A spurious confusion in temporal logic
Keywordstemporal logic, time, truth-value
AbstractR.L. Epstein and E. Buitrago-Díaz aspire to present a vitally new approach to temporal logic, an approach based on the idea of absolute truth-values. They claim the existing approaches are confused and incoherent, and contain a significant number of nonsenses. The alleged problems are generated by truth-values being relativized to positions in time. The fundamental incoherence consists in some confusion between propositions and their schemata. Epstein and Buitrago-Díaz have formulas be simply true or false and describe fixed areas of time. I endeavour to show that all objections Epstein and Buitrago-Díaz raise to existing temporal logic are misunderstandings. The calculus they present is easily reconstructable in existing calculi, so there is no new approach here. However, the calculus is correct and may be of some interest in logic.
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