Catholicism and Evolution: Polygenism and Original Sin (Part II)

JAMES R. HOFMANN
California State University Fullerton
jhofmann@fullerton.edu
ORCID: 0000-0001-6890-2148

Abstract. As documented in the first installment of this essay (Hofmann 2020b), throughout the first half of the twentieth century, theological conformity to monogenism, the alleged descent of all human beings from Adam and Eve, was closely linked to Catholic doctrines of original sin. Receptivity to polygenism, the more scientifically supported account of human origins through a transitional population, was further discouraged by Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani generis. Nevertheless, de facto acceptance of polygenism became commonplace following Vatican II. A significant turning point was reached when an effort to have polygenism designated “contrary to Catholic faith” failed to persuade the Council Fathers and the topic was not included in Dei Verbum, the 1965 Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. In 1968, the presentation of polygenism as a viable theological option in The Supplement to A New Catechism was clear evidence that opposition to polygenism within the Roman Curia had abated. Furthermore, a preponderance of post-Vatican II theological discourse on original sin either marginalized monogenism or retained it in a spiritual rather than a biological sense. The historical record shows that theological commitment to monogenism has been more deeply rooted in doctrines of Catholic tradition than was the case for geostasis. Secondly, again in contrast to geostasis, monogenism has been amenable to nuanced conceptual development, including purely spiritual characterizations. These two historical factors provide some explanation for the longstanding Catholic commitment to monogenism.
To the extent that dogmatic convictions premised upon traditional doctrines of original sin continue to be perceived as both compelling and authoritative, it can be expected that some form of theological monogenism will also persist.¹

**Keywords:** *Dei Verbum, Humani generis,* Karl Rahner, monogenism, Paul VI, pre-Adamites.

### 1. Initial Reactions to *Humani generis*

The twelve-year period between the publication of *Humani generis* and the beginning of Vatican II was a time of complex scientific and theological dialectic (Kapusta 2009). It included the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA and the initial applications of protein sequencing and molecular clocks to the study of human evolution, developments that of course could not be foreseen when *Humani generis* was issued on August 12 of 1950. Although the encyclical did not single out any specific proponent of *nouvelle théologie*, it did admonish anyone who would deny the primacy of Thomistic metaphysics as the best vehicle to explicate permanent theological truth. But it also expressed a guarded receptivity to the science of human origins.

Thus, the Teaching of the Church leaves the doctrine of Evolution an open question, as long as it confines its speculations to the development, from other living matter already in existence, of the human body. (That souls are immediately created by God, is a view which the Catholic faith imposes on us.) In the present state of scientific and theological opinion, this question may be legitimately canvassed by research, and by discussion by experts on both sides (Knox 1950, 190).

On the other hand, after a passing reference to those who are “misrepresenting the whole nature of original sin,” Pius XII explicitly ruled out two versions of polygenism. His brief comments were slightly enigmatic and translations of the original Latin to some extent reflected the expectations or prior convictions of the translators. What the pope actually wrote was that, in contrast to the freedom granted to Catholic scholars for research on the general topic of human evolution, and with respect to polygenism in particul-

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¹ Earlier drafts of this essay have been improved due to very helpful comments from Kenneth Kemp who should not be assumed to agree with my analyses or conclusions.
ular, “cum nequaquam appareat quomodo huiusmodi sententia componi queat cum iis quae fontes revelatae veritatis et acta Magisterii Ecclesiae proponunt de peccato originali” (Pius XII 1950). Gustave Weigel credited Ronald Knox with one of the most accurate English translations of the encyclical (Weigel 1951, 544); Knox rendered the crucial phrase *cum nequaquam appareat* by the English “it does not appear.”

There are other conjectures, about polygenism (as it is called), which leave the faithful no such freedom of choice. Christians cannot lend their support to a theory which involves the existence, after Adam’s time, of some earthly race of men, truly so called, who were not descended ultimately from him, or else supposes that Adam was the name given to some group of our primordial ancestors. It does not appear how such a view can be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin, as this is guaranteed to us by Scripture and tradition, and proposed to us by the Church. Original sin is the result of a sin committed, in actual historical fact, by an individual man named Adam, and it is a quality native to all of us, only because it has been handed down by descent from him (Knox 1950, 190).

The Vatican website presently uses a similar translation that “it is in no way apparent” how polygenism is to be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin. In either version, the encyclical’s wording does seem to hold open the possibility that the appearance of incompatibility might be overcome in the future. It also should be noted that *Humani generis* warned that polygenism appeared to be irreconcilable with *fontes revelatae veritatis et acta Magisterii Ecclesiae*; Knox translated this tandem as “Scripture and tradition,” and the relative import of each factor would be subject to scrutiny by both biblical scholars and theologians during the subsequent two decades.

Two general categories of polygenism were suspect. One scenario would involve humans who exist “after Adam’s time” but are not descended from him. This would be the case, for example, if humans originated independently in more than one time and place. This was how polygenism had been defined by Georges Vandebroek, and it would also apply to Hermann Klaatsch’s earlier racial polygenesis (Hofmann 2020b, 108 and 133). These
cases would more accurately be termed polyphyletic polygenism or human polyphyletism. There are other possibilities that might be included in this first category of polygenism depending upon how humanity is characterized, either physically or spiritually. For example, if members of a unique human population contemporary to Adam left human offspring not descended from him and living “after Adam’s time,” this would be a form of monophyletic polygenism included in Pius XII’s first category. During the 1950s and 1960s, hypotheses involving “pre-Adamite” or “co-Adamite” populations were carefully formulated with due concern about this form of polygenism.

