Further Reflections on Sentences Saying of Themselves Strange Things

Elia Zardini

doi:10.12775/LLP.2017.004

Authors

Elia Zardini University of Lisbon

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2017.004

Keywords

diagonalisation, factivity, incompleteness, necessitation, reductio ad absurdum, semantic paradoxes, truthmaking

Abstract

Milne [2005] argued that a sentence saying of itself that it does not have a truthmaker is true but does not have a truthmaker. López de Sa and Zardini [2006] worried that, by parity of reasoning, one should conclude that a sentence saying of itself that it is not both true and short is true but not short. Recently, Milne [2013] and Gołosz [2015] have replied to López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, arguing in different ways that the worry is illfounded. In this paper, I’ll address these replies and argue that they fail to dispel López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, bringing out in the process some broader points concerning the use of self-referential sentences in arguments in philosophy of logic.

Author Biography

Elia Zardini, University of Lisbon

LanCog, Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group

Philosophy Centre

FCT Investigator

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