§ 1. Basic gestures

The human motor system is built into its physical surroundings, whether natural or artificial, by the morphological predisposition of its basic muscular attunement to the spatial world of places, things, and beings: its gestures, in the largest sense of this term. Essential schemas of our imaginative mind are grounded in motor patterns reinforced through interaction with this spatial world. Locomotion yields one important pattern of this variety (aspects of ‘going’ from place to place), besides instrumental gestures (aspects of our manipulation of things, of our constructing, changing, moving or destroying them) and immediate symptomatic gestures of mental activity and affective state (such as ‘hesitation’ and ‘perplexity’); special attention must of course be paid to the realm of expressive gestures (aspects of ‘showing’ meanings to others), including those that accompany language or constitute a language in its own right.

Note that all these basic gestures, still in the largest sense of the term, can both be ‘spontaneously’ performed and ‘consciously’ imitated, quoted, or faked; this opposition has many names, and it is crucial to the understanding of behavior. Authenticity, sincerity etc. on one side, simulation, manipulation etc. on the other. In the first case, they are simply done, so to speak, and the doer thereby most often lets others see his simple and trivial intention to do them. In the last case, they are shown, whether then also done or only sketched out, and the performer’s intention addresses the by-lying others’ attention for whatever reason, directing it to the performance.

All gestures are thus in principle subject to conscious volition. They are in principle voluntary, even when they are entrenched and automatized. They can still be either reinforced or inhibited, and repeated or interrupted: made significant - this is precisely what happens when they are shown to others.
Intention in the other - be it volition (subject-oriented) or attention (object-oriented) - is generally and basically detected by the observation of gestures. Correspondingly, intentions in the self are related to, and generally dependent on, gestural proprioception.

§ 2. Theatrical gestures

But on this basic level, the culturally most important phenomenon: theatrical behavior, significant gesturing, or role-playing, acting, in general, cannot be further developed, defined or described: we do not yet understand what it is that makes it possible at all. There is not yet any framed stage to ‘act’ on. By ‘stage’ I mean to refer to the intentional transformation of that space in which a theatrical gesture is understood as taking place: role-playing in a sense fictionalizes for a moment the contextual setting of ongoing communication and makes it into a different scene, namely that which the role refers to. The problem of understanding the occurrence of theatricality in bodily behavior, its character of meaningful ‘performance’, is by nature semantic. Theatrical gesturing refers to and hence depends on autonomously specified meanings, i.e. on some sort of inter-subjectively present and previously established contents of consciousness, representations shared by self and other.

Zoo-semiotically, pretense is thus known to be frequently found as related to behaviors of mating and fighting (about some evident value), and sometimes, more vaguely expressed, of competing', are these behaviors also the evolutionary origins of theatricality in our species? And if so, are such historical ‘origins’ to be taken as structural truths about the originated phenomenon? At least, some other basic properties of human inter-subjectivity seem to be involved in our forms of theatricality. It is hard to see any human behavior as theatrically dramatic, if it does not involve an inter-subjective scenario, a frame of conflict that allows for figurative and dynamic variation, such as peace-making, postponement of competing, perhaps of mutually lethal performances (see Deacon, 1997).

§ 3. Complexity and genres

Gestures in this broad sense integrate semantically into sequences that we understand as elementary units of action, or practical doings (e.g.: going-somewhere-and-getting-something; or taking-something-and-making-an-artifact-out-of-it), and doings further integrate into acts of exchange (e.g.: offering-a-service-in-retum-for-a-skillfully-configurated-object) (Brandt, 2000b). Exchanges in their turn feed into evaluative behaviors (e.g.: showing satisfaction or dissatisfaction of an exchange by expressive
gestures of affirmation, negation, or concern). These doings, exchanges, and evaluations are then repeated for mnemonic purposes, and communicated either through fully embodied behaviors of ‘acting’ - i.e. showing: by spectacular or scenic reiteration of the involved gestural sequences, e.g. heroic display performances (the so-called ‘show-off’), pedagogical showing (demonstrating) or ritual officiating - or eventually down-scaled into gestural symbolizing (cf. the use of small signs of politeness: greeting, symbolic smiling, etc.). These formal behaviors are often bound to situations and locations. Behavioral scenarios and stages are framed locations in space where given genres of exchange habitually and spectacularly ‘take place’: a place is ‘taken’ by a regularly executed intersubjective exchange of doings that become acts when they are seen and understood as intentionally performed and intended to be relevant to such a particular exchange, in which they ‘count’. The counting and accounting are then the cognitively symbolic aspect of such a staged interaction (cf. a match of table tennis). Acts count and are counted, when they are ‘rightly’ performed in the ‘right place’, including the ‘right time’. Here, ‘right’ means: formally related to other acts taking place within the same frame, whose category includes indications of location and timing. Spatial and temporal continuity of sequenced acts is of course required for bodily interaction; this simple principle follows from the requirement of continuity of intentional contact between interacting subjects. Note that theatrical acting of all kinds has a limited duration and has a strongly marked on-set and end-point: it is as strongly framed in time as in space.

