BUCHAREST NINE IN THE PROCESS OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE ON NATO’S EASTERN FLANK

Abstrakt

The purpose of the research presented in this article was to analyze the role of the Bucharest Nine States (B9) in shaping NATO’s strategic deterrence mechanisms and to assess their effectiveness in ensuring the security of the eastern flank. When discussing the research problems, top-down and bottom-up approaches were adopted to confront NATO’s deterrence initiatives with the expectations of B9. The research process revealed that B9 encourage the United States to engage in European security. They are aware of the need to pay a high cost for their own security, they make defensive efforts in projects implemented by the European Union, especially in acquiring capabilities that guarantee the defense of their own territory and deterrence through punishment. They create conditions for the operating of battalion battle groups on their own territory, or participate in them themselves, and make a large contribution to the reformed NATO response forces and command system. The B9 states actively participate in building allied horizontal deterrence mechanisms to prevent asymmetric escalation of conflict, as well as mechanisms of deterrence by denial to thwart the conquest of their own territory.