INFERIORITY AND VIOLENCE
ISLAMIC TERRORISM SEEN AGAINST
THE RESSENTIMENT THEORY

ABSTRACT

The paper addresses the problem of the relation between ressentiment and Islamic terrorism. The analyses of that correspondence are carried out on the basis of reflections Friedrich Nietzsche’s, the renowned German scholar and creator of the first theory of ressentiment, and two American researchers – Lauren Langman and Douglas Morris. In the author’s view, the transition from ressentiment to terrorism essentially stems from the mechanism of the revaluation of values and the reaction to its final product, namely compensatory values, which manifests itself in the form of fundamentalism and fanatism.

Keywords: ressentiment, terrorism

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of ressentiment is used extremely rarely to explain the contemporary social phenomena. This is presumably due to the fact that the concept refers to the phenomenon which is elusive and imponderable by nature, which in turn makes the very concept ambiguous. Generally speaking, ressentiment can be described as a permanent mental attitude, arising from the experience of one’s humiliation (shaped by intense feelings of envy, jealousy, urge to retaliate, Schadenfreude). Consequently, the values which had previously been perceived as highly desirable, become distorted. The distortion itself consists in the depreciation of the desired yet unachievable values by an individual and in the glorification of those values which he is the part of and feels committed to.

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The analyses of ressentiment are mainly based on Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept, thoroughly discussed in his famous work entitled *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Nietzsche is known to have believed in will power as the driving force of historical processes and individual aspirations. Will power is a desire to overcome resistance and to dominate others. When for a variety of reasons, this does not prove feasible (due to limited possibilities: material, spiritual or physical), there appears a feeling of inferiority and ressentiment, developing at its foundations.

Thus, at the heart of ressentiment there is an overwhelming sense of unfulfilled desire for power (powerlessness), which emerges when individuals are unable to achieve values that are essential to them. Such a feeling does not involve all persons but only those who, due to various mental or physical defects, are forced to bear depreciation or an inability of self-creation and confirmation of one’s own value; those have limited possibilities to confront the challenges of the reality – “tailored” to people free from these defects and powerlessness. Therefore, people who are weak and incapable are bound to suffer, and the suffering is extremely painful as it relies on one’s own negative image (Nietzsche, 1995: 27). The suffering is always accompanied by intense hatred, both in relation to the world that is ruled by values inaccessible to them and towards those who represent these values.

Hatred in a natural way gives rise to a desire for revenge that cannot be executed directly. Certainly, there are numerous sources of such a lack of contentment. Usually, the fear may arise from an inability to admit one’s inferiority or a failure when confronted with the better one who lives in undeserved glory, as is usually claimed by the “worse” one, disadvantaged by fate. Fear has got another crucial feature (especially when long-term); namely, it severely undermines one’s self-esteem. Moreover, it poisons, raises doubts, inflicts pain. Therefore, an individual who is experiencing pain must act – they must create (on an unconscious level) strategies that will enable them to rebuild the lost sense of their own dignity. An example of such a strategy is suppressing hatred, anger, jealousy or a desire to retaliate. Owing to such an “operation on emotions”, it is possible to forget their source, their direct painful cause (a specific situation or a perpetrator of the suffering). Obviously, suppression does not eliminate jealousy, anger or a desire to retaliate. The emotions continue to stay on, yet they are less “palpable”, less “tangible”. Therefore, it is easier to separate them from a real ressentiment cause. Besides, they are easier to interpret, which enables us to set a new direction. Suppression is not a solution to all issues. Muffled emotions continue to affect one’s psyche. They do not cease to hurt, tease, invoke bitterness or cause misery. Ultimately, the individual who is torn by these emotions generates a new, enhanced strategy, relying on the depreciation of the desired yet unattainable values and on the glorification of those values which he feels doomed to (Nietzsche, 1997: dissertation 1, paragraph 14). This strategy clearly runs counter to real desires and aspirations. However, due to such an approach, the man of ressentiment ceases to feel jealousy and anger because of the absence of specific values – the value of these values is depreciated. At the same time, those who are holders of these values cease (at least on the conscious level) to experience anger, the willingness to retaliate, becoming mere objects of mercy. From now on, the only and indisputable objects of pride will be those values that are represented by them. Moreover, they form the foundation of his new psychic and axiological “backbone”.

