Vagueness is a Kind of Conflation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2016.020Słowa kluczowe
conflation, vagueness, nontransitive logic, tolerance, borderline casesAbstrakt
This paper sketches an understanding of conflation and vagueness according to which the latter is a special kind of the former. First, I sketch a particular understanding of conflation. Then, I go on to argue that vague concepts fit directly into this understanding. This picture of vagueness is related, but not identical, to a number of existing accounts.Bibliografia
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