In Defence of Dialetheism: A Reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk

Ben Martin

doi:10.12775/LLP.2017.030

Authors

Ben Martin University College London

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2017.030

Keywords

dialetheism, paraconsistent logics, logic of paradox, self-referential paradoxes

Abstract

In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [41] have criticised a prominent dialetheic logic and common arguments for dialetheism, respectively. While Beziau argues that Priest’s logic LP commits the dialetheist to trivialism, the thesis that all propositions are true, Tkaczyk maintains that the arguments traditionally proposed for dialetheism are faulty and ultimately that dialetheism should be rejected as self-refuting. This paper shows that both are mistaken in their contentions. Beziau’s argument conflates truth-in-an-interpretation with truth simpliciter and Tkaczyk misconstrues the substance of dialetheic arguments. In the process of identifying these weaknesses of both arguments, the paper clarifies elements of both dialetheic logics and dialetheism which these discussions demonstrate are still misunderstood within the literature.

Author Biography

Ben Martin, University College London

Philosophy Department

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