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1 In Nietzsche, the role of will power has two aspects. On the one hand, the will power has no direction. It does not aim to achieve any ideal. On the other hand, it entails a specific evaluation, which in practice means that it must be geared towards specific objectives and objects, without which it may not exist (Nietzsche, 1988: 563).
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The complex phenomena known as resentment have been of interest to relatively few researchers. The first person to deal with this phenomenon was Frederick Nietzsche. He discussed the issue mainly in his work *On the Genealogy of Morality* (Nietzsche, 1997). In Nietzsche, it is possible to find two levels of analysis of resentment: psychological and historical-philosophical-cultural contexts. At the first level, Nietzsche deals with personality causes of the formation of resentment. At the second level, Nietzsche is interested in the manner in which resentment revaluation affects the shape of European culture and how it annihilates the culture.

Another distinguished German thinker, Max Scheler, combined two perspectives: a philosophical and sociological one, in his resentment analyses. In the framework of the first perspective, the author of *Resentment and Morality* (Scheler, 1978) clarified and elaborated upon many of Nietzsche’s claims and analyses. In the sociological perspective, Scheler strongly exceeded Nietzsche’s claims; he stated that apart from psychological factors, a very important role in the formation and development of resentment is played by different aspects of the social structure, such as age structure, sex structure, structure of social roles and structure of social positions.

Max Weber’s work *Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft* presents merely a sociological approach towards the phenomenon of resentment (Weber, 2008). Contrary to Scheler, who distinguished many social forms of resentment, Weber linked it with the axiological activity of the members of the lowest layers of society, who believed that the cause of the inequalities of “mundane destiny” is sin and injustice of privileged groups. Ressentiment, according to Weber, includes its manifestations of the glorification of suffering and a promise of the abolition of the loathed social order.

The issue of resentment has never become a subject of systematic studies or analyses in social sciences. The last thirty years, however, brought several studies (e.g. By Carl Nordstrom, Edgar Friedenberg, Hilary Gold *Society’s Children: A Study of Ressentiment in the Secondary School* (Nordstrom, Friedenberg, Gold, 1967), David Williams “Ressentiment and Schooling” (Williams, 1976), John Thomas English “Nietzsche’s Concept of Ressentiment: an Application to Higher Education”, Leon Wurmser *Die zerbrochene Wirklichkeit. Psychoanalyse als das Studium von Konflikt und Komplementaritaet* (Wurmser, 2001), *Die Maske der Scham. Die Psychoanalyse von Schamaffekten und Schamkonflikten* (Wurmser, 1988), *Flucht vor dem Gewissen*, Ramon Leon, Cecilia Romero, Joaquin Novara i Enrique Quesada “Una escala para medir el resentimiento” (Leon, Romero, Novara, Quesada, 1990), which used the category of resentment in pedagogy, sociology and psychology. However, the works were mainly empirical in their character, and they additionally employed a much broader concept of resentment.

Nowadays, this phenomenon plays a more and more significant role in analyses in the field of political sciences as it is closely connected with widely discussed problems of fundamentalism, fanaticism, extremism and terrorism, as in Lauren Langman i Douglas Morris “Islamic Terrorism: From Retrenchment to Ressentiment and Beyond” (Langman, Morris, 2002) or Ronald Pies “A Simple Way to End Terrorism” (Pies, 2001), Chip Berlet „Taking Tea Parties Seriously: Corporate Globalization, Populism, and Resentment” (Berlet, 2011), Henry Munson “Islam, Nationalism and Resentment of Foreign Domination” (Munson, 2003), Manfred Frings “Max Scheler and the Psychopathology of the Terrorist” (Frings,
or finally: Thomas Auchter “Das Selbst und das Fremde: Zur Psychoanalyse von Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Fundamentalismus” (Auchter, 2016). It must be highlighted that in the areas of political sciences and sciences of security, dealing with the considerations on the phenomena of ressentiment consequences, the research into the phenomenon which is most interesting to the author (also the related phenomena of fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism) will play the most crucial role.