On the level of social ‘acting’, there are at least three theatrical genres to consider and compare, all related to significant places or stages: 1) inventive dressing at specified occasions (include, seductive fashion wear; carnival get-up; gala full-dress); 2) behaviors of functional addressing (of incorporating representative authority); and 3) fictional behaviors (pretending, imitating, role playing, embodying narrative and dramatic characters). In none of these genres the agent behaves simply ‘as himself’. The theatrical genres are types of ‘stages’. Note that a person always has an unmarked and unframed ‘off-stage’ style that contrasts these marked, staged, and framed behaviors.

These social genres are all in some sense demonstrative. The inventive genre has a public-space context; the functional has an institutional context; and the fictional has a ritual context. These contexts largely determine the discursive interpretations that theatrical performances universally call for.

§ 4. Language is theatrical

Language is in itself a source of theatricality. Dialogue is inherently theatrical. Let us consider a trivial example: two persons are discussing a matter. One presents his arguments, and at some point he anticipates and then proceeds to
present the other’s likely counter-argument, in order to refute it. When formulating this likely counter-argument, he plays the role of this other. He jumps out of that role, as soon as his refutation starts. He jumps in and out of the-other-as-a-role. He takes longer turns in the dialogue, and eventually the discourse assumes a monological form, a monologue which is intermittently (on and off) theatrical. But at a certain point, the other takes the floor and copies the procedure; he likewise anticipates his interlocutor’s possible arguments and becomes intermittently theatrical. Both discussants are now represented both ‘theatrically’ (according to each other) and ‘authentically’ (according to themselves). If they finally agree on the matter-at-hand, or at least or on the reasons why they happen to disagree, then the theatrical versions integrate into a joint venture, even if a limited one, which overrules the original ‘authentic’ positions, and now both persons can say: “We think that...” This we is a theatrical integration, occurring in a sort of middle space between the speakers P1 and P2 (Fig. 1):

Figure 1. In this theatrical integration, both persons, P1’ (P1 according to P2) and P2’ (P2 according to P1), are roles in a play, whose script is given by the real dialogue underlying it. The speakers can easily assume the integrated we-role, and any audience immediately understands what this we means. The pronoun conserves such integrations and allows for their creation in dialogue.

§ 5. Seeing and saying

Fundamental cognitive and semiotic research is needed in order for cultural theory to understand how theatrical styles are possible in human bodily behavior. We will here consider two interrelated structural aspects of expressive behavior that seem to feed into all forms of theatricality, including linguistic forms like a speaker’s embodiment of content roles (such as: “you think...”, “we think...”, or “he thinks...”). These are: enunciation as a viewpoint structure, and embodied...
semiosis as a mental space network. The first aspect, which will be studied in this section and in the following, will appear as embedded in the second, to be studied in §7.

*Enunciation* - subjectivity in semiosis - is basically known from linguistic shifter morphology, such as the personal pronouns (Benveniste, 1966; Coquet, 1984-85). But no general structural *model* of it has been canonized in semiotics, or even in linguistics. Suggestions from different sides and traditions must still be tried against analysis in order to achieve knowledge of the schematism underlying this particularly tricky phenomenon. Most theories of language, literature, and cognition even ignore the whole issue. The speaker speaks, the communicator communicates, and there is nothing more to say or theorize about; or if there is, then the ‘context’ is the matter: the famous, ungraspable monster that mysteriously specifies and determines our meanings, leaving us no means of following its operations.

In the following, we will instead assume that gestural and linguistic agency is inherently determined by a semiotic role-schematism built into our cognitive equipment. There is a *cognitively given semantic schematism for semiosis* (semiosis: inter-subjective transfer of meaning) which universally underlies the personal pronouns in language and all other communicational markers. Morphological ‘persons’ basically refer to embodied human individuals addressing each other. The schematism has a trans-personal deixis springing from a first person, addressing a second person, and pointing to a referential content given in the third ‘person’, so that the first instance, by volition, orients the attention of the second instance toward the third instance:

*I want you to see this*

This deictic function corresponds to what is generally, or in Theory of Mind, called shared attention, and it is based on elementary gaze dynamics: persons tend to follow each other’s gaze direction, so the ‘beam’ of one person’s attentive gaze automatically attracts that of another person who observes it. This function can operate *ad oculos*, that is, it can point to topics present in the space of enunciation (“Look at this strange bird...”), but it can also direct a second person’s attention to phenomena only accessible to observation outside this space, i.e. accessible ‘from other viewpoints’. In such cases, the first person’s viewpoint is no longer deictic, but anaphoric, in a very general sense (“This is what Jensen says in his book...”). It leaves its embodied speaker’s or signer’s ‘home base’ and goes to a different base, where the embodied addressee is supposed or rather imagined to be at some moment. From this new base, *focus* is on what the utterance refers to. Thus, the focus belongs to a mobile second person experiencing from the new base ‘what there is to see from there’, i.e. what the utterance contains
and has its focus on, as indicated by a disembodied first person (above the new base of the second person) accompanying this delegated observer. If I want you to see something that I myself cannot see, then my description of what you should see makes you focus on it in my place, as my substitute, or delegate. The idea of this analysis is then that the first person is still with the delegated second person, but in an imaginary form, as a semiotic role, a viewpoint. Pl is no longer in its here-and-now ‘home base’, but is ‘alienated’ and camping in some other base, possibly still in its own body, but then in the past, or in the future, or in a different place or state, or mental space (Fig. 2):

