Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2013.025Keywords
self-reference, truth-theories, meaning-theories, compositionality, natural language semanticsAbstract
This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.References
[Kaplan, 1989] Kaplan, D., “Demonstratives”, pages 481–564 in: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
[Soames, 2010] Soames, S., What is Meaning?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010.
[Yablo, 1993] Yablo, S., “Paradox without self-reference”, Analysis, 53 (1993): 251-252. DOI: 10.2307/3328245
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Published
2013-09-03
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TSOHATZIDIS, Savas L. Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth. Logic and Logical Philosophy. Online. 3 September 2013. Vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 445-452. [Accessed 28 March 2024]. DOI 10.12775/LLP.2013.025.
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