3. METHODOLOGY

Ressentiment is an extremely complex phenomenon. This is why, in the opinion of the author, the research perspectives cannot be of a homogeneous character but they must complement and illuminate one another. Therefore, my research related to ressentiment (and broader islamic terrorism), although clearly concentrated on the problems of security, has also an interdisciplinary dimension. It was carried out both in the domain of security studies and in the domain of philosophy, political sciences, sociology and history. I believe that such a contravention of the “purity” of disciplines does not have to condemn the researcher to a superficial and flattened grasp of the topic. Quite the contrary, many significant theories and conceptualizations occur at the intersection of various disciplines. Hence, limiting oneself in the research process to only one discipline and its proper research methods is necessarily connected with narrowing the cognitive fields, and therefore with a simplified grasp of the scrutinized phenomenon. I intend to avoid it.

In spite the fact that the goal of my research was reaching objective truth, in the process I have tried not to impose on myself in advance any universal methodological standards, which would later force me to formulate certain theoretical judgments, regarding, for example, the choice and number of the methods used as well as the accepted theoretical conceptualizations. In the research practice it means adopting an attitude close to theoretical pluralism, but without the voluntarist anarchism, which is so representative of the former. Such an attitude is defined, above all, by the openness to the multitude of alternative grasps of the research problems, which serve as both external standards of criticism and imagination extending “orientation points”. It is also defined by the fact that it allows the possibility to change the methodology, even while conducting the research procedures. A philosophical basis of this approach is the Feyerabendian view that bias is uncovered not by analysis but by contrast (Feyerabend, 2001: 30). This is why the multiplicity of various methodological or theoretical approaches, even if they are adopted only for a while, will neither impoverish, nor darken the final picture; on the contrary, they will enrich and clarify it by bringing in a particular epistemological perspective that allows to grasp the reality in the multifaceted light of truth. The consequences of adopting such a cognitive attitude in my research were twofold. Firstly, I decided to go beyond a simple monistic perspective that inclines the researcher to depict the phenomenon from the point of view of only one discipline. Secondly, it was my intention to come up with a non-one-dimensional depiction that would be created through many dimensions and many domains, especially philosophy, political science, and sociology.
4. PROBLEM WITH SUPERIORITY