Note that standard literary or linguistic accounts of viewpoint and focus have a direct P1-to-P3 setting. Space delegations concerning focus and reference are then described in terms of viewpoints sending focuses to other viewpoints sending focuses further to still other viewpoints sending focuses. What is new in the enonciative account presented here is its anchoring of viewpoint mobility in the mobile semiotic role called second person. According to this analysis, embodied enunciation is the grounding structure of all ‘view-pointing’. So, seeing is grounded in saying. Or, more accurately and generally speaking: the grounding factor is a semiosis basically going on between two embodied subjects - not an opsis involving one embodied subject and the world, as in the accounts that wish Perception to be the Mother of Meaning.

§ 6. Viewpoint types and focus-space delegation types

Two important theoretical problems arise from this analysis, since it shows that viewpoints vary, and focuses are delegated, and that these variations are distinct dimensions of enunciation.

6.1. The first problem concerns the possible types of the alienated viewpoints'. what semiotic roles are there at all? In order to answer this question, we might
take instruction from language. (1) The non-alienated viewpoint is the one presented only in explicit (performative) speech-act constructions: “I hereby promise you to do X”. (2) Alienation of the first person maintaining the same subject is obtained by adverbal modifiers: “Yesterday, I...”, “Sometimes, I...”, “Perhaps, I...”. (3) Changes of subject from / to we or to most.people, all humans, or other quotable institutional discursive sources of information, knowledge, belief, imagination, fiction, are expressed by completive embeddings: “Most people think that X”, “It is generally believed that X”, “According to Jensen, X [J. wrote that X]”. (4) Finally, there is an absolute alienation, by which the Olympic enunciator, an instance supposedly having unrestricted access to truth, is the enunciative viewpoint: “X is the case”, “What nobody knows, or will ever find out, is that X”, “It is raining”, “The weather is bad (it just is)”. Maybe the weather and the constructions we use to refer to contingency in general are the original source of this apparently it-based, ‘impersonal’ syntax. For philosophical, though linguistically irrelevant reasons, this Olympic viewpoint has been treated with surprising disrespect by scholars of many kinds, especially literary critics, in spite of its omnipresence in everyday conversation and discourse. It is most often imperceptible, since it is unmarked, implicit, and non-emphatic.

We might summarize the types of possible viewpoints as follows:

(1) The non-alienated speech-act viewpoint (I-here-now...)
(2) The same-subject alienation of viewpoint (I-sometimes...)
(3) The different-subject alienation of viewpoint (we, or some people, think...)
(4) The Olympic viewpoint (it is unquestionably true that X, or simply: X)

We might further consider the alienated viewpoint types as located at an increasing distance from the communicative and intentional mind itself (0), starting at the explicit instance of ‘impersonating’ the speaker: (1), along the line of P1 (in Fig. 2).

\[
\text{Pl: (0) ------ (1) ----- >(2) ----- >(3) ------}(4)
\]

Under (1), the focus is, by definition, on some item in the semiotic base space; the self-reference of the performative utterance is an example of this. Under viewpoints of the three other types, the scope of the content is larger, so even if an object X is first foregrounded as present in base space under (1), its history or category or relevance in infinitely many respects can be thematized under (2), as X’, under (3), as X”, or under (4), as X’” - this last aspect would be some “truth about X”, including its “essence”.

Phenomenologically, the viewpoint line (1—4) just considered has a zero stance (0): the self, or the subject in what will become a deictic ‘base space’ (1). This zero stance represents the state of the subject just-before-semiosis, that is, prior to expression; the subject has an experience or an idea and an intention to
communicate it. From (0) through (1), (2), and (3), to (4), there is (still in a phenomenological sense) a decrease of experiential immediacy (seeing, hearing, feeling, sensing in general): of subjective, experiential force, and an increase of what we might call ‘access to information’: of objective, epistemic force.' Any communicated content is given as purported both by some experiential force and by some epistemic force, but under (1), the experiential force of its validity is maximal, and the epistemic force is minimal, whereas the inverse holds for contents under (4). This complementarity might explain the semiotic importance of the viewpoint line in general, since it is of evident cognitive interest to agree on the sort of validity that communication assigns to a content. The following representation should be read as a ‘sliding’ device allowing for all positions between the extremes of total stream of consciousness - under (1) - and total doctrinarity or omniscient enunciation under (4) (Fig. 3):

Complementary forces of validity under different viewpoints:

![Complementary forces of validity](image)

The fact - I think it is a fact - that in this naturally given schematism of enunciation, the two forces of validity are complementary and inversely proportional, is dramatically important for subjects in semiosis. It entails that if I show you something which has weak experiential force for myself, then there is some part of it which will subsequently be interpreted from a viewpoint ‘sliding’ from my own to one approaching the Olympic stance.

This complementarity is of course useful in dialogues devoted to cooperative interpretation of experiences (you or someone else might know better than I).

