Is Transparent Intensional Logic a non-classical logic?
KeywordsTIL, bivalence, classicality, construction, expressivity, extensions, intensions, hyperintensionality, procedure, realism, anti-realism
It is shown that:
(a) classicality is connected with various criteria some of which are fulfilled by TIL while some other are not;
(b) some more general characteristic of classicality connects it with philosophical realism whereas (radical) anti-realism is connected with non-classical logics;
(c) TIL is highly expressive due to its hyperintensionality, which makes it possible to handle procedures as objects sui generis.
Thus TIL is classical in obeying principles of realism and non-classical in transcending some principles taught by textbooks of classical logic.
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