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## Yakym Yarema's Views on the Problem of Unconscious Mental Processes and Their Background in Philosophy of Kazimierz Twardowski and Franz Brentano

**Abstract:** This article introduces the views of Yakym Yarema, the Ukrainian representative of the Lviv-Warsaw School, on the problem of unconscious mental processes and proves the direct influence of Kazimierz Twardowski on them and indirect influence of Franz Brentano. The first part of the paper analyses the framework of Yarema's manuscript "The problems of unconscious mental processes" (1926). The second part demonstrates the background of Yarema's views on the problem of unconscious mental processes. The article demonstrates that Yarema's interest in terms of unconscious mental phenomena did not contradict to the tradition of Twardowski's philosophical school, but was determined by the development of psychology as an independent science.

**Keywords:** unconscious mental processes, Yakym Yarema, Kazimierz Twardowski, the Lviv-Warsaw School, Franz Brentano

## Introduction

Jan Woleński characterises the Lviv-Warsaw School (hereinafter LWS) by such features as genetic – teaching of Kazimierz Twardowski and his students; geographical – the location of the school in Lviv and Warsaw; time – the emergence of the school in the late nineteenth century and its activity before World War II; factual – the corps of common philosophical ideas. According to Woleński, none of these features alone is sufficient to define LWS.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with Stepan Ivanyk's research, at least ten Ukrainian philosophers of pre-war Galicia belonged to LWS genetically, geographically, regarding time and common ideas. They were Stepan Baley, Yakym Yarema, Volodymyr Yurynets, Havryil Kostelnyk, Oleksandr Kulchytskyi, Yaroslav Kuzmiv, Stepan Oleksiuk, Milena Rudnytska, Ilarion Svientsitskyi and Myron Zarytskyi. That means that one may consider LWS as multicultural intellectual formation with the Ukrainian branch as its integral part.<sup>2</sup>

Thanks to Twardowski, LWS became one of the centres of the Brentano tradition in philosophy.<sup>3</sup> According to Anna Brożek's thesis about the direct influence of philosopher A on philosopher B and indirect influence of philosopher A on philosopher C through philosopher B, provided that philosophers B and C accept the terminology, problems, methods or theses of philosopher A, Franz Brentano influenced LWS indirectly – via Kazimierz Twardowski.<sup>4</sup> Thus, through Twardowski, Brentano indirectly influenced the Ukrainian branch of LWS.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jan Woleński, *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska* (Warszawa: PWN, 1985), 11.

<sup>2</sup> Stepan Ivanyk, *Filozofowie ukraińscy w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* (Warszawa: Semper, 2014), 187.

<sup>3</sup> Izydora Dąmbska, "Franciszek Brentano a polska myśl filozoficzna. Kazimierz Twardowski i jego szkoła", *Ruch Filozoficzny* 1–2 (1979): 1–10; Barry Smith, *Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano* (Chicago–La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), access 14.02.2022, [http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian\\_philosophy/](http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/).

<sup>4</sup> Anna Brożek, "Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School", *Academia.edu*, p. 4, access 30.11.2020, [https://www.academia.edu/36043332/AB\\_Brentano\\_FINIS](https://www.academia.edu/36043332/AB_Brentano_FINIS).

<sup>5</sup> Stepan Ivanyk, "Franz Brentano's Influence on Ukrainian Philosophy: A Methodological Introduction to Research", *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 6 (2019): 125–146.

Ivanyk identified the features of the scientific works, written by the Ukrainian students of Twardowski. Firstly, they wrote mostly in the Ukrainian language and thus, contributed to the Ukrainian philosophical terminology development. Secondly, a common element, which united the works within LWS, was not their national basis, but the figure of Twardowski. Thirdly, compared to the Polish representatives of LWS, the representatives of the Ukrainian branch showed great interest in the unconscious mental phenomena and the psychoanalytic method.<sup>6</sup>

According to Ivanyk, we should consider the “psychoanalytic nature” of the Ukrainian branch of LWS in more detail, since this feature can distinguish scientific works of Twardowski's Ukrainian students from the LWS philosophical tradition.<sup>7</sup> The scholar argues that Twardowski's Ukrainian students aimed at coordination of the generally accepted Brentano concept of psyche, intentionalism, and introspectionism with the statement of the existence of unconscious mental phenomena. In addition, they did not oppose the psychoanalytic method to the scholarly postulates, generally accepted in LWS, but considered it only as a certain tool that makes it possible to discover new phenomena in the psyche.<sup>8</sup>

Thorough research of the Ukrainian LWS representatives' works in terms of their «psychoanalytic nature» can prove that the interest of the Ukrainian branch of LWS to unconscious mental phenomena did not contradict the tradition of Twardowski's philosophical school, but rather was formed under its direct influence and indirect influence of Brentano school. This article is aiming at the analysis of Yakym Yarema's<sup>9</sup> views on the problem of unconscious and conscious mental processes, and at demonstration of Twardowski's direct influence and Brentano's indirect influence on them.