1 If I say: “Jensen says that X”, then X can be epistemically reinforced by the authority of Jensen (magister dixit). If, however, I add: “but he is wrong about X”, I let the Olympic instance (4) overrule this ‘magister’ (3). This is what happens, if I say: “Jensen believes that X”, because the verb believe (as other ‘mind verbs’) contains an idea of Olympic overruling.
However, if the thing I am showing you is *myself* my gesturally embodied self, which I do not experience as strongly (from the ‘inside’) as I suppose others do, then I cannot but feel literally *ex*-*posed*, seen through, transparent - exposed, not only and simply to the eyes of others, but to their truth-seeking minds (under (3)) and eventually to the all-penetrating and all-knowing Olympic ‘consciousness’. This is what it means to be and feel *visible*-, to be staged under alien viewpoints of increasing epistemic force. Shyness, bashfulness, is a primary affective and gestural reaction to this situation (of being and feeling *visible*). A secondary gestural move is the one by which the visible subject tries to get access to the alien viewpoint (focusing on the visible subject) by self-objectivization, that is, by assuming a *theatrical* behavior.

6.2. The second problem concerns focus and what happens to it when the utterance refers to things outside the enunciational base space. Let us call this essential semiotic dimension, responsible for all references to an ‘out there’: *space delegation*. Whatever be the viewpoint taken by an utterance, the topic focused on can stay the same, and can stay in base space - as we just saw in the case of reference to the gesturer’s own body. But the viewpoints (2-4) can go where (1) cannot. Note that delegations running from one already established space ‘out there’ to another ‘out there’ space raise the same problem as those delegations that depart from base space and should be analyzed exactly the same way. Any space created by space delegation is a possible base for new delegations created from there. All space delegations are cognitively to be seen as mental operations involving memory, reasoning, and imagination.

There are at least four types of space delegation, perhaps only these four:

- **spatial delegation**: “on the moon, X”; “next door, X”; “over the rainbow, X”; “nowhere, X”; “everywhere, X”; “somewhere, X”; “here and there, X”;
- **temporal delegation**: “in a minute, X”; “yesterday, X”; “a hundred years ago, X”; “some day, X [my prince will come]”; “never, X”; “always, X”; “sometimes, X”; “now and then, X”; “once upon a time, X”;
- **modal delegation**: “perhaps, X”; “possibly, X”; “probably, X”; “necessarily, X”; “hopefully, X”; “regrettably, X”; “preferably, X”; “desirably, X”; “optionally, X”; “imperatively, X”; “hypothetically, X”; “conditionally, X”; “if Y, then X”; “miraculously, X”;
- **representational delegation**: “in the Bible, X”; “in Monet’s paintings, X”; “in Greek mythology, X”; “in Sigmund Jensen's dream, X”; “in Carl Th. Jensen’s films, X”; “in most sonnets, X”; “in Adolf Jensen’s psychotic hallucination, X”; “Bill Jensen lied that X”; “in Alice’s Wonderland, X”; “in the world according to Garp, X”; “in all possible worlds, X”; “in the whole world, X”; “in this world, X”; “in the universe, X”.

Amazingly, the simple formula “not X” - as in: “No, no! she exclaimed” - can mean things like: (a) “not [here] X”, (in answer to: “May I kiss you?”);
(b) “not [any longer] X”, (answering questions such as: “Are you still hungry?”); 
(c) “not [wanted/allowed/possible] X”, (in answer to: “Can I come in?”); or 
(d) “not [the case that] X” (“Are you Miss Jensen?”). Negation („not X”) actually creates two mental spaces outside the enunciational base space, one that includes X according to some viewpoint (2 - 4) and one that excludes X. The latter is then signed by the subject of the performative viewpoint (1) as consistent with its communicative intention (0).

The type (d) includes the formation of fictional spaces. The principle of representational delegation is that there is what we call a world, which semiotically means a space accessible only through human representation. The notion of Reality is that of a world (some world). A fiction is a world specified by a particular type of enunciation, one that invents, that represents, with (0) as its onset: the subject focuses on producing language, on ‘mental writing’, using language’s built-in focus (d) - the world according to language - not on experiencing immediate contents of consciousness. This particular attitude affects enunciation altogether. From the voice and view now artificially established under (1), all space delegations remain possible, as well as all viewpoints. However, the first person is no longer the self-exposing utterer, but an artificial enunciator role: a narrator. The formula of fiction is thus: viewpoint (1), focus (d) - or: (Id). The impersonal, Olympic voice dominantly heard in classical fiction is: 4d. The voice heard in stream-of-consciousness prose is: la (“In my consciousness, X”).

