Grounding and Propositional Identity: A Solution to Wilhelm’s Inconsistencies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2022.012Keywords
grounding, propositional identity, inconsistency, consistencyAbstract
By following a recent result of [Wilhelm, 2021], it can easily be shown that standard conditions for immediate partial grounding and relevant identity conditions for propositions are inconsistent with one another. This is an unfortunate situation for all grounding enthusiasts; however, by adopting the approach presented by Poggiolesi [2016a,b], which displays a more-fined grained use of negations, it can also be shown that consistency can be restored back.
References
Poggiolesi, F., 2016a, “A critical overview of the most recent logics of grounding”, pages 291–309 in F. Boccuni and A. Sereni, editors, Objectivity, Realism and Proof, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. DOI: http://dx.doi.org 10.1007/978-3-319-31644-4_15
Poggiolesi, F., 2016b, “On defining the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding”, Synthese, 193 (10): 3147–3167. DOI: http://dx.doi.org 10.1007/s11229-015-0923-x
Poggiolesi, F., 2018, “On constructing a logic for the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding”, Synthese, 195 (3): 1231–1254. DOI: http://dx.doi.org 10.1007/s11229-016-1265-z
Poggiolesi, F., 2020, “A proof-theoretical framework for several types of grounding”, Logique et Analyse, 252: 387–414.
Wilhelm, I., 2021, “Grounding and propositional identity”, Analysis, 81 (1): 80–81. DOI: http://dx.doi.org 10.1093/analys/anaa024
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Copyright (c) 2022 Francesca Poggiolesi
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