Relating Logics Meet Scientific Understanding: On Clustering and the Methodology of Logical Classification

Maria del Rosario Martinez-Ordaz

doi:10.12775/LLP.2026.006

Authors

Maria del Rosario Martinez-Ordaz Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México City https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2118-3515

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2026.006

Keywords

relating logics, clustering, scientific understanding

Abstract

Here I discuss the legitimacy of the cluster of logics that are considered to be relating logics. I argue that even if the cluster ⌜Relating logics⌝ satisfies the basic theoretical criteria for legitimate clusters, logicians and philosophers of logic have failed at providing the corresponding pragmatic backing. In response to this, I propose to provide the pragmatic justification of the cluster by showing a domain of application for which ⌜Relating logics⌝ fit more adequately the evidence than any of their rivals do; such a domain is the phenomenon of scientific understanding. Finally, I argue that the characterization of scientific understanding as a relating phenomenon provides a description of it that is more accurate than the ones offered by rival views.

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