In fiction, the space of enunciation is transformed into a stage. Expressions are transformed into non-deictic entities, non-presentations: re-presentations. But since the pure intentional stance (0) cannot be touched by this transformation, fictions always attract the representational addressee’s (French: de l’enonciataire) attention to what the author ‘has, or had, in mind’, or to what any author would have in mind while offering this fiction as a representation ‘instead of’ showing its meaning directly. Fictions call for interpretation. They are supposed to ‘mean’ something ‘else’, something different from what they explicitly represent. They are, in Mark Turner’s (1996) terms, parabolic. Often they are interpretable as indirect commentaries to the empirical situation in which enunciation takes place. As works of art, they are supposed to be parables of a maximally general meaning, of feelings concerning the human existence or thoughts about the world (one representation is then the image of another). All fictional enunciations lead to the search for deeper meanings. Since these deeper meanings are ‘imaged’,

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2 One such example is irony: ironic theatricality is role-playing and calls for interpretation - for an interpreter’s sensitivity to an underlying meaning - which searches for an implicit intention that contrasts or modifies the literal meaning of the utterance. Irony is local fictionalization of enunciation.
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signified figuratively, by the representations (or worlds), the fictional enunciations call attention to the immanent structure of the literal, thematic content of these representations. Interpretations thus follow (from) structural ‘readings’ - global accounts of relations and elements found in the fictional worlds.

In § 3, we considered three genres of theatricality, the last of which corresponds to the (ld)-analysis of fictional enunciation. The inventive genre of theatricality, e.g. fashion, and perhaps general eccentricity, is also representational (d), but under a non-basic viewpoint (2) referring to ‘alienated’ aspects of the subject such as gender, age, ethnicity, professional affiliation etc. The functional theatricality is representational (d) under a necessarily collective viewpoint (3): “We the King...”; “our party thinks ...”; “France declares...”.

§ 7. The mental-space network of enunciation

When people communicate, they are physically connected in such a way that they can perceive each other’s gestures and signs. I call this circumstance the semiotic base space. This base space thus includes the communicating subjects and the signifying physical events produced in communication.

The meaning unfolded in the communication going on in this base space unfolds in delegated mental spaces linked to and projected from the base space by so-called ‘space builders’ (Fauconnier, 1985) - a set of semiotic properties of these signifying events: gestures and facial expressions, sentences or phrases or words (pronounced, signed, or written), written texts, iconic items such as paintings, drawings, or even physical objects exchanged or treated in ritual ways, or simple clues that the communicators understand as indications (e. g. of the speaker’s attitude toward the conversational topic) - and the built-up mental spaces comprising the meaning (signifieds) of these signifiers form networks of variable complexity, by which a semantic whole is constructed and finally fed back into the base space as an integral content of the signifying act in question.

The first step in this construction of meaning consists in singling out two spaces: a viewpoint space (Input 1) in which the enunciational subject displays the appearance, from some ‘angle’, of what the second person is supposed to ‘see’; and a focus space (Input 2) containing what this entity is taken to be. If, for instance, the enunciator is acting, Input 1 has the way he acts, and Input 2 has the role he is presumed to play. Any addressee can grasp the difference, and must perceive it in order to understand what ‘acting as’ means. Furthermore, semioticians will see that Input 1 picks up iconic structure of the signifying event in base space, and that Input 2 picks up symbolic structure (from the same source). Any state of affairs referred to has singular traits that constitute its ‘signifiability’. This is the iconic aspect. The role also has a name and an identity,
‘signifiable’ by a recognizable style. This is the symbolic aspect. Theatrical gestures have iconic and symbolic structure simultaneously. Semiotically, it is obvious that the iconic Input 1 relies on experiential force and the symbolic Input 2 on epistemic force, in terms of viewpoint structure, cf. §6.

The second step in the construction is the stylistic mapping of the contents of the two input spaces. A caricature of a person profiles some graphically or gesturally deformed contours that map onto foregrounded moral properties of the target. By contrast, an official portrait of the same person, e.g. a political ruler, will preferentially present a worshipping, ascending angle and show a rather inscrutable gestural attitude and facial expression mapping onto the ‘grandeur’ of the person. Such mappings, occurring between something shown and something meant, prepare the establishment of a new space that blends information from Input 1 and Input 2 and produces a creature which can be described as an ontological amphibium: a character (halfway between the actor and the role) or a characterization of a state of affairs (halfway between the commentary and the issue, between appearance and being).

However, such a blended space (which is - I think - precisely what ‘theatrical places’ are meant for displaying, physical stages as well as platforms, rostrums, lecterns, etc., and which is what frames around pictures are mentally facilitating) would be chaotic without a schematic regulator of its amphibian content. It is a puzzling fact that it is possible to show something in ways that may even be overtly incompatible with the shown thing without destroying the reference to it.

My suggestion is that a third input space is projected from the base space by indexical, pragmatic indicators in the signifying event, such as the proxemics of the bodies in base space, the nature of the situation, and the implied genre of ongoing communication within a sequence of previous and following communicative events, and that this space maps onto the blend and orders it by submitting it to its schematism. What I have in mind here is the enunciational schema (§6), which might be rendered more fully by the following graph, where I have made a special case for representational delegation: it goes directly to the Olympic viewpoint\(^4\) and then ‘floats’ backwards, occupying (1) in fiction, but stopping at the d-limit, beyond which there is, as we have seen, an intentional stance of ‘deeper meaning’ to interpret (Fig. 4):

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3 As in A.-J. Greimas’ structure of ‘veridiction’, cf. Dictionnaire I and II.

