The Liar Paradox: Between Evidence and Truth
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2022.005Keywords
paraconsistency, Liar paradox, epistemic approach, evidence, truthAbstract
Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is dealt with by classical logic. In this paper we discuss the fate of the Liar paradox in this picture. While this is a paradox about truth, it cannot be accommodated by the classical part of the approach, due to trivialization problems. On the other hand, the paraconsistent part does not seem fit as well, due to the fact that its intended reading is in terms of non-conclusive evidence, not truth. We discuss the difficulties involved in each case and argue that none of the options seems to accommodate the paradox in a satisfactory manner.
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