Strong Kleene Logics as a Tool for Modelling Formal Epistemic Norms

Agustina Borzi; Federico Pailos; Joaquín T. Toranzo Calderón

doi:10.12775/LLP.2024.029

Authors

Agustina Borzi National Scientific and Technical Research Council, Department of Philosophy, University of Buenos Aires-CONICET https://orcid.org/0009-0008-4368-0444
Federico Pailos Department of Computer Sciences, University of Tübingen https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9991-2760
Joaquín T. Toranzo Calderón IIF-SADAF, National Scientific and Technical Research Council, Department of Philosophy, University of Buenos Aires; AI and Robotics Research Group, National University of Technology, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1297-0912

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2024.029

Keywords

epistemic attitudes, formal commitments, bridge principles, three-valued logics, substructural logics

Abstract

In this paper, we present two ways of modelling every epistemic formal conditional commitment that involves (at most) three key epistemic attitudes: acceptance, rejection and neither acceptance nor rejection. The first one consists of adopting the plurality of every mixed Strong Kleene logic (along with an epistemic reading of the truth-values), and the second one involves the use of a unified system of six-sided inferences, named 6SK, that recovers the validities of each mixed Strong Kleene logic. We also introduce a sequent calculus that is sound and complete with respect to both approaches. We compare both accounts, and finally, we suggest that the plurality of Strong Kleene logic as well as the general framework 6SK are linked to formal epistemic norms via bridge principles.

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