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<sup>6</sup> Ivanyk, *Filozofowie ukraińscy*, 176–177.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, 177–180.

<sup>9</sup> The biography and bibliography of the Ukrainian scholar can be found in: Dmytro Hertsiuk, “Strokes to the portrait of Yakym Yarema”, in: *Yakym Yarema*, ed. Dmytro Hertsiuk (Lviv: Ivan Franko National University of Lviv Publishing Centre, 2003), 11–24 [in Ukrainian]; Ivanyk, *Filozofowie ukraińscy*, 40–41.

## Unconscious mental phenomena: Yakym Yarema

Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schelling, Arthur Schopenhauer used the concept of unconscious in metaphysics. Eduard von Hartmann made this concept the basis of his philosophy of the unconscious. Later, Harald Höffding, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Theodor Lipps applied this concept into psychology to find out certain facts of the conscious mental life.

Sigmund Freud considered the unconscious to be an indisputable fact of the mental life. After his psychopathological research, it became impossible to avoid the concept of unconscious in psychology. Those scientists who sought to see psychology being free from metaphysics opposed the concept of unconscious in psychology. According to them, psychology was a science exclusively of the conscious mental life.

Yarema tried to eliminate this resistance by distinguishing the mental unconscious as the absence of "I" consciousness, the object, and the mental conscious as the product of the complication and intensification of the former. According to him, psychology, when studying only the processes of consciousness, demonstrated some weaknesses as an explanatory science. First, it was not able to establish the natural necessary connections in the course of conscious mental life since it was limited only to the observation and description of its phenomena. Secondly, it could not determine the causes of conscious mental life as it identified mental life exclusively with consciousness. Yarema based his argument on a critical review of the views on the unconscious of such scholars as Eduard von Hartmann, Harald Höffding, Kurt Grau, Sigmund Freud and Vladimir Bekhterev. At the same time, he explored how the problem of the unconscious was shifting from metaphysics to the scientific validity ground. Yarema also showed the tight network of metaphysics and especially the theory of knowledge of Immanuel Kant with psychological theory of the unconscious, which made the meaning of the unconscious unsuitable for science. Let us follow the course of the philosopher's reflection.

## Eduard von Hartmann. Philosophy of the unconscious

Eduard von Hartmann defined the basics of the unconscious, such as absolute-unconscious mental activity, physiological unconscious and relatively unconscious mental phenomena. The philosopher considered the conscious spiritual life to be the result of an active unconscious psyche, which in its essence is both an inseparable unconscious will and an unconscious idea. In his opinion, nothing mental corresponds to the physiological unconscious, because its carriers are only traces of dispositions in the grey matter of the brain. Relatively unconscious mental phenomena in relation to the total central consciousness are below the threshold of consciousness and therefore are unconscious for it, and in relation to the consciousness of the lower centres are above the threshold of consciousness and therefore are conscious for them.<sup>10</sup>

Yarema explained the hypothesis of the mental unconscious in Hartmann's philosophy:

- by the intention to protect the independence of mental conscious life from its materialization and mechanization;<sup>11</sup>
- by the erroneous belief in the inability of pure psychology of consciousness to understand and clarify the course of changes and phenomena of consciousness;<sup>12</sup>
- by the need to contrast naive realism with transcendental realism;<sup>13</sup>
- by the opposition to prevailing in Germany idealism.<sup>14</sup>

Yarema considered the opposition of the consciousness of matter and the recognition of its dependence on the psychic transcendent reality to be the Achilles heel of Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious. According to Yarema, it is impossible to deduce the intentional inner existence of the sub-

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<sup>10</sup> Eduard Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious. Speculative Results according to the Inductive Method of Physical Science*, vol. 1 (London: Trübner & Co., Ludgate Hill, 1884).

<sup>11</sup> Yakym Yarema, "The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)", in: *Archive of Yakym Yarema* (Kyiv: Scientific Archive of the Scientific Library at the National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", 1928), 15–16 [in Ukrainian].

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, 17–18.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, 18–19.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, 20.

ject from the unconscious mental activity, as it does not have this intentional existence.<sup>15</sup>

Yarema considered Hartmann's theory of the mental unconscious unacceptable from the scientific point of view. In his opinion, this theory brings neither something positive nor new to science. By allowing the activity of the mental unconscious, Hartmann did not make mental life clearer, since what he wanted to explain, he explained by the facts which also needed some explanation.<sup>16</sup> For these reasons, according to Yarema, psychology as a science must reject Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious soul and recognize only its right for the name of philosophy of the soul.

