ZF-Class Nominalism and the Küng-Armstrong Trilemma
A Plea for Moderate Ineffabilism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2024.005Słowa kluczowe
class nominalism, ineffabilism, properties, set theoryAbstrakt
This paper will examine the Küng-Armstrong trilemma against Class Nominalism. We will see that combining Class Nominalism and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) can provide us with a sophisticated version of Class Nominalism, namely ZF-Class Nominalism, which successfully addresses the objection and leads to a moderate version of ineffabilism about the putative set-membership relation.
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Prawa autorskie (c) 2024 Francesco Calemi
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