Is it possible to apply Nietzsche’s concept of resentment to explain the behaviour of Islamic extremists? In the opinion of such scholars as Lauren Langman and Douglas Morris, the authors of the article entitled “Islamic Terrorism: From Retrenchment to Ressentiment and Beyond”, the answer is ‘yes’. According to them, utter commitment to exterminate the unfaithful, an ostentatious contempt for the western lifestyle and a strong emphasis on the value of tradition derive from deprivation, which has befallen Islamic communities and which leads to resentment. As commonly known, the history of mutual relationships between the West and the world of Islam has not always been based on depreciation and resentment of the latter. From 7th until the end of the 15th century, it is possible to speak with all certainty about the triumph of the Islamic culture and its military power. The first wave of Muslim expansion, which took place from 7th to mid-8th century, ended in its dominance over North Africa, having established their sway over the Iberian Peninsula, Persia, North India and the Middle East. Although towards the end of 11th century, Christians invaded the western part of the Mediterranean, also conquered Sicily and Toledo, yet they failed to enter the Holy Land. In 1291 they had to surrender their last stronghold Akka to Muslims. Approximately at that time also the Ottomans began their own conquests. Initially, they threatened and considerably weakened Byzantium. Later, they conquered a part of the Balkans and North Africa. In the end, in 1453, they conquered Constantinople and in 1529, for the first time, besieged Vienna. However, the triumph of the Muslim military slowly began to decline. In the 15th century Christians slowly began to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula, with the most important event being annexation of Granada in 1492. In this period, western inventions in the fields of navigation allowed surrounding Muslim territories and reaching India, which very quickly translated into the development of trade and the growth of prosperity in Western countries. The power of the Ottoman Empire was gradually getting diminished. The defeat of Ottoman Turks in the battle of Vienna in 1683 became a symbolic end point. The fight of the Balkan nations for the liberation from the Turkish occupation and the expansion of the Habsburg Monarchy completed their downfall. After World War I, France, Italy and the United Kingdom established their reign on lands belonging to the Ottoman Empire (except for the Republic of Turkey). In the 1920s, only four Muslim countries, i.e. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan remained free from political influences of the West. This state of affairs was a source of deep humiliation for the Muslim world. Launched in the 1920s and 1930s, the decay of the era of colonialism did not change much in this respect. Even though colonialism fell, the structure of dominance remained. Moreover, it began to affect not only the economic or military sphere, but also that which constitutes the identity of every human community, namely culture. Following Langman and Morris, Muslims today are humiliated and insulted; with their own culture, tradition and religion being pushed aside by the more “attractive”, hedonistically-oriented culture of the West. The development of satellite television and the Internet has made them aware that they are perceived as lazy, dirty, treacherous, prone to violence barbarians. In other words, they are worse: “The conditions of modernity have fostered greater and greater resentment. One of the consequences of globalization has been the annihilation of time and space. Islamic cultures have been increasing exposed to the secular values of the West, especially its shallow materialism, individualism and instrumental rationality that have challenged many traditional beliefs of orthodox Islam. The diffusion (and appeal) of the popular culture of the West, with its narcissistic hedonism and sexual freedom,
among the educated classes, especially youth, has been an affront to the culturally dominant conservative traditions of Islam. Further, the growth of satellite television and/or VCRs and media representations of the West have highlighted the value differences between Islam and the West. Large numbers of Muslims, have access to mass media (many have access to the internet). Many Muslims receive reports from family members that are part of the migrations and student sojourns to Europe and the US. Muslims witness how they are represented as subalterns in the West. ‘Orientalism’ constructs the Muslim (and Islamic culture) as denigrated Other. She is seen as lazy, dirty (despite Islam’s almost fanatical concerns with cleanliness), ignorant, treacherous, duplicitous, corrupt, violent and/or barbaric. Muslims everywhere see how blatantly their societies are materially poor compared to the West. They are well aware of the power of the US and the many injustices it fosters. They find that their religious values are challenged and in response, they are more likely to defend their values, even as they often know it is hard to defend certain laws and practices, e.g., slavery, the treatment of women and autocracy. This disposes the embrace of fundamentalism that valorises and sacralises their culture that is denigrated by others. Nevertheless, fundamentalism, while rarely violent, may become used as its justification” (Langman, Morris, 2002: 153–154).

5. PROBLEM WITH INFERIORITY

A long-lasting sense of defeat, experiencing a loss of dignity and recognition, and ultimately powerlessness in confrontation with the Other power, according to Langman and Morris, inevitably had to yield ressentiment which is full of hatred (Langman, Morris, 2002: 156–157). The ressentiment as a “suppressed form of hatred against the Other, turns towards the Self as a disease, as devouring self-hatred”. (Langman, Morris, 2002: 151), prompting the Self to self-destructive actions, such as alcoholism, drug abuse and various forms of violence². Naturally, the internalised ressentiment is extremely dangerous for the subject. In accordance with theory of ressentiment, in such a case it is necessary to develop a strategy to cope with it – to discharge it on the outside without the risk of a direct confrontation with the stronger and dominant Other. As argued by Langman and Morris, the Islamic culture is struggling to cope with ressentiment by using exaggerated values, which consist in removing the values and the things which are the veiled objects of desires, and a the same time, a tool of dominance of a foreign culture – wealth, mundane power, individual freedom, hedonistic happiness, and also strengthening those who in some way oppose them – asceticism, afterlife, community hierarchy, tradition and virtues. Revaluation makes it possible to come to terms with a lack of specific values. It also enables a perception of values and the built-in power of the Other, as essentially evil, as something that deserves contempt and condemnation.