At the same time, Yarema acknowledged that Hartmann's theory had positive aspects because:

- the conscious mental cannot be elucidated from the previous mental, since the conscious mental life is not continuous, but only the activity of the brain is;
- it is not always possible to understand the motives of our conscious experiences on the basis of the other conscious experiences, as in the unity of processes everything cannot be realized at once;
- the processes of consciousness are not something separate for themselves, because they do not occur in isolation from the material basis, but only form with the brain processes that determine them something one in itself continuous.<sup>17</sup>

Although Yarema rejected Hartmann's hypothesis of the mental-absolute-unconscious as a means of scientific explanation of the consciousness processes, he agreed with him in his assumption about relatively unconscious mental phenomena. In his opinion, the physiological central process always has its mental equivalent, which is sometimes of a conscious nature (conscious) and once – unconscious, because otherwise the emergence of the conscious would be unprepared, unconditioned, [as] Kant's [thing in itself] – from nothing. On the other hand, we could not explain why the same physi-

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<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, 21.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, 26.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, 27–28.

ological process sometimes goes by a mental experience, and sometimes it is deprived of such an experience.<sup>18</sup>

### Harald Höffding. The conscious and the unconscious

Harald Höffding suggested that the unconscious is something that is only a little conscious, and therefore it is something that differs from the conscious only quantitatively, not qualitatively. Therefore, he believed that the unconsciousness is not an absence of the consciousness, but only its lower degree. This means that the unconscious and the conscious are different degrees of consciousness. According to Höffding, the mental unconscious helps to connect conscious processes into a single whole. He substantiated his assumption with the data of empirical experience, where the mutual influence between conscious and unconscious processes seemed to him an indisputable fact.<sup>19</sup>

In his manuscript, Yarema considered several facts, the explanation of which, according to Höffding, requires the assumption of mentally unconscious processes:

- recollection and preparation for a scientific problem solving is sometimes unconscious;
- reproduction is often unconscious;
- mental activity is mostly unconscious;
- conscious motives can turn into unconscious;
- the cause of the associative delay may be unconscious;
- conscious and unconscious activities have a different nature of the course;
- unconscious impressions cause unconscious feelings;
- the increase of feelings and the strength of impressions are realized only after they reach certain values;

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<sup>18</sup> Ibidem, 31.

<sup>19</sup> Harald Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology* (London–New York: Macmillan and Co., Limited, The Macmillan Company, 1904), 71–86, access 15.02.2022, <https://archive.org/details/outlinesofpsycho00hoffuoft/page/n5/mode/2up>.

- dreams are formed by unconscious impressions;
- artistic creativity is unconscious, and scientific creativity is conscious;
- there is usually only one thought in the centre of consciousness, the others are unconscious.<sup>20</sup>

### Kurt Joachim Grau. Consciousness, the unconscious and the subconscious

Kurt Grau denied the mental unconscious. After analyzing all the cases on which the hypothesis of the mental unconscious is based, the philosopher concluded that the unconscious is inherent in a lesser degree of consciousness – the subconscious, which is beyond attention, at the very edge of consciousness, where a person cannot notice anything, although the external stimuli actually affect her. In particular, he denied:

- unconscious recollection and unconscious preparation for a scientific problem solving;
- unconscious reproduction and unconscious creative imagination;
- unconscious mental activity;
- unconscious acts and unconscious functions.<sup>21</sup>

Yarema considered Grau's arguments regarding the denial of the mental unconscious to be weak. The reasons for this, in his opinion, were such as:

- neglect of the psychoanalysis results;
- confirmation of the unconscious by the introduction of the subconscious;
- reduction of the subconscious to the influence of "dark" emotions.<sup>22</sup>

According to Yarema, Grau's term "subconscious" means the mental unconscious, as by it he indicates something mental that intentionally does not contain any object.<sup>23</sup> Thus, Yarema concluded that Grau, seeking to eliminate from psychology the idea of the empirical unconscious, actually failed, and

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<sup>20</sup> Yarema, "The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)", 38–42.

<sup>21</sup> Kurt Grau, *Bewusstsein, Unbewusstes, Unterbewusstes* (Munich: Rösl, 1922).

<sup>22</sup> Yarema, "The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)", 49.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, 50.



had to recognize the power of the unconscious, which he called otherwise, but the essence has not changed.<sup>24</sup>

### Sigmund Freud. The unconscious

Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theory suggested the new method of treating psychoneurotic patients and proved based on empirical data the close dependence of the conscious "I" on unconscious, latent mental processes. Freud interpreted consciousness not as a sign of the mental, but as an act of observation of mental processes. Mental processes alone he regarded as unconscious and believed that they become conscious only when consciousness observes them. Like observations of the external world are not adequate to things and we should not identify them with the thing itself, according to Kant, as observations of consciousness, according to Freud, are not adequate and identical with those observed unconscious mental processes that are the object of our consciousness. This means that both the external physical and the internal mental are not exactly as they are observed. Moreover, consciousness does not observe everything mental, and, what it observes does not do exactly and not quite correctly. Defining all mental processes as unconscious, Freud was interested in which system they were – Ubw (unconscious), Vbw (preconscious) or Bw (unconscious). If they are in Ubw system, they can be observed, but if they are in Vbw (or Bw) systems – then they cannot.<sup>25</sup>

On the one hand, Yarema acknowledged, based on psychoanalysis, the great influence of the unconscious on the conscious spiritual life but, on the other hand, he could not agree with all its principles.

