Can contradictions be asserted?

Manuel Bremer

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.1999.014

Abstract


In a universal logic containing naive semantics the semantic antinomies will be provable. Although being provable they are not assertible because of some pragmatic constraints on assertion I will argue for. Furthermore, since it is not acceptable that the thesis of dialethism is a dialethia itself, what it would be according to naive semantics and the prefered logical systems of dialethism, a corresponding restriction on proof theory is necessary.

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References


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