THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2006.001Abstract
The New Political Economy deals with human behaviour and responsiveness when it comes to the political aspects of public affairs. According to the New Political Economy all modern democratic tendencies create the foreground and make it possible for politicians, bureaucracy and political or social allies to implement particular interests, which, in turn leads to certain limits of economical freedom as well as economical stagnation and decline. The New Political Economy stands against the Government direct intervention, interference and intrusion into economic processes. It also stands for the least minimum influence of the Government deliberately using all the wide ranges of market techniques and methods.
The New Political Economy additionally deals with both: the theory of political cycles and changes, as well as the public choice theory. The theory of political cycles points to the analogy and correspondence of government election cycles with politics of economy.
According to the Public Choice Theory (especially to the constitutional political economy by J. Buchanan) a state keeps and possesses a double function when we consider state economics and assurance, and execution of constitutional rights and maintaining and assuring same time supplying of public goods. The main aim in assuring and protecting constitutional rules is minimising and diminishing the overall losses when it comes to the operativeness and functionality of the state bureaucracy, so in general, the economisation of the public sector. The constitution itself defines: the property rights and their enforcement, public and private limits as well as the rules of supplying public goods.
References
Acocella N. , Zasady polityki gospodarczej, PWN, Warszawa 2002.
Buchanan J., Tullock G., Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1962.
Downs A., An Economic Theory of Democracy,Harper Row, New York 1956.
Fukuyama F., Budowanie państwa. Władza i ład międzynarodowy w XXI wieku, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań 2005.
Kalinowski M., Ekonomiczne przesłanki lobbingu w świetle teorii public choice, „Gospodarka Narodowa”, 2005 nr 7-8.
Metelska-Szaniawska K., Ekonomia konstytucyjna – ekonomia polityczna ładu gospodarczego (w:) Teoria wyboru publicznego. Wstęp do ekonomicznej analizy polityki i funkcjonowania sfery publicznej, J.Wilkin (red.), Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2005.
Michalak T., Ekonomiczna teoria demokracji Anthony’ego Downsa (w:) Teoria wyboru publicznego…op. cit.
North D.C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York 1990.
Olson M., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1965.
Stiglitz J., Ekonomia sektora publicznego, PWN, Warszawa 2004.
Teoria wyboru publicznego. Wstęp do ekonomicznej analizy polityki i funkcjonowania sfery publicznej, J.Wilkin (red.), Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2005.
Tłaczała P., Analiza grup interesu (w:) Teoria wyboru publicznego…op. cit.
Tłaczała P., Podstawy ekonomicznej teorii biurokracji (w:) Teoria wyboru publicznego…op. cit.
Wilkin J., Teoria wyboru publicznego – homoeconomicus w sferze polityki (w:) Teoria wyboru publicznego…op. cit.
Ząbkowicz A., Współczesna ekonomia instytucjonalna wobec głównego nurtu ekonomii, „Ekonomista”, 2003, nr 6.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
Stats
Number of views and downloads: 1862
Number of citations: 0