Another manner of coping with ressentiment is terrorism. Following Langman and Morris, terrorism allows at least a partial redirection of ressentiment hatred and its turning now outside, towards those who have become the subject of contempt and condemnation, thanks

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² This phenomenon has been repeatedly described by psychologists, investigating various personality defence mechanisms. For example, Howard B. Kaplan devoted his work entitled *Deviant Behavior in Defense of Self to Analyse this Issue*, in which he presents and supports by an empirical material, the theory that binds the phenomenon of negative self-assessment with the phenomenon of a defensive rejection of the norms, binding in the groups, in which the standards could not be met. (Kaplan, 1980: 215).
to revaluation. So far, the power of terrorist actions is quite limited. But that is not the point here. Terrorism is not only a means of overcoming political, economic and cultural powerlessness. It is also cathartic, which strengthens the community identity, allowing a restitution of the sense of power and dignity. These are not the only advantages of terrorism. According to Langman and Morris: “Membership in a terrorist organization, from the time of schooling and/or recruitment, to training camps to the planning/execution of missions, places one in a highly valued publicly esteemed, cohesive community. 2) Resting upon the legacy of the esteemed warrior, the terrorist finds recognition and dignity in his acts (on some occasions her acts). Some gain pride in this life (seculars), those who go on to the next (holy warriors), are remembered and esteemed by friends and family. 3) Powerlessness, lacking agency to shape one’s own destiny, leads to intense anger and hatred that is turned upon the self. But as a terrorist, by turning passivity into activity, empowerment and agency are realized, however destructive and inhumane may be the consequences. 4) Finally, given the historical legacies/current realities that engendered ressentiment, in face of the rapid social changes of the modern world and attendant anomie, exposed to the empty materialism of the West with its “disenchantment of the world”, terrorism, sacred or secular, provides a framework of values and meaning that saves one from insignificance, finitude and even the fear of death” (Langman, Morris, 2002: 169).

6. PROBLEM WITH REVALUATION

How can ressentiment with its inherent attribute of the revaluation of values be used to explain the phenomenon of Muslim violence? Without doubt it is not difficult to find values which are part of the re-assessment scheme? Let us start with the supreme value, that is the value which is the starting point for all ressentiment feelings and emotions. This value is obviously might. Might equals success, usually translating into an access to certain material assets, respect of the environment, a sense of agency or of making a difference to the world. In modern times, this success does not coincide with the possession of specific values that are referred to as fundamental or primary. They include individualism, hedonism, secularity, democracy, freedom to self-determination, materialism. When the power becomes unattainable, for a variety of reasons, (e.g. it is obstructed by a lack of education, money or cultural competences), the values with which it was combined (primary values), must be depreciated and rejected. They are replaced by secondary values – artificially produced, which are not a primary object of desires – asceticism, community hierarchy, tradition, decency, orientation on afterlife. The secondary values are a product of pure compensation. They are characterised by an opposition to primary values (in some way, they are their contradiction). For the ressentiment subject, it is important for the values to be easily achievable. They must not become a subject of disappointment or frustration. Therefore, they are usually a part of tradition, “cultural kit” of a given group or a community, a ressentiment safety belt awaiting a revival.