Firstly, Yarema believed that Freud's definition of all mental processes as unconscious and consciousness as an act of observation involved psychology into such difficulties that it would never be able to solve. The Ukrainian philosopher asked: "If all the mental is unconscious, and consciousness is only

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<sup>24</sup> Ibidem, 51.

<sup>25</sup> Sigmund Freud, "Unconscious", in: Sigmund Freud, *General Psychological Theory. Papers on Metapsychology* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1963), 116–150, access 15.02.2022, [https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Freud\\_Unconscious.pdf](https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Freud_Unconscious.pdf).

an act of observation, then what is observation? Some specific mental processes. If specific, then super psychic, and if not specific, then unconscious? Then where does consciousness come from?<sup>26</sup>

Secondly, Freud's three mental systems, Ubw, Vbw, and Bw, seemed to Yarema very similar to Hartmann's three groups of the unconscious: the absolutely unconscious mental activity, the physiological unconscious, and the relatively unconscious mental phenomena.<sup>27</sup>

It was more interesting for Yarema to know why Freud did not hesitate to consider the unconscious as something mental. The scholar explained this by Freud's reference to the following:

- facts of memory that psychology has to find out psychologically;
- cases of association based on middling unconscious members;
- posthypnotic suggestions as the facts of consciousness breakthrough, which can be connected only by assuming an unconscious act;

the facts of living contact that exist between unconscious and conscious acts, and the possibility of bringing unconscious acts to consciousness and describing them in the same categories as conscious.<sup>28</sup>

Abstracting from the ambiguities of psychoanalysis, Yarema characterized it as the first attempt to disclose the spiritual life in terms of the influence of the unconscious on conscious behavior. While psychology of that time was interested only in conscious cases and the subconscious were terra incognita for it – something unknown and unknowable, without influence and meaning, for psychoanalysis they were of paramount interest.<sup>29</sup>

### Vladimir Bekhterev. Objective psychology

Vladimir Bekhterev defined psychology as a science of mental life in general, and not only of its conscious manifestations. Thus, the purpose of psychology he associated with investigation of conscious and unconscious

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<sup>26</sup> Yarema, "The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)", 60.

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, 61.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, 62.

mental processes, external manifestations of mental activity and biological processes, which are closely related to mental ones.<sup>30</sup> Bekhterev agreed with Freud that conscious phenomena are distant results of the unconscious and that everything conscious passes the stage of the unconscious. Bekhterev considered the limitation of contemporary psychology only to the research of consciousness a big mistake, because, according to him, there are a lot more unconscious processes in the mental life than conscious ones. The scholar interpreted the unconscious as such a real mental, the inner nature of which we know very little. Bekhterev did not consider consciousness to be a necessary element in establishing appropriate relationships between man and the world. To his mind, such processes as, for example, logical thinking, intuitive cognition, artistic creativity can run without consciousness. Therefore, the opinion that we know the external world as much as it is in our consciousness, Bekhterev considered illusory.<sup>31</sup>

According to Yarema, Bekhterev did not speak clearly about the nature of unconscious processes, since for him unconscious mental processes were both brain processes and latent mental processes as something inseparable.<sup>32</sup>

### Yarema's conclusion

According to Yarema, psychology acknowledged its incompleteness in cognition of the inner mental world. The psychoanalysis, which emphasized the importance of the unconscious factor in mental life, also greatly supported it. The scholar believed that in the future there should no longer be such psychology that would not consider the unconscious.

Yarema was interested in the nature of unconscious processes: whether they are physiological or mental, and "if mental, then how their mentality should be understood when compared with the mental conscious?".<sup>33</sup> The re-

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<sup>30</sup> Vladimir Bekhterev, *Objective psychology* (Moscow: Nauka, 1991) [in Russian].

<sup>31</sup> Vladimir Bekhterev, *General Foundations of the Reflexology of Man. Handbook Toward the Objective Study of Personality* (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1928) [in Russian].

<sup>32</sup> Yarema, "The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)", 66.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, 67.

searcher substantiated the mentality of unconscious processes from a theoretical and practical-methodological point of view.

For theoretical reasons, Yarema explained the latent mental as a preliminary, preparatory phase for the phenomenal mental. The facts of recollection and perseveration prompted this assumption.

