INVESTOR PROTECTION AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2006.002Abstract
This paper presents the results of research in “law and finance” approach in the area of significance of investor protection for financial system structure (i.e. if this system is bank- or securities market based). Namely, the level of this protection, shaped by such characteristics of law as: legal tradition, regulations in corporate governance, accounting standards, and enforcement of law are main factors influencing the financial system architecture. However, these results are criticized. First, opponents prove that legal regulations are secondary for political factors. Second, there is also impaired importance of legal tradition, i.e. durability of advantage of one type over another and independence of its effectiveness from local circumstances.
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