Is it possible to create secondary values with impunity? Is it feasible (without incurring psychological consequences) to move from original values (which were the subject of desires and a guarantee of might) to secondary values (created artificially, as a result of compensation)? It does not seem to be psychologically possible. It must be borne in mind that the essence of revaluation is forging dreams. The man of ressentiment must convince himself that his former desires, directed towards unattainable values, were erroneous, whereas the
new ones were properly addressed, legitimate, and truly authentic. If he was able to effectively make operations on wishes, i.e. if he managed to erase from his awareness primary desires and replace them with the fake secondary ones (artificially constructed), undoubtedly, he would be successful. However, the problem is that these initial desires embody what he really wishes, whereas the secondary desires are an imaginary creation (born in the struggle to maintain self-assessment, and thus non-authentic, shaky and weak. Therefore, the revaluation of values can never be fully effective. Always the “true” values (i.e. those which the man of resentment turns to in its original desires) will, as Scheler used to say, “shine through” (German “transparent hindurchscheinen”) underneath the illusive rights which they cover (Scheler, 1978: 17–18). In this manner, inside the resentment individual, there arises an emotional discord and double axiological awareness built upon it.

Without doubt, the instability of secondary axiological preferences and an emotional dissonance must give rise to doubts in the resentment individual, in relation to the sincerity of the created system of values. Thus, it can be expected that the next element of the strategy is the need to legitimize – to gain confidence by creating metaphysical references to the Absolute that the system of resentment-shaped values is one and only. As observed by Richard Smith, the men of resentment must permanently kindle the belief that their way of reality perception and assessment is justified and indisputable. However, their way of dealing with the above always proves unreliable – they selectively collect information about the reality, ignoring the unfavourable portion of it, they contradict the uncomfortable facts so that not a single doubt breaches their field of awareness (Smith, 1993: 140–141). This tendency to justify oppresses the spirit of scepticism (a healthy need to criticise). In this way, fundamentalism enters the justification of secondary desires.

7. PROBLEM WITH FUNDAMENTALISM

However, fundamentalism is not always free from worries. It is always exposed to a confrontation with other fundamentalisms and their justifications. Always in such a situation further doubts may arise, this time concerning a unique and absolute status of fundamentalist justifications. How can the justifications be preserved in such a situation? Some insight into the issue is to be traced in the studies conducted by Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter (Festinger, Riecken, Schachter, 2008). The aim of the study was to verify the assumptions of the theory of cognitive dissonance. The key was the question why in a cognitive dissonance situation (tensions induced by a discrepancy in beliefs), people are inclined to distort their views on reality rather than treat them as wrong. The object of research was a sect that believed that on 21 December, as a result of great flooding, the world will come to an end. The sect members could have been rescued from death by an intervention of alien creatures from planet Clarion. The extraterrestrials were to take away the members to shelter on flying saucers.3 When preparing for the galactic expedition, the sect members abandoned their work, gave away money and possessions, and even left their families. The group of researchers was curious about what would happen if the announced prophecy would not come true. When the world doomsday began to approach, the calm and remote sect started to gain

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3 One of the sect members, Marian Keech, contacted the extraterrestrials.
new members and use various propaganda actions which they had previously shunned. On 21 December, when the prophecy did not come true, contrary to sound expectations, the sect members (after a short breakdown and rationalisation, under which the Earth had been saved from the cataclysm, thanks to a deep faith of the sect followers) did not abandon their faith. Just the opposite, the sect members started to spread the faith extremely actively.

Festinger does not provide in-depth psychological explanations of his research. Nevertheless, it was not his intention. It does not change the fact that the case described by him contains a certain analogy to our deliberations, leading to a hypothesis on the sources of fanaticism (a hypothesis which must be closely examined, also empirically). Following Festinger’s path and transferring the conclusions of his research on the grounds of considerations that are of our interest, it can be presumed that when fundamentalist values and their justifications cannot withstand doubts cast by other fundamentalisms (other competitive visions of the world), the faith in other metaphysical conviction becomes more acute. This faith is combined with a fanatical activity (on the spiritual or physical level) to dissipate the arising doubts. This fanatical activity is not only (as it used to be the case of fundamentalism) an intellectual protection against the doubts created by the subject himself, but a response to threats coming from the outside that may lead to a loss of faith. When the threats are “serious” in their character, when they strongly affect the world outlook built on secondary values, they will inevitably result in frustration (associated with the inferiority pain), which, in favourable circumstances, becomes transformed into aggression and violence. Whether this is the case depends upon numerous factors, in particular whether under the ideology, linked by fundamentalism, violence is accepted or condemned (whether others are attracted to other forms of relieving frustration)? While projecting these claims on the grounds related to considerations on Islam, the following hypothesis can be drawn: if the fundamentalist values, conceived on the grounds of Islam are ressentiment in their character, then in a clash with other systems (especially when they appear to be politically and economically successful), it will entice their admirers into fanatic and aggressive attempts of authentication.

