Conflict without contradiction: paraconsistency and axiomatizable conflict toleration hierarchies in Evidence Logic
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2001.009Abstract
Evidence Logic (EL) goes beyond Classical Logic (CL) in its primitive expressivity by including both confirmatory and refutatory predications, additionally equipped with evidence level annotations. Previous work has characterized the Boolean Sentence Algebras (BSAs) of the monadic, functional, and undecidable varieties of EL [4], [5]. From the perspective that our knowledge of the world is often less-than-certain, that is to say “evidential”, application-wise EL is conceptually antecedent to CL and provides a broad foundational framework wherein axiomatizable extensions reach out to a number of the more domain-specific recent constructions of logics for the representation and processing of uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (AI). In this paper we analyze EL from this point of view in sections 1 and 2. In Section 3 the relationship between this work and issues in paraconsistency is briefly explored.References
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