Sorites, Curry and Suitable Models

Bruno Da Ré, Paula Teijeiro



In this paper we present two new approaches for dealing with semantic paradoxes and soritical predicates based on fuzzy logic. We show that both of them have conceptual advantages over the more traditional Łukasiewicz approach, and that the second one even avoids standard proofs of ω-nconsistency.


paradoxes; vagueness; truth; ω-inconsistency; Łukasiewicz logic

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ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)

ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

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