8. CONCLUSIONS: IN SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION

Is it possible to prevent ressentiment fundamentalism and fanaticism? Even a superficial insight into the essence of ressentiment leads to an observation that this phenomenon is difficult to eliminate. The ressentiment-laden structure of awareness is extremely complicated, particularly if it triggers secondary cognitive disturbances, i.e. revaluation of values. In this case, axiological preferences efficiently hide hatred, making it concealed not only for others but for the awareness itself. It is not easy to separate individuals who are affected by ressentiment. Besides, it is not easy to eliminate the causes that generate it. Is it possible, therefore, to cope with Muslim ressentiment?

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4 They contacted the press, radio and TV.
5 Naturally ressentiment does not necessarily have to go through both stages of cognitive disturbances. It may as well stop on the level of an incorrect assessment of specific persons or groups. Even then, when it reaches a level of a false identification of values, a return to the previous stage, even to the level of conscious hatred seems to be possible.
Theoretically, a condition to deal with it might be avoiding ressentimental revaluation (to reject primary and secondary values which were created in a compensatory manner) and its consequences (fundamentalism, fanaticism and extremism). This can be achieved in two ways.

The first would be to bolster people who might be affected by ressentiment. In practice this would mean enabling them to gain all that was missing and which made them feel inferior (education, labour, material resources). In fact, the governments of many western countries attempted, through various social programmes aimed at professional activation, language learning, cultural integration to provide the basis for achieving these values. In relation to a large part of emigration community of Muslim roots, such attempts have failed, even in countries which prepared for it quite solidly. Despite the inclusion of multiculturalism into political projects, it still raises reluctance or even open opposition. In 2005, the Archbishop of York, John Sentamu, stated: “Multiculturalism has seemed to imply, wrongly for me, that other cultures are allowed to express themselves but the dominant culture cannot tell us about its glories, its struggles, its joys, its pains at all” (Gledhill, 2005). In 2007, the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Jonathan Sacks, in an interview with the Sunday Telegraph, admitted that the model of a multicultural society causes an increase in intolerance and deepens social divisions. Multiculturalism itself poses a threat to the cultural identity of the British (Wynne-Jones, 2006). Moreover, Sacks added that the experiment of a multicultural society failed, and that continuing along this path will intensify difficulties.

The second way would be to eliminate the possibility of an emergence of planes for comparison. As aptly noted by Max Scheler, the largest load of ressentiment is to be found in societies in which an official social and political equality goes hand in hand with a huge diversification of actual authority, possession and education – in a society in which “everyone has the right to be equal to another and yet they cannot equal anyone”. Thus, ressentiment will become a rare phenomenon in caste societies and in societies with a clear state division (Scheler, 1978: 9). Obviously, such societies due to a too low number of potential beneficiaries and a cultural-moral mismatch are unlikely to be established within the western world. A certain modification of this concept would be a postulate of having separate cultures, i.e. a far-reaching disintegration. In practice, it would mean a creation of a new policy that might popularise actions exercising little popularity: banning “culturally alien” emigration, bringing humanitarian aid only at “a conflict site”, avoiding an aggressive articulation of minorities’ “cultural claims” and obviously a very rare interference into state affairs belonging to other cultures. Both ways are purely theoretical in their character. They do not seem possible to be implemented in any form. If we wish to effectively defend ourselves against ressentiment and its destructive consequences, we need to think of something totally new. Otherwise, we will never manage to control ressentiment that may reveal its even more destructive face. Revaluation in one way or another will return.
REFERENCES


