How to Get out of the Labyrinth of Time?  Lessons Drawn from Callender

Jerzy Gołosz

doi:10.12775/LLP.2022.015

Authors

Jerzy Gołosz Institute of Philosophy Jagiellonian University http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2457-9865

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2022.015

Keywords

flow of time, block universe, endurantism, asymmetry of time, dynamic existence, dynamic multipresentism, multiple presents, Callender

Abstract

Callender [2017] claims that contemporary science demonstrates that there is no objective present and no objective flow of time, especially since all sensed events come from the past, our various senses need different amounts of time to react, and there are enough asymmetries in the physical world to explain our experience of time. This paper holds that, although Callender’s arguments for the subjectivity of the flow of time are unconvincing, the scientific discoveries and arguments he indicates can still be applied to improve theories of the objective flow of time. The paper develops precisely such a theory, one which introduces multiple individual proper presents for all of the objects that make up our world.

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