Defining ontological categories in an expansion of belief dynamics

Jan Westerhoff

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2002.012

Abstract


There have been attempts to get some logic out of belief dynamics, i.e. attempts to define the constants of propositional logic in terms of functions from sets of beliefs to sets of beliefs. 1 It would be interesting to see whether something similar could be done for ontological categories, i.e. ontological constants. The theory presented here will be a (modest) expansion of belief dynamics: it will not only incorporate beliefs, but also parts of beliefs, so called belief fragments. On the basis of this we will give a belief-dynamical account of the ontological categories of states of affairs, individuals, properties of arbitrary adicities and properties of arbitrary orders.

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References


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