Smale strategies for the n-person iterated prisoner's dilemma

Ethan Akin, Sławomir Plaskacz, Joanna Zwierzchowska

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/TMNA.2019.001

Abstract


Adapting methods introduced by Steven Smale, we describe good strategies for a symmetric version of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with $n$ players.

Keywords


Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; $n$-person game; Smale; good strategies; simple Smale strategy

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References


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