4 This is the worst problem in any theory of literature. Representations are worlds and therefore have an Olympic ‘ruler’. Representations become fictions, when the viewpoint (1) is contaminated - but the previous instance (0) cannot be contaminated: there is a difference of principle between the base enunciator and the «I» of a first person fiction. This is what the d-limit is supposed to denote. Perhaps this explains what happens in psychosis: the d-limit does not hold, and (d) contaminates the speaker. I dedicate this note to the psychiatrist Bent Rosenbaum.
If we insert this schema in the third input space, the instance I propose to call a *relevance space* (since it regulates the chaos in the blend of Input 1 and Input 2 in relation to relevant factors), we have a mapping between Input-1 structure and Input-2 structure, on the one hand, and a mapping between their blend and the instances of this schema, on the other. This last mapping specifies by inference the schematic configuration of viewpoint (1-4) and focus (a-d) and prepares a final blend (Fig. 5):
The final blend (BI. 2) is a mental space containing what the empirical participants in Base space understand as the specified enunciational constraints of the ongoing semiosis and its now validated content: a ‘Model Base space’ in the sense in which Umberto Eco (1992 and 1979; see Brandt, 2000a) posits a Model Reader, a Model Author, and the (Model) text - a specified, edited version of the original base space, projected back to the latter as a specification aiding the communicating subjects in determining in what sense an uttered meaning is relevant and meaningful. The final blend of this network might be called an internal Base space, as opposed to the original, external Base space.

§ 8. Visibility

The simplest form of semiosis, and no doubt the crudest of all, is the one we innocently call a situation. When people meet, they have to appear in front of each other, and they have to accept the idea that they are where they are, because it is in their ‘essence’ to be there and to be seen as being there and to look exactly as they do... When we ‘appear’ somewhere, we know that we automatically attract attention of others to our being there and thus to our appearing there in a certain way, in a way that others may know more about and interpret better than we, in terms of ‘being’ or ‘essence’. When people meet, this ‘essentialistic’ condition is of course mutual, and the natural embarrassment or uneasiness caused by the direct gaze of the other, and by our own gaze directed at the other, is a matter of tacit negotiation in any face-to-face situation (cf. Sartre’s [1943] famous description of the gaze conflict in such relations). Politeness consequently has general rules for gaze behavior. The fact of being bodily visible is experienced as a semiosis whose enunciational structure makes us feel ‘characterized’, seen through, transparent, as it were.

When people meet unexpectedly in strange places - for instance: two academic colleagues crossing each other in a brothel (both: “What are you doing here?”) - the optical emphasis produced by the fact of being observed and involuntarily staged causes particular embarrassment and awkward behavior, because such a fatal seeing forces theatricality upon both observed observers: they are thrown into a field of intensified visibility that offends their feelings of pudency and often triggers strong affective reactions, ranging from confusion to panic. The very common and painfully strong fear of speaking in public, and

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5 As suggested in Line Brandt, 2000.
6 The phenomenon is known to afflict both sexes, but to my knowledge, women are more ready to admit it than men. Perhaps the feeling in question is really more prominent in women. It may be at the origin of affectation in general.
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thus of being somehow involuntarily observed, is another example of this phenomenon. What happens structurally is that the subject as a ‘naked self’ is thrown into exposure (before God’s indecent eye\(^7\)) without appropriate theatrical clothing (cf. the naked emperor in Andersen’s tale). Since this happens against the subject’s will, the subject tends to abandon the fragile initial speech-act viewpoint position (1) and is reduced to occupying an alienated position - sometimes it even produces a momentary black-out. The reaction is, I think, conditioned by the above mentioned conflict of validating forces in enunciation (§6, and Fig. 3), experienced as an asymmetry: visibility far exceeds vision. To be involuntarily visible is to be seen in general and ultimately from the Olympic viewpoint, that of an Ultimate Truth\(^8\). It entails being transparent, being seen through, deeper than the self can reach (incidentally, Lacano-Freudian psychoanalysis uses this principle consciously to intimidate the patients, making them believe that the Olympic opsis of the analyst can really go that far... into their ‘Unconscious’ and their ‘Truth’). This obsessive phenomenology of truth-in-visibility seems to be explicable in terms of our enunciative schematism; far out there, I-am-being-shown-as-I-am: ecce homo. Thus, I truly am what is seen in me, 1) even though I cannot see for myself what it is that is seen, and 2) even if I did have access to it, I could never change the verdict.

Paradoxically, I am alienated by the ‘Truth’ an sich. The proper response to this uncanny situation is theatrical behavior. Psychological disturbances of volition, like those felt in simple situations of pragmatic perplexity, produce the same experience and the same responses: confusion, panic, and then affected,\(^9\) theatrical behavior.

§ 9. Maupassant on fatal visibility

One writer who was particularly aware of this phenomenon was Guy de Maupassant (1850-1893). In his short story La ficelle (A piece of string), he lets the protagonist, Maitre Hauchecome, die in the end from despair and a strong feeling of paradoxical guilt that he had previously acquired when he was seen in the act of picking up a worthless object and understood as thereby stealing

\(^{7}\) Nietzsche’s remark on female pudency.

\(^{8}\) The Olympic viewpoint and its epistemic force - «Ultimate Truth» - are, once again, structural properties of language-related cognition that many scholars find hard to accept. It is perhaps easier to recognize the feelings I try to pin down in this paragraph.

