplete logic K3, by arguing that this presentation is as legitimate as the other perspectives on this logic available in the literature. Utilizing new insights into the nature of the duality between the logics LP and K3 [as featured in 9], a translation from every valid metainference of ST into a valid inference of the logic K3 is offered. Additionally, a possible understanding of the notion of external logic is considered, allowing K3 to be viewed as the external logic of ST. Finally, an interpretation of the notion of consequence is presented that provides a natural understanding of the metainferences of ST as metainferential counterparts of the inferences of K3.
Bibliografia
Asenjo, F., “A calculus of antinomies”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 7, 1 (1966): 103–105.
Avron, A., “The semantics and proof theory of linear logic”, Theoretical Computer Science 57, 2–3 (1988): 161–184.
Barrio, E., and P. Egré, “Introduction: Substructural logics and metainferences”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2022): 1215–1231. DOI: CrossRef
Barrio, E., and F. Pailos, “Why a logic is not only its set of valid inferences”, Análisis Filosófico 41, 2 (2021): 261–272. DOI: CrossRef
Barrio, E., F. Pailos, and D. Szmuc, “What is a paraconsistent logic?”, pages 89–108 in W. Carnielli and J. Malinowski (eds.), Between Consistency and Inconsistency, Trends in Logic, Springer, 2018.
Barrio, E., F. Pailos, and D. Szmuc, “A hierarchy of classical and paraconsistent logics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 49, 1 (2020): 93–120. DOI: CrossRef
Barrio, E., L. Rosenblatt, and D. Tajer, “The logics of strict-tolerant logic”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 44, 5 (2015): 551–571. DOI: CrossRef
Blok, W., and B. Jónsson, “Equivalence of consequence operations”, Studia Logica 83, 1 (2006): 91–110. DOI: CrossRef
Blomet, Q., and P. Égré, “ST and TS as product and sum”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (2024): 315–342.
Cobreros, P., P. Égré, D. Ripley, and R. van Rooij, “Tolerant, classical, strict”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, 2 (2012): 347–385. DOI: CrossRef
Cobreros, P., P. Égré, D. Ripley, and R. van Rooij, “Reaching transparent truth”, Mind 122, 488 (2014): 841–866. DOI: CrossRef
Cobreros, P., P. Égré, D. Ripley, and R. van Rooij, “Tolerant reasoning: nontransitive or nonmonotonic?”, Synthese 195 (2018): 3191–3215. DOI: CrossRef
Cobreros, P., P. Égré, D. Ripley, and R. van Rooij, “Inferences and metainferences in ST”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (2020): 1057–1077. DOI: CrossRef
Da Ré, B., F. Pailos, D. Szmuc, and P. Teijeiro, “Metainferential duality”, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 30, 4 (2020): 312–334. DOI: CrossRef
Da Ré, B., and F. Pailos, Metainferential Logics, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Switzerland, 2023. DOI: CrossRef
Da Ré, B., “Structural weakening and paradoxes”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 62, 2 (2021): 369–398. DOI: CrossRef
Da Ré, B., M. Rubin, and P. Teijeiro, “Metainferential paraconsistency”, Logic and Logical Philosophy 30, 3 (2021): 433–457. DOI: CrossRef
Dicher, B., and F. Paoli, “ST, LP, and tolerant metainferences”, pages 383–407 in C. Başkent and T.M. Ferguson (eds.), Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency, Springer Verlag, Cham, Switzerland, 2019.
Fjellstad, A., “How a semantics for tonk should be”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 8, 3 (2015): 488–505. DOI: CrossRef
French, R., “Structural reflexivity and the paradoxes of self-reference”, Ergo 3, 5 (2016): 113–131. DOI: CrossRef
Gentzen, G., “Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen”, Mathematische Zeitschrift 39 (1934): 176–210, 405–431.
Humberstone, L., The Connectives, MIT Press, 2011.
Kleene, S.C., Introduction to Metamathematics, Noth-Holland, Amsterdam, 1952.
Kortenbach, B., “Appreciating global validity”, Synthese 206, 67 (2025). DOI: CrossRef
Negri, S., “Proof theory for modal logic”, Philosophy Compass 6, 8 (2011): 523–538.
Priest, G., “The logic of paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, 1 (1979): 219–241. DOI: CrossRef
Priest, G., In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, Oxford University Press, 2006. DOI: CrossRef
Přenosil, A., “Cut elimination, identity elimination, and interpolation in super-Belnap logics”, Studia Logica 105, 6 (2017): 1255–1289. DOI: CrossRef
Pynko, A., “Gentzen’s cut-free calculus versus the logic of paradox”, Bulletin of the Section of Logic 39, 1–2 (2010): 35–42.
Raftery, J.G., “Correspondences between Gentzen and Hilbert systems”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 71, 3 (2006): 903–957. DOI: CrossRef
Restall, G., “Multiple conclusions”, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 12 (2005): 189–205.
Ripley, D., “Conservatively extending classical logic with transparent truth”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 5, 2 (2012): 354–378. DOI: CrossRef
Ripley, D., “Paradoxes and failures of cut”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91, 1 (2013): 139–164. DOI: CrossRef
Teijeiro, P., “Strength and stability”, Análisis Filosófico 41, 2 (2021): 311–340. DOI: 10.36446/af.2021.459">CrossRef
Urbas, I., “Paraconsistency”, Studies in Soviet Thought 39, 3–4 (1990): 343–354. DOI: CrossRef
Zardini, E., “A model of tolerance”, Studia Logica 90, 3 (2008): 337–368. DOI: CrossRef
Pobrania
Opublikowane
Jak cytować
Numer
Dział
Licencja
Prawa autorskie (c) 2026 Eliana Franceschini

Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Bez utworów zależnych 4.0 Międzynarodowe.
Statystyki
Liczba wyświetleń i pobrań: 55
Liczba cytowań: 0