Gareth evans’s argument against vague identity

Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.016

Abstract


In the paper Evans’s argument concerning indeterminate identity statements is presented and discussed. Evans’s paper in which he formulated his argument is one of the most frequently discussed papers concerning identity. There are serious doubts concerning what Evans wanted to prove by his argument. Theorists have proposed two competing and incompatible interpretations. According to some, Evans purposefully constructed an invalid argument in order to demonstrate that the vague objects view cannot diagnose the fallacy and is therefore untenable. According to others, Evans wanted to formulate a (valid) argument to the effect that there cannot be vague identity statements whose vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects. As it has been argued, if it is the former interpretation which is correct, than the argument really is invalid, but it is doubtful whether it achieves its aim. It might be claimed that “the vague objects view” it refutes is not the view that most vague objects theorists hold. The main part of the paper is devoted to the second interpretation and the discussions concerning the validity of the argument on this interpretation. It appears that the vague objects theorist is in a position to object to the validity of every single step of the proof.

Full Text:

PDF

References


Burgess, A. J., ‘Vague identity: Evans misrepresented’, Analysis 49 (1984), 112–119.

Copeland, B. J., ‘On vague objects, fuzzy logic and fractal boundaries’, in Horgan, T., (ed.), Vagueness, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1994), suppl., pp. 83–96.

Evans, G., ‘Can there be vague objects’, Analysis 38 (1978), 208.

Fine, K., ‘Vagueness, truth and logic’, Synthese 30 (1975), 265–300.

Garrett, B. J., ‘Vagueness and identity’, Analysis 48 (1988), 130–135.

Garrett, B. J., ‘Vague identity and vague objects’, Nous 25 (1991), 341–351.

Johnsen, B., ‘Is vague identity incoherent?’, Analysis 49 (1989), 103–113.

Keefe, R., ‘Contingent identity and vague identity’, Analysis 55 (1995), 183–190.

Lewis, D., ‘Vague identity: Evans misunderstood’, Analysis 48 (1988), 128–130.

Lowe, E. J., ‘Vague identity and quantum indeterminacy’, Analysis 54 (1994), 110–114.

Over, D. E. ‘Vague objects and identity’, Analysis 49 (1989), 97–99.

Parsons, T. and P. Woodruff, ‘Worldly indeterminacy of identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 45 (1995), 171–191.

Pelletier, F. J., ‘The not-so-strange modal logic of indeterminacy’, Logique et Analyse n.s. 27 (1984), 415–422.

Pelletier, F. J., ‘Another argument against vague objects’, The Journal of Philosophy 1989, pp. 481–492.

Rasmussen, S.A., ‘Vague identity’, Mind 95 (1985), 81–91.

Tye, M., ‘Sorites paradoxes and the semantics of vagueness’ in Tomberlin, J.E. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language (1994), 189–206.

Tye, M., ‘Vagueness: welcome to the quicksand’, in Horgan, T. (ed.), Vagueness, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1994), suppl., pp. 1–22.

Wiggins, D., ‘On singling out an object determinately’, in Pettit, P., McDowell, J. (ed.), Subject, Thought and Context, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, 169–180.

Williamson, T., Vagueness, Routledge, London and New York 1994.








Print ISSN: 1425-3305
Online ISSN: 2300-9802

Partnerzy platformy czasopism