In defence of an argument against truthmaker maximalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2014.018Keywords
truthmakers, truthmaker maximalism, Milne, de Sa, Zardini, Rodriguez-PereyraAbstract
The paper analyses the argument proposed by Milne (2005) against truthmaker maximalism and shows that the objections raised to this argument by de Sa and Zardini, and Rodriguez-Pereyra are misguided because the first one misuses the vagueness of some terms; and the second one is based on a fallacy of petitio principii (this is exactly the same type of objection as it was raised by Rodriguez-Pereyra against the Milne’s argument).References
Armour-Garb, B., and J. A. Woodbridge, 2010, “Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility”, Analysis, 70:11–23. DOI: 10.1093/analys/anp123
Armstrong, D., 2000, “Difficult cases in the theory of truthmaking”, The Monist, 83: 150–160. DOI: 10.5840/monist200083112
López de Sa, D., and E. Zardini, 2006, “Does this sentence have no truthmaker?”, Analysis, 66:154–57. DOI: 10.1093/analys/66.2.154
Milne, P., 2005, “Not every truth has a truthmaker”, Analysis, 65: 221–224. DOI: 10.1093/analys/65.3.221
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Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 2006, “Truthmaker maximalism defended”, Analysis, 66: 260–264. DOI: 10.1093/analys/66.3.260
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