A Realistic View on Normative Conflicts

Daniela Glavaničová, Matteo Pascucci

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2020.001

Abstract


Kulicki and Trypuz (2016) introduced three systems of multi-valued deontic action logic to handle normative conflicts. The first system suggests a pessimistic view on normative conflicts, according to which any conflicting option represents something forbidden; the second system suggests an optimistic view, according to which any conflicting option represents something obligatory; finally, the third system suggests a neutral view, according to which any conflicting option represents something that is neither obligatory nor forbidden. The aim of the present paper is to propose a fourth system in this family, which comes with a realistic view on normative conflicts: a normative conflict remains unsolved unless it is generated by two or more normative sources that can be compared. In accordance with this, we will provide a more refined formal framework for the family of systems at issue, which allows for explicit reference to sources of norms. Conflict resolution is thus a consequence of a codified hierarchy of normative sources.


Keywords


action; deontic logic; deontic value; multivalued logic; normative conflict

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References


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ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)

ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

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