True, Untrue, Valid, Invalid, Provable, Unprovable

Zach Weber

doi:10.12775/LLP.2024.008

Authors

Zach Weber Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, New Zealand

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2024.008

Keywords

dialetheism, revenge paradoxes, paraconsistent metatheory

Abstract

There are many approaches to paraconsistency, ranging from the very moderate to the more radical. In this paper I explore and extend the more radical end of the spectrum, where there are truth-value gluts. In particular I will look at paraconsistent metatheory – the machinery of truth, validity, and proof  as developed in a glut-friendly paraconsistent setting. The aim is to evaluate the philosophical and technical tenability of such an approach. I will show that there are very significant technical challenges to face on this sort of radical approach, but that there is good philosophical support for facing these challenges.

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