Vagueness unlimited: In defence of a pragmatical approach to sorites paradoxes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.013Abstract
As far as ‘modern’ logical theories of vagueness are concerned, a main distinction can be drawn between ‘semantical’ ones and ‘pragmatical’ ones. The latter are defended here, because they tend to retake into account important contextual dimensions of the problem abandoned by the former. Their inchoate condition seems not alarming, since they are of surprisingly recent date. This, however, could very well be an accidental explanation. That is, the true reason for it might sooner or later turn out to be bearing exactly on the fundamental human limitations, when it comes to theorizing, that these approaches are urging us to appreciate.References
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