\(^{9}\) The term affectation is curiously ambiguous: 1) unnatural, artificial behavior; 2) influence, being influenced, ‘affected’ by something - basically by the condition of being visible, we may assume.
a wallet, which he tries in vain to convince the community was not the case, but ends up understanding could truly as well have been the case, in view of his charakter (see Greimas, 1983). In his story Deux amis (A Fishing Excursion), well-known among semioticians and thoroughly analysed by A.-J. Greimas (1976), two anglers are caught fishing in the war zone, by the Seine, during the Prussian siege of Paris. Absorbed in a conversation about life and death, and the ever-lasting wars, they are interrupted:

... Suddenly they started. They had heard a step behind them. They turned and beheld four big men in dark uniforms, with guns pointed right at them. Their fishing-lines dropped out of their hands and floated away with the current.

In a few minutes, the Prussian soldiers had bound them, cast them into a boat, and rowed across the river to the island which our friends had thought deserted. They soon found out their mistake when they reached the house, behind which stood a score or more of soldiers. A big burly officer, seated astride in a chair, smoking an immense pipe, addressed them in excellent French:

„Well, gentlemen, have you made a good haul?”

Just then, a soldier deposited at his feet the net full of fish which he had taken care to take along with them. The officer smiled and said:

„I see you have done pretty well; but let us change the subject. You are evidently sent to spy upon me. You pretended to fish so as to put me off the scent, but I am not so simple. I have caught you and shall have you shot. I am sorry, but war is war...”

10 “Mais ils tressaillirent effares, sentant bien qu’on venait de marcher derriere eux; et ayant toume les yeux, ils aperçurent, debout contre leurs epaules, quatre grands hommes armes et barbus, vetus comme des domestiques en livree et coiffes de casquettes plates, les tenant en joue au bout de leurs fusils.

Les deux lignes s’échapperent de leurs mains et se mirent a descendre la riviere.

En quelques secondes, ils furent saisies, attaches, emportes, jetes dans une barque et passes dans file.

Et derriere la maison qu’ils avaient crue abandonnee, ils aperçurent une vingtaine de soldats allemands.

Une sorte de geant velu, qui fumait, a cheval sur une chaise, une grande pipe de porcelaine, leur demanda, en excellent français: “Eh bien, messieurs, avez-vous fait bonne peche?”

Alors un soldat deposa aux pieds de l’officier le filet plein de poissons, qu’il avait eu soin d’emporter.

Le Prussien sourit : “Eh! eh! je vois que ça n’allait pas mal. Mais il s’agit d’autre chose. Ecoutez-moi et ne vous troublez pas.

“Pour moi, vous etes deux espions envoyes pour me guetter. Je vous prends et je vous fusille. Vous faisiez semblant de pecher, afin de mieux dissimuler vos projets. Vous etes tombes entre mes mains, tant pis pour vous; c’est la guerre. ... ” (de Maupassant, 1939. The translation seems due to the author of the introduction to this English edition, Wallace Brockway). It is highly recommended that the reader make acquaintance with the full text commented here.
“C’est la vie”, M. Sauvage had said in the conversation preceding the quoted passage; “Dites plutôt que c’est la mort”, M. Morissot had answered. “C’est la guerre”, the Prussian officer now states. Three Olympic utterances are made, and the last one tells us why this is not just, as Greimas suggested, an ideological debate between equally valid personal ‘points of view’, opposing humanism and Stalinism. The theatrical Prussian is objectively, olympically right, and as does the narrator, he knows it.

The two angling friends react by a nervous shivering and remain silent to the Prussian officer’s theatrically and ironically polite attempts to get their password (they don’t have any, only a written permit; and they are not spies, to their knowledge). But they have been seen involuntarily, in the wrong place, and are now explicitly redefined according to the principles of war: since they are where they are, rather than what they are, they are executed as spies and thrown into the river Seine. They have (most involuntarily) seen where the Prussians are, and in this sense the situation makes them spies; the officer is objectively right about this. Maupassant’s Olympic narrator stays silent about the evident strategic truth, and lets the situation speak for itself. Visibility is decisive in certain circumstances. The circumstances, including what they make you do and not do, how they make you act and react, determine what your acts will mean; they fatally decide on which situational ‘stage’ the subjects are acting. No declarations would be able to change this truth-in-visibility, which is stronger than any biographical Selbstverstehung (self-understanding) and which will always defeat it. In my reading of Maupassant’s text, the two friends understand this, so their silence coincides with that of the Olympic narrator; there is no point in speaking when the place you are speaking ‘from’ contradicts and invalidates your claim. The ‘act’ you are caught in overrules your claim to be doing a different act.”