For practical and methodological reasons, Yarema considered incorrect to use the double terminology for denoting the same process, because if the conscious psychic is conditioned by something that is still mental, though unconscious, then it should be denoted only by psychological terms. After all, we must somehow call the unconscious, and a clear name can only be a psychological one.<sup>34</sup>

Name to Yarema, the “unconscious consciousness” is a statement and at the same time its negation. Because if, for example, a conscious representation contains a subject and an object, someone who imagines something, and something that someone imagines, then the unconscious representation is nobody’s representation and nothing’s representation, this is the representation “in which no one imagines anything”.<sup>35</sup>

To separate the conscious mental from the unconscious mental, Yarema suggested distinguishing these concepts terminologically and calling the latter not as the unconscious mental, but the unconsciousness. That is, such mental, in which there is no subjective and objective moment. The conscious mental, by analogy, he proposed to call the consciousness, that is, such mental, which already has both subjective and objective moment.<sup>36</sup> By this distinction, the philosopher emphasized the nature of the unconscious mental: “To determine that the mental is not given in my consciousness directly, is not observed, I will say that it is not conscious to me, and to define its essence, I will say that it is unconscious”.<sup>37</sup>

Considering the so-called unconscious processes as unconsciousness, deprived of the object and subject of consciousness, Yarema denied the possibility of unconscious thinking, creation or imagination. However, he empha-

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<sup>34</sup> Ibidem, 69.

<sup>35</sup> Ibidem, 70.

<sup>36</sup> Ibidem, 73.

<sup>37</sup> Ibidem, 74.

sized that the soul is not only a conscious "I", but that beyond it. Moreover, under it stretches a mass of mental actual and potential, in which there is neither "I" nor "not-I", but which is also connected with the activity and dispositions of the brain, with which it forms an inseparable and such a mysterious unity.<sup>38</sup>

Did Twardowski and Brentano influence Yarema's conclusions?

### Franz Brentano, Kazimierz Twardowski and Yakym Yarema

Twardowski studied at the University of Vienna under the sign of Brentano, who became for him an ideal of a philosopher-researcher who unwaveringly seeks the truth, and a teacher who, following the example of ancient philosophers, gathers students around him and treats them as his younger friends.<sup>39</sup> Twardowski shared Brentano's views on science-oriented philosophy, its method, style and issues. He not only borrowed the concept of his teacher's philosophy, but also significantly developed and modified it.

At the University of Lviv, Twardowski tried to deliver to his students the spirit and the method of Brentano's philosophy, as well as the special style of his philosophizing.<sup>40</sup> That was not a common doctrine or a similar view of the world that united the Lviv School, but only the method of philosophizing and the common scientific language did.<sup>41</sup> Subsequently, this became the characteristic feature of the entire LWS.<sup>42</sup> However, since Twardowski was very tolerant to the diversity of his students' scientific interests, Brentano's influence on their beliefs was unconditional only in terms of his metaphi-

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<sup>38</sup> Ibidem, 77.

<sup>39</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, "Autobiografia [5]", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Mysł, mowa i czyn*, cz. 2 (Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2014), 38.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem, 45.

<sup>41</sup> Izydora Dąmbska, "Czterdzieści lat filozofii we Lwowie 1898–1938", *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 44 (1948): 14.

<sup>42</sup> Jan Woleński, "Tadeusz Kotarbiński i szkoła lwowsko-warszawska", *Ruch Filozoficzny* 43 (1986): 243.

losophy.<sup>43</sup> Twardowski's students could both develop and criticize Brentano's specific ideas.<sup>44</sup>

To prove Twardowski's direct influence and Brentano's indirect influence on Yarema in solving the problem of unconscious mental phenomena, let us try to separate Brentano's ideas, which he perceived directly from Twardowski, from those of his ideas, which he tried to develop in some way. At the same time, we will focus on Brentano's early psychologically oriented ideas, as it was these ideas that Twardowski adopted in Vienna and spread in Lviv.

### Philosophy as an exact science and the development of scientific psychology

The ideal of Brentano's philosophy was an exact science. Therefore, he did not consider favorable to philosophy the division of science into speculative and exact.<sup>45</sup> Achieving his ideal of philosophy Brentano associated with exact natural science. He considered the method of natural sciences to be a model for philosophy, but a model in general and only as a basis. In his opinion, philosophy, like the natural sciences, should draw its knowledge from experience. Brentano's views on philosophy as an exact science influenced his understanding of psychology.

His standpoint in psychology was empirical. He believed that experience alone was significant in psychological research.<sup>46</sup> Only experience can guarantee to psychology the scientific nature. Brentano defined psychology as science of mental phenomena.<sup>47</sup> By this definition, Brentano, in contrast to the

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<sup>43</sup> Arianna Betti, "Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School", in: *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, ed. Uriah Kriege (New York: Routledge, 2017), 1334–340, access 30.11.2020, <https://hdl.handle.net/11245.1/40898c34-6357-4d3a-af7c-ed9eb3c6aedc>.

<sup>44</sup> Brożek, "Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School".

