ANOTHER SUCCESS FOR GAME THEORY: NOBEL LAUREATES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN 2012
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2013.014Keywords
game theory, theory of stable allocations, practice of market designAbstract
Game theory has earned recognition in economics along with the development of mathematical economics. It was reflected in Nobel Prizes, especially in 1994, 2005 and 2007. Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth award honours the achievements of a distinguished, elderly champion in the paradigm of game theory and a younger scholar who is also an effective organiser of matching pairs in the allocation of markets which fit the framework of game theory. Successes in marriage matchmaking, school recruitment and regulations of the exchange of human organs for the purpose of transplantation have already become an inspiration for further research and new markets improvement.
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