Change in individuals without a name. Contextual indicators & the free change-adaptive logic

Guido Vanackere

doi:10.12775/LLP.2003.011

Authors

Guido Vanackere University of Ghent

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011

Abstract

Proof theory and semantics of an adaptive logic that deals adequately with change in individuals with or without a name are presented. New logical constants are introduced, viz. indicators. Within a given context they function as names, predicates and quantifiers at the same time. The thus extended language (of classical logic) has a big expressive power and solvespartly — the (classical) non-logical presuppositions with respect to ‘the existence of individuals’. Nevertheless, from a purely logical point of view, the here pre - sented logic requires nothing but a very intuitive selection of classical models of the premises, viz. the minimally abnormal ones.

Author Biography

Guido Vanackere, University of Ghent

Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science

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