Intuitionistic Logic from a Metainferential Perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2025.006Słowa kluczowe
Buenos Aires Plan, metainferential logics, intuitionism, proof-theory, substructuralityAbstrakt
This paper introduces a metainferential version of intuitionistic logic. I work on the framework proposed by some logicians of Buenos Aires, who defend that a logic should be defined in terms of inferences and metainferences of growing complexity. Three logical systems are presented and proved to be adequate from an intuitionistic point of view
Bibliografia
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