<sup>45</sup> Franz Brentano, "Habilitation theses", in: Franz Brentano, *About the future of philosophy. Selected works*, ed. Viktor Molchanov (Moscow: "Akademicheskij proekt", 2018), 19 [in Russian].

<sup>46</sup> Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (London–New York: Routledge, 2009), xxv.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibidem*, 14.

definition of psychology as a science of the soul, deprived it of any metaphysical preconditions, including Kant's transcendentalism, as well as irrational doctrines about the unconscious.

Twardowski opposed the a priori understanding of philosophy. He shared Brentano's belief in philosophy as a science. In his opinion, there is no difference between the subjects of research in the natural and philosophical sciences: the natural sciences study physical phenomena, and the philosophical sciences – mental ones. This clearly solved the problem of method in philosophical sciences: they can lose a priori only if they use a method similar to the method of natural sciences. Therefore, Twardowski denied the idea that in philosophy the general cannot be cognized based on experience.<sup>48</sup>

Twardowski, like Brentano, defined psychology as an empirical science. He believed that psychology should formulate and substantiate its affirmations about mental life only based on experience.<sup>49</sup> Although the philosopher knew enough examples from the history of science when metaphysical views of the world preceded their scientific justification. In particular, thanks to psychology, the metaphysical concept of unconscious mental facts by Gottfried Leibniz entered scientific usage.<sup>50</sup>

It is noticeable that Yarema's manuscript contains the scientific analysis of the unconscious mental processes. The philosopher was interested in the transition of the unconscious from metaphysics to philosophy as a science. He chose to show how metaphysics, and especially Kant's theory of cognition in unity with the psychological theory of the unconscious, sometimes makes it impossible to use the concept of the unconscious in scientific philosophy. Thus, in Yarema's opinion, philosophy of the unconscious by Hartmann deliberately neglected the basic principle of science: not to explain anything with

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<sup>48</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, "Opening Lecture at the Lvov University", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Mysł, mowa i czyn. On Prejudices, Judgments, and other Topics in Philosophy* (Amsterdam–New York: Rodopi, 2014), 39.

<sup>49</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, "On the Method of Psychology. An Introduction to the Comparative Methodology of Scientific Research", in: Twardowski, *Mysł, mowa i czyn. On Prejudices*, 62.

<sup>50</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, *Przemówienie, wygłoszone na obchodzie dwudziestopięciolecia Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie dnia 12 lutego 1929* (Lwów: Nakładem "Słowa Polskiego", 1929), 28.

anything that needs explanation, but to give an explanation now when science manages to introduce something unfamiliar into the familiar chain of general natural causality. Because Hartmann derived the concept of the unconscious from the unconscious mental activity, it did not make mental life more understandable, but on the contrary, turned consciousness into Kant's thing in itself, not conditioned and prepared.<sup>51</sup> Since Freud, similarly to Hartmann, continued to consider in science mental conscious processes as peculiar phenomena of transcendent real processes, Yarema saw certain similarities in Freud's psychoanalysis and Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious.<sup>52</sup>

Yarema tried to solve the problem of unconscious mental processes in a way independent of metaphysical principles, so he avoided metaphysical definitions of the unconscious. In his opinion, psychology as a science should explain psychic reality only based on that material reality which makes it, since human can research and cognize only this inner material side of life. To the extent where it is still unknown, man has the right and must put forward physiological hypotheses for the purpose of scientific elucidation. The scholar saw no other way for psychology as a science. He did not consider any other way scientific in the exact sense of this word to psychology.<sup>53</sup>

### Requirement of clarity and unambiguity

Brentano believed that words are sometimes worth arguing about, especially if it is a dispute about what concept is behind a word. To avoid misunderstandings in philosophy, he tried to use words unambiguously.<sup>54</sup> To do this, he applied the analysis of concepts.

Twardowski transformed Brentano's analysis of concepts into a requirement of the clear philosophical style. He believed that philosopher's clear style is the key to clarity of his thoughts. If a philosopher cannot express his

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<sup>51</sup> Yarema, "The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)", 26.

<sup>52</sup> Ibidem, 61.

<sup>53</sup> Ibidem, 27.

<sup>54</sup> Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 78.



thoughts clearly, then he also cannot think clearly, therefore, his thoughts are not worth studying.<sup>55</sup>

The analysis of the unconscious in Yarema's manuscript is clear and unambiguous. The philosopher sought to find unclear statements about the nature of the unconscious in philosophy. He believed that Graub denoted the mental unconscious by the term "subconscious", while Bekhterev confused its physiological interpretation with psychological one: "In his terminology, mental are brain processes, which he considers a manifestation of a continuous flow of psychonervous energy, in which subjective consciousness is potentially hidden".<sup>56</sup> Yarema also believed that psychology could not use double terminology. For example, it cannot use psychological terms to denote the process when it is referred to as conscious, and physiological or mechanical ones – when it is referred to as unconscious: "If we move in such cases to physiological terminology, then we would have to say that such a chemical process under certain conditions turns into such an idea. And that would be obvious nonsense".<sup>57</sup>

### Introspectionism

Brentano argued that we perceive mental phenomena only in the inner consciousness (introspection) and their perception is directly obvious. Physical phenomena are only available to external perception.<sup>58</sup>

Twardowski, following his teacher, also believed that the source of direct knowledge of mental phenomena was only internal (introspective) experience. Physical phenomena are available for cognition in external (sensory) experience.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, "On a clear and unclear philosophical style", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and other Topics in Philosophy* (Amsterdam–Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1999), 258.

