Local Applications of Logics via Model-Theoretic Interpretations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2022.023Keywords
interpretations, model-theoretic semantics, proof-theoretic semantics, localism, ST-hierarchyAbstract
This paper analyses the notion of ‘interpretation’, which is often tied to the semantic approach to logic, where it is used when referring to truth-value assignments, for instance. There are, however, other uses of the notion that raise interesting problems. These are the cases in which interpreting a logic is closely related to its justification for a given application. The paper aims to present an understanding of interpretations that supports the model-theoretic characterization of validity to the detriment of the proof-theoretic one. This is done by making use of the hierarchy of ST-related logics. Finally, a localist conception of logic is defended as the natural view stemming from the model-theoretic approach.
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