Three Approaches to Logical Correctness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2024.013Keywords
Carnap, logical correctness, logical pluralism, logical realismAbstract
This paper outlines three broad ways one might think about logical correctness: the Realist approach, the One-Language approach and my own Neo-Carnapian view. Although the realist and one-language views have dominated the philosophy of logic in recent years, I argue against them, favouring of the Neo-Carnapian approach.
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