From the Meinongian Point of View
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2022.028Słowa kluczowe
Alexius Meinong, Peter van Inwagen, Willard van Orman Quine, non-existent objects, quantifiersAbstrakt
In this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen’s charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear.
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Prawa autorskie (c) 2022 Maciej Sendłak
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