Humani generis also precluded a second general category of polygenism in which, using Knox’s translation, “Adam was the name given to some group of our primordial ancestors.” This imprecise wording implies the more common twentieth century form of monophyletic polygenism where “Adam” would refer to the entire initial human population rather than an individual. Reliance upon transitional populations was of course central to the population genetics approach to species change developed by Theodosius Dobzhansky during the 1930s (Dobzhansky 1937). For example, analysis of a single transitional population as the source of Homo sapiens would pertain to the simplest version of what came to be known as the “out of Africa” hypothesis. Although he did not elaborate any detailed examples, Pius XII presumably held that all forms of both polyphyletic and monophyletic polygenism were in apparent conflict with traditional understanding of the origin and transmission of original sin from a unique initial pair of human individuals responsible for the first sin.

Interpretations of the encyclical’s succinct wording ranged over quite a broad spectrum. Anthony Cotter took it to have a very restrictive import; he translated the encyclical’s precautionary sentence on polygenism as “For it is unintelligible how such an opinion can be squared with what the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Magisterium of the Church teach on original sin, which proceeds from sin actually committed

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2 The non-racial hypothesis that during the 1980s became known as multi-regionalism also posits multiple sources for the evolution of modern humans but additionally allows for significant complications such as migration and gene flow.
by an individual Adam, and which, passed on to all by way of generation, is in everyone as his own” (Cotter 1951, 43). Cotter had previously published objections to virtually all aspects of evolutionary theory (Hofmann 2020a, 261), and he maintained this perspective in his commentary with a blunt condemnation of polygenism.

Neither theory can be reconciled with what the Magisterium has always taught on original sin. While the Encyclical is not a new definition on this point, a Catholic would be rash to ignore it. Some die-hards might wish to see a loophole in the words “for it is unintelligible” (cum nequaquam appareat) as if they left the door open for a different decision in the future. This would be an illusion. Polygenism is definitely banned; it should not even be put forward as a hypothesis. Monogenism is the Catholic doctrine, though the Encyclical does not settle the further question what precise theological note it is to be assigned (Cotter 1951, 105).

Cotter’s uncompromising assessment was seconded by Charles Boyer, theology professor at the Pontifical Gregorium University in Rome.

Under the name of Adam, one cannot understand a collectivity, but only an individual. The reason for these affirmations is to be found in the fundamental doctrine of original sin, as found in scripture and fixed by the Councils. A single man sinned and his sin has been transmitted by generation to all men. There is no way to accommodate polygenism. A Christian is not free to sustain it even as a hypothesis. It would certainly be to betray the thought of the Holy Father to see in the formula “cum nequaquam appareat” a door left half-open for a different directive in the future. Polygenism, as defined in the encyclical, is definitely precluded (Boyer 1950, 533).

Although Cotter and Boyer were free to publish their interpretations, Teilhard de Chardin was not allowed that privilege. His writing had been subject to Jesuit censorship since the 1930s and for the rest of his life he was consistently barred from non-scientific publication by either his Superior General or the Holy Office. Shortly after the publication of Humani generis, he wrote a short note, only published posthumously, in which he maintained the position he had held since 1910, namely that the application of mono-
genism and polygenism terminology should be to designate the initial human population as one couple or multiple couples. The pope had also referred to a second mode of polygenism, which Teilhard noted was more accurately called polyphyletism, the descent of humanity through multiple lineages. More substantively, he also pointed out that because science cannot with absolute certainty decide between monogenism and polygenism, they “are in reality purely theological notions, introduced for dogmatic reasons” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971, 209). Nevertheless, concerning monogenism, a scientist “may judge that this hypothesis is rendered scientifically untenable by all we believe we know so far of the biological laws of ‘speciation’ (or ‘genesis of species’)” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971, 210). Here Teilhard had in mind the speciation process from the perspective of population genetics, the gradual change in gene frequencies due to mutation and natural selection. He could only hope that “theologians will somehow come to realize that, in a universe as organically structured as that of which we are now becoming conscious, a solidarity of man, much closer even than that which they seek in ‘the bosom of Mother Eve’, is readily provided for them by the extraordinary internal cohesion of a world which, all around us, is in a state of cosmo- and anthro-genesis” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971, 211).

It would take about fifteen years for Teilhard’s evolutionary conception of human unity to become commonplace in discussions of original sin. In the meantime, a frequently adopted alternative to the uncompromising position of Cotter and Boyer was a tentative acceptance of monogenism subject to reconsideration based upon possible theological progress. For example, along with the prominent Jesuit biblical scholar Jean Levie, Ernest Messenger was one of those who, in the view of Cotter and Boyer, illegitimately saw “a door left half-open” for a future reassessment of polygenism. Messenger repeated Levie’s observation that “the Pope has carefully given the reason why the polygenism in question is to be rejected: he says, not that ‘it is altogether clear that such a theory cannot be reconciled with’ the doctrine of original sin, but ‘it is in no wise clear how such a doctrine can be reconciled with’, etc.” (Messenger 1951, 214; Levie 1950, 789). Although Messenger died on December 25 of 1951, his last comments on polygenism were published
posthumously and he again expressed his views cautiously. On the one hand, “... *Humani generis* does not constitute a final and irreformable decision, or a dogmatic definition on the point in question by the Holy See, and it is for the theologian to examine more closely the nature of the unique sin of Adam