<sup>56</sup> Yarema, "The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)", 65.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*, 69.

<sup>58</sup> Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 70.

<sup>59</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, "On the Method of Psychology. An Introduction to the Comparative Methodology of Scientific Research", in: Twardowski, *Mysł, mowa i czyn. On Prejudices*, 64.

Following Brentano and Twardowski, Yarema argued that we could obtain direct knowledge of mental phenomena only through introspection. In cases where psychology cannot do so, it must say: “there is no explanation for this fact yet, the corresponding function of the nerve centres is not yet known; or: here we stand on the border of scientific knowledge, here we can present only the data of those facts that are observed introspectively in our own consciousness”.<sup>60</sup>

### Intentionalism

According to Brentano, the main feature of mental phenomena was intentional inner existence, i.e. focus on the object or immanent objectivity: “In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on”.<sup>61</sup> Twardowski, like Brentano, used to define focus on some immanent object as a specific feature of mental phenomena.<sup>62</sup>

Yarema also defined intentionality as an essential feature of mental phenomena. To unconscious mental phenomena, this characteristic is not typical, since they do not contain any knowledge about something. He believed that it was difficult to find out, for example, from Hartmann’s philosophy how in the laboratory of unconscious such mental activities as impressions, feelings, representations, thoughts, consciousness of something are finally formed, since unconscious mental activity contained no consciousness of something.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, according to Yarema, Grau identified the term “subconscious” with the mental unconscious, because it was something mental, which already meant the absence of any impression, representation or feeling.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Yarema, “The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)”, 27.

<sup>61</sup> Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 68.

<sup>62</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, “O treści i przedmiocie przedstawień”, in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne* (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), 3.

<sup>63</sup> Yarema, “The problems of unconscious mental processes (manuscript)”, 21.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*, 50.

## Inner consciousness

Brentano believed that no mental phenomenon was consciousness of the object. In this regard, he raised the question of the existence of such mental phenomena that would not be the objects of consciousness: "all mental phenomena are states of consciousness, but are all mental phenomena conscious, or might there also be unconscious mental acts?"<sup>65</sup> Although philosophers at the time had already assumed the existence of unconscious mental phenomena, Brentano strongly denied their hypotheses. In his opinion, there was no mental phenomenon without our representation of them. That is, there was no unconscious consciousness.<sup>66</sup>

Twardowski linked the question of whether man obtains all mental phenomena directly only in introspection or consciousness with the question of whether there are so-called unconscious mental phenomena.<sup>67</sup> The philosopher doubted the existence of unconscious mental phenomena, however, he did not reject the hypothesis of their existence as he believed that "in psychology one can try to go this way, if someone has the strength to do so".<sup>68</sup>

Yarema seemed to be one of those Ukrainian students of Twardowski who tried to do that. He considered a number of facts of conscious mental life, the explanation of which required philosophers to assume their unconscious basis. This led him to accept the thesis that the unconscious is important for conscious mental life. Since this is so, psychology as a science cannot abandon the unconscious. Without the unconscious, psychology reduces itself only to the description and observation of the facts of mental life.

Yarema treated the unconscious as the mental. He considered unconscious mental processes as the basis of conscious mental processes. By accepting the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes, Yarema raised the question of the importance of filling the gap in the description of conscious

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<sup>65</sup> Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 79.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibidem*, 106.

<sup>67</sup> Kazimierz Twardowski, "O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju", in: Twardowski, *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne*, 257.

<sup>68</sup> Stefan Baley, "Kazimierz Twardowski a kierunki psychologii współczesnej", *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 41 (1938): 344.

mental processes, not given in the mind directly, and the need for a psychological explanation of the cause of their appearance and course.

According to Yarema, if the conscious mental life determines, prepares the unconscious, the definition of their names should be psychological, because only psychological names are clear to us.

The philosopher believed that the term “mental unconscious” confuses its understanding, since consciousness can have different meanings, depending on whether we come from an objective or subjective moment of consciousness. The unconscious mental may mean that (i) it is not the object of observation, (ii) or that it contains no meaning, no knowledge of something, no feeling of something, (iii) or that it does not contain “I”, a subject who knows something. To separate the first meaning from the second and third, Yarema introduced the term “unconscious psychic” for the second and third meanings, that is, something that is neither someone’s knowledge nor any knowledge of something, that is, deprived of the constitutive elements of consciousness. Through the introduction to psychology of the concept of the unconscious, Yarema significantly expanded representation of our “I” foundations. These foundations are not cognizable, we can only think of them metaphysically, but they are what create our real “I”.

