Women’s Rights, Procreative Liberty and Theory of Identity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/DP.2014.004Keywords:
reproductive rights, procreative liberty, women’s rights, abortion, prenatal harm, wrongful life, Non-Identity Problem, Metaphysical-Biological Split AccountAbstract
In the present paper we investigate, from the politico-philosophical point of view, the inconsistencies of legal solutions concerning reproductive freedom that are present in various jurisdictions in the civilised world. We hypothesise
that an attempt to introduce into legal systems such institutions as preconception harm, prenatal harm or wrongful life without taking into consideration metaphysical questions of identity and ontological status of the foetus is doomed to
failure. To boot, we pay attention to the relationship between these new legal inventions and the question of procreative
liberty and women’s rights.
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