The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis

Daniele Chiffi; Fabien Schang

doi:10.12775/LLP.2017.006

Autor

Daniele Chiffi Tallinn University of Technology
Fabien Schang Universidade Estadual de Maringá

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2017.006

Słowa kluczowe

logic for pragmatics, assertion, hypothesis, question-answer semantics, logical opposition

Abstrakt

The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR₄ and AR₄_¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a wide variety of epistemic norms. After comparing the different norms of justification involved in these logical systems, two hexagons expressing Aristotelian relations of opposition will be gathered in order to clarify how (a fragment of) pragmatic formulas can be interpreted in a fuzzy-based question-answer semantics.

Biogram autora

Fabien Schang - Universidade Estadual de Maringá

Centro de Cięncias Humanas

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