§ 10. Conclusion

An angler is a recognizable figure, whereas a spy looks like anything but a spy. A spy can disguise himself as an angler, but an angler cannot disguise himself as a spy. The angler role is iconically distinguishable (by its qualitative identity, its figurative appearance): the angler looks like this’, wherever he is. Whereas the spy role is strategically or symbolically recognizable (by his singular, situated being, his numerical identity, his dynamic being, so to speak): the spy is ‘this

\[11\] I first treated this semio-localistic phenomenon and this example in Brandt, 1983. Appearance and being are terms of Greimas’ semiotic square of ‘veridiction’, which I had to reelaborate to meet the problem.
man’, and he is ‘there’. The two friends in Maupassant’s story are qualified both ways, and the irony of the situation in which the double determination occurs - an irony embodied in the Prussian’s mocking tone of address - springs from the objective coexistence and equal truth value of these contradictory qualifications, one of which must overrule the other and seal the fate of the two friends.\textsuperscript{12}

There is thus one mental space\textsuperscript{13} in which the friends are anglers (catching fish), another mental space where they are spies (caught by the Prussians), and a blended space where being anglers makes them into spies, appearing as anglers. This last space is dialogical and maps onto an organizing and framing space of enunciational structure, in such a way that the ‘spy truth’ becomes epistemic and Olympic, whereas the ‘angler truth’ stays experiential and personal. The result is a final blend, in which our empathy stays with the anglers, while our rationality follows the spy reading. The two friends’ agentive behavior is now \textit{tragically theatrical} (involuntary), whereas the Prussian officer’s acting is \textit{comically theatrical} (voluntary).

An account of this state of affairs in terms of mental space networks presents the following architecture - in which the enunciational schema is again inserted as a regulator of relevance (Input 3), whereas this time the Base space in question is \textit{internal} to the text, a region of our Model Base space (§7, Fig. 5). Fig. 6:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6.png}
\caption{From Gesture to Theatricality}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{12} The same logic is remarkably shown by Maupassant’s story \textit{La ficelle} (A piece of string).

\textsuperscript{13} In the sense of Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier’s (1998) theory of mental spaces and blended spaces.
This inter-space structure follows a general network design which is also, incidentally, that of metaphorical structure. As indicated under the graph, Maupassant’s text invites in fact for a metaphorical reading of the source-target relationship holding between anglers-catching-fish (source) and officer-catching-spies (target). There is correspondingly a clear domain difference between the geographic - RIVER space and the - politico-strategic - WAR space. This metaphor motivates the final gesture of the Prussian officer, who asks his cook to prepare the two anglers’ fish for him. The metaphorical blend, where fishing and warfare coincide, maps onto an implicit, proverbial, schematic relevance regulator (Input 3): big fish eat smaller fish. But this transitive schema (A ‘eating’ B ‘eating’ C etc. - A: officer, B: anglers, C: fish...) is itself interpreted by the general principle of the text. The two friends are first anglers, then spies: the spy predicate ‘eats’ the ‘angler’ predicate, because the situational truth overrules the intentional qualification, which is but a subjective conviction. This follows from the structure of the enunciational schema.

None of this would in fact be intelligible without an enunciational key to the relevant meaning of the Prussian officer’s utterance in the situational Base space: “I am sorry, but war is war...” - here, he is alienated as an officer speaking from the viewpoint stance (2).

Theatricality is an intricate semiotic aspect of gesture which is first given existentially, so to speak, as an important aspect of the relation embodied human subjects have to their life-world, in so far as the theatrical styles of behavior (ranging from fear and perplexity to pretence’) are conditioned by the basic experience of situational presence, and particularly as involuntary (fatal, tragic) exposure. Second, it is given as a marked mode of co-existence in all situations where - for different reasons - the Olympic viewpoint is foregrounded: sports, religious rituals, child play, courtship, political speeches, celebrations, parades, etc. and in what we call aesthetics.

When theatre turned into an art form, tragedy consequently became, as it remained, a prototypical dramatic genre. Actors are then professional pretenders that voluntarily demonstrate how we behave voluntarily or involuntarily under pressure, that is, under strongly imposed circumstances and in particular those created by ‘visual fatality’. What do we do when our appearance ‘out there’ and our being ‘in here’ cannot be one? There is one radical solution, an alternative to theatricality altogether: king Oedipus is known to have blinded himself, a desperate ‘ostrich’ move of a haunted man who wanted to escape the situational condition entirely. Physical blindness can make a subject non-theatrical, authentic and Olympic. So say our traditions. Teiresias, the Greek ‘seer’, first saw things he should not have seen, for which he was blinded, and then could only ‘see’ prophetically - he could see or know Fate, which is blind itself. He was followed by poets like Milton and Borges.
A final reflection. Expressions like “I see”, “you see?”, “let us see..” show that there is a forceful Metaphor Concept according to which UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. It is implied that SEEING is straight-forwardly equivalent to practising optical perception. However, according to the above analysis, SEEING as conceptualized by our species is structured by a viewpoint schematism - related to intersubjectivity in enunciation - and in this conceptualization, being seen (your seeing me) is as basic as seeing (my seeing you). We see things in our quality of enunciational subjects. Furthermore, our seeing things is dependent on our seeing each other. Vision is phenomenologically an affair involving interactive subjects, and it involves them in a non-symmetric manner: in my view, my seeing you is only experiential, whereas your seeing me is epistemic. ‘Truth’ reaches me, flows towards me, from outside. Your seeing me is ‘understanding’. This phenomenon might be at the origin of the above Metaphor Concept, and also of the Concept that presents Consciousness as a Theatre.

References


