Ramseying liars

Barry Hartley Slater

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2004.003

Abstract


Despite the volume of discussion on the Liar Paradox recently, there is one stream of largely British thought on the matter which is hardly represented in the wider literature. This paper points out salient aspects of the history of this tradition, from its origin in forms of propositional quantification found in Ramsey, through to more precise symbolisations which have emerged more recently. But its purpose is to exposit, with respect to a number of contested cases, the ensuing results. Thus it goes on to apply the analysis to several other well known paradoxes, including one rarely discussed, which reveals more fully the consequent consistency and completeness of natural language.

Keywords


Liar; Curry and Gödel Paradoxes; propositions; epsilon calculus

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References


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ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)

ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

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