Classical model existence and left resolution
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2007.011Słowa kluczowe
classical propositional logic, classical model existence theorem, Gentzen system, resolutionAbstrakt
By analyzing what are necessary conditions in the proof [4] of the classical model existence theorem CME (every consistent set has a classical model), we present the left resolution Gentzen systems R(¬,-), which proof-theoretically characterize CME.Bibliografia
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