DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE IN THE POLISH TWO-TIER BOARD MODEL
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/JPM.2014.003Keywords
corporate governance, corporate boards, board-level employee representativesAbstract
Purpose: This paper is devoted to the eff ectiveness of corporate boards. Its aim is to present the board models found in European companies and to propose changes that would lead to better performance of Polish corporate boards.
Approach: The article presents an analysis of European corporate board models, as well as their advantages and disadvantages. Based on this analysis, the author pointed out possible directions of change in the Polish two-tier board model.
Implications: The author suggests that the introduction of an optional model, whereby the shareholders can choose between the one-tier board model (board of directors) and the two-tier board model (supervisory board and management board), would enable better use of the social and intellectual capital present in the corporate boards of Polish companies.References
Aste, L. (1999), “Reforming French Corporate governance: A Return to the Two-Tier Board?”, The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 1 – 72.
Bohdanowicz, L. (2009), Profesjonalizm w funkcjonowaniu rad nadzorczych spółek akcyjnych, Wydawnictwo UŁ, Łódź.
Cadbury, A. (2002), Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View, Oxford University Press, Oxford. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252008.001.0001
Davis, P. (1978), “The Bullock Report and Employee Participation in Corporate Planning in the UK”, Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation”, Vol. 1, pp. 245 – 272.
Demb, A., Neubauer, F.F. (1992), The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Garratt, B. (2003), The Fish Rots from the Head – The Crisis in Our Boardrooms: Developing the Crucial Skills of the Competent Director, Profile Books, London.
Haff er, R., Glińska-Neweś, A. (2013), „Pozytywny Potencjał Organizacji jako determinant sukcesu przedsiębiorstwa. Przypadek Polski i Francji”, Zarządzanie i Finanse, Vol. 11, No. 4(1), pp. 91 – 100.
Jeżak, J. (2010), Ład Korporacyjny: Doświadczenia światowe oraz kierunki rozwoju, Wyd. C.H. Beck, Warszawa.
Jungmann C. (2006), “The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems”, Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 426 – 474.
Mayer, C. (1995), „Nadzór nad działalnością spółek w gospodarce rynkowej i w gospodarce okresu transformacji”, in: Hessel, M. (Ed.), W poszukiwaniu skutecznej rady, czyli o kontroli spółek akcyjnych w gospodarce rynkowej, Wyd. Profesjonalnej Szkoły Biznesu, Kraków 1995, pp. 27 – 54.
Millet-Reyes, B., Zhao, R. (2010), “A comparison between one-tier and two-tier board structures in France”, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 279 – 310. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-646x.2010.01042.x
Morck, R., Steier, L. (2005), “The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction”, in: Morck, R. (Ed.), A History of Corporate Governance Around the World, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1 – 64.
Nadler, D.A., Behan, B.A., Nadler, M.B. (2006), Building Better Boards: A blueprint for effective governance, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
Pawlak, M. (1996), Działalność rady nadzorczej w spółce akcyjnej na przykładzie doświadczeń niemieckich, Wydawnictwa Uczelniane, Politechnika Lubelska, Lublin.
Rose, C. (2005), “The composition of the semi-two-tier corporate boards and firm performance”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 691 – 701. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00460.x
Rozwkitalska, M. (2012), „Interakcje międzykulturowe w ujęciu pozytywnego potencjału organizacji”, Organizacja i Kierowanie, No. 4, pp. 15 – 28.
Rudolf, S. (2008), „Udział przedstawicieli załogi w radach nadzorczych spółek w nowych krajach Unii Europejskiej”, in: Rudolf, S. (Ed.), Rola nadzoru korporacyjnego w kreowaniu wartości przedsiębiorstwa, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź, pp. 393 – 408.
Rudolf, S., Janusz, T., Stos, D., Urbanek, P. (2002), Efektywny nadzór korporacyjny, PWE, Warszawa.
Siemiątkowski, T. (2004), „System monistyczny ładu korporacyjnego – krok ku przyszłości”, Nasz Rynek Kapitałowy, No. 11, pp. 53 – 55.
Spisto, M. (2005), “Unitary Board and Two-tiered Board for the New South Africa?”, International Review of Business Research Papers, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 84 – 99.
Stankiewicz, M.J. (Ed.) (2010), Pozytywny potencjał organizacji. Wstęp do użytecznej teorii zarządzania, Dom Organizatora, Toruń.
The European Commission (2009), Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States, 23 September.
Tricker, B. (2009), Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Van Bekkum, J., Hijink, J., Schouten, M., Winter, J. (2010), “Corporate Governance in the Netherlands”, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 14, No. 3, available at: http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-17.pdf (accessed 15 May 2013).
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright
Articles submitted to the journal should not have been published before in their current or substantially similar form, or be under consideration for publication with another journal. Authors submitting articles for publication warrant that the work is not an infringement of any existing copyright and will indemnify the publisher against any breach of such warranty. For ease of dissemination and to ensure proper policing of use, papers and contributions become the legal copyright of the publisher unless otherwise agreed.
Plagiarism and ghostwriting
In response to the issue of plagiarism and ghostwriting the editors of the Journal of Positive Management has introduced the following rules to counteract these phenomena:
1. Contributors should be aware of their responsibility for a content of manuscripts.
2. Collective authors are obliged to reveal the contribution and an affiliation of each author (i.e. who is an author of specified part of a paper).
3. Any act of dishonesty will be denounced, the editors will inform appropriate institutions about the situation and give evidence of all cases of misconduct and unethical behaviour.
4. The editors may ask contributors for financial disclosure (i.e. contribution of specified institutions).
Stats
Number of views and downloads: 1
Number of citations: 0
