Smale strategies for the n-person iterated prisoner's dilemma
Słowa kluczowe
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, $n$-person game, Smale, good strategies, simple Smale strategyAbstrakt
Adapting methods introduced by Steven Smale, we describe good strategies for a symmetric version of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with $n$ players.Bibliografia
E. Akin, Good strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Smale vs Markov, J. Dyn. Games, 4 (2017), no. 3, 217–253.
K. Behrstock, M. Benaim and M. Hirsch, Smale strategies for network Prisoner’s Dilemma Games, J. Dyn Games 2 (2015), no. 2, 141–155.
C. Hilbe, B. Wu, A. Traulsen and M. Nowak, Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas, PNAS 111 (2014), no. 46, 16425–16430.
C. Hilbe, B. Wu, A. Traulsen and M. Nowak, Evolutionary performance of zerodeterminant strategies in multiplayer games, J. Theoret. Biol. 374 (2014), 115–124.
S. Smale, The Prisoner’s Dilemma and dynamical systems associated to non-cooperative games, Econometrica 48 (1980), no. 7, 1617–1634.
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