A Brief Note on Béziau’s “Rather Trivial Theorem” About LP
Keywordsdialetheia, paraconsistent logic, trivial interpretation
AbstractBéziau has recently argued that the logic LP commits dialetheists to trivialism and Martin has pointed out very clearly the main problems with that alleged result. My sole purpose here is to make the spirit of Martin’s reply more concise, exhibiting as clearly as possible the logical defects in Béziau’s reasoning. Additionally, I want to make some remarks on LP qua logic and not only as an interpreted language.
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