The Therapeutic vs. Constructive Approach to the Transformative Character of Collective Intentionality. The Interpersonal Level of Explanation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2020.004Keywords
collective intentionality, shared intentionality, the interpersonal level of explanation, the shared intentionality hypothesis, mechanism-based explanation, M. Tomasello, L. VygotskyAbstract
In their article, Andrea Kern and Henrike Moll (2017) argue in support of a certain vision of shared/collective intentionality and its role in understanding our cognitive capacities. This vision is based on two aspects: a negative one, i.e. a theoretical diagnosis of the contemporary debate on shared/collective intentionality, and a positive one, referring to the proposals for shared/collective intentionality. As regards the negative aspect, the main thesis concerns the arbitrary assumptions underlying the whole debate on shared/collective intentionality. According to Kern and Moll (2017), this assumption prevents us from capturing the transformative character of shared/collective intentionality and therefore the uniqueness of the human being. This paper is not so much a detailed criticism or discussion of said article, as rather an opportunity to formulate my own position in the colloquy with Kern and Mole’s position. This approach states that understanding the transformative character of SI/CI requires taking into account a broader approach to the constitution of the mind, in which, apart from the personal and the sub-personal level of explanation, there is also a third level of explanation the interpersonal level of explanation. Thus understood, the ILE is a part of multi-level analysis and mechanism-based explanation, whereas shared/collective intentionality is one of the main mechanisms of the ILE.
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