In psychology, such representative of Franz Brentano philosophical school as Theodor Lipps outlined the most precise meaning of the concept of the unconscious for understanding and explaining the conscious mental life.

Lipps raised the question of the unconscious not as from a psychological angle, but as from the angle of its essence and purpose. He believed that in mental life unconscious processes are of the same nature as conscious ones, so the very concept of the unconscious is necessary to restore the causal gaps between mental processes.

Lipps defined the unconscious as the mental. In this way, he sought to relate the unconscious to the mental connection. Although the philosopher excluded a physiological explanation of the unconscious, he did not consider it reliable.

According to Lipps, psychology that is only aiming at a description of the experiences of consciousness is a story or report on the processes of one’s own individual consciousness. Science cannot obtain a ready-made re-

relationship from direct experience, but can only create it, mentally construct it from something that is real or considered real, and from the data of direct experience.<sup>69</sup>

Thus, Lipps did not consider the subject or "I" as only a relationship of representation or mental facts.<sup>70</sup> He defined directly experienced desire as the axis of "I" consciousness. All other objects of consciousness are doubly connected with this feeling. Once "I" experiences that its desire is directly satisfied in the being, appearance, flow, stay, change of objects, therefore, in relation to objects "I" has a feeling of free activity. Sometimes "I" experiences that the objects of its consciousness are what they are, and "I" does not matter how it behaves towards them by its will, therefore, in relation to objects "I" has a sense of passivity. The feeling of free activity is directly accessible to experience or purely empirical consciousness of subjectivity and the feeling of passivity is initial or elementary consciousness of objectivity.<sup>71</sup> Lipps did not stop at the immediate consciousness of subjectivity. The judgments about external processes experienced in dreams convinced him of this. Here "I" or the subject philosopher considered not as directly experienced, but something which is beyond it, "transcendent", not as given only in direct experience, but existing independently of it, the objectively real "I" or subject.<sup>72</sup> This real "I" Lipps considered something unknown, which we must only mentally lay in the basis of the directly experienced "I" and all those objects of consciousness that are objects of either a sense of free activity or a sense of passivity.<sup>73</sup>

Yarema's manuscript contains a similar approach which can solve the problem of unconscious mental processes. The Ukrainian philosopher supported Lipps's thesis that psychology as an empirical science is impossible without the concept of the unconscious. Through the concept of the unconscious psychology can explore the patterns and relationships of mental life. Herewith, the unconscious is as mental as the conscious one. The un-

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<sup>69</sup> Theodor Lipps, *Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der Psychologie* (München: Verlag von J. F. Lehmann, 1896), 3.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*, 5.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*, 7.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*, 8.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibidem*.

conscious mental is a prerequisite for conscious mental life. The only thing that distinguishes Yarema's approach in solving the problem of unconscious mental processes is his desire to make a terminological distinction between the conscious mental and the unconscious mental. According to him, the mental is of a conscious nature in case it contains the consciousness of something and when the subject knows it, and it is of the unconscious nature if it does not contain the consciousness of something and when it is unknown to the subject.

## Conclusion

The review of Yarema's manuscript "The problem of unconscious mental processes" allows us to put forward the inference that Brentano's philosophy indirectly influenced his views on the problem of the unconscious. Twardowski directly contributed to this. Yarema shared Brentano's and Twardowski's views on philosophy as an exact science and psychology as an empirical science. In his analysis of the concept of the unconscious, Yarema complied with the requirements of clarity and unambiguity in philosophizing, introduced by Brentano and Twardowski. The introspectionism and intentionalism of Brentano and Twardowski determined Yarema's views on the problem of unconscious mental processes. Yarema tried in an original way to agree the generally accepted Brentano concept of psyche and intentionalism and introspectionism with the statement about the existence of unconscious mental processes. He did this through distinguishing the mental unconscious and the mental conscious based on Lipps's approach. The development of psychology as an independent science, which led to considering the concept of the unconscious in mental life not only acceptable but also necessary for understanding and explaining conscious mental life, forced Yarema to do this. At that time, psychology could no longer understand consciousness without its basis – the unconscious, and it could not cover the unconscious other than through consciousness and its manifestations in the area of consciousness and in relation to it. Thus, Yarema's "psychoanalyticism" does not reveal his remoteness from the philosophical tradition of Brentano-Twardowski, but

only manifest his loyalty to the principle of diligence in science. This principle, which concerns not only methodology but also scientific ethics, Yarema inherited from Twardowski, who taught his students not a certain system of philosophical knowledge, but the method of philosophy and respect for philosophy as a pure science.

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