Propositions, possible worlds, and recursion
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2011.004Keywords
, propositions, possible worlds, decidabilityAbstract
The issue of reduction of propositions to sets of possible worlds is addressed. It is shown that, under some natural assumptions, there always exist recursive propositions, i.e. decidable sets of possible worlds, which are not assigned to any sentence of a language. Some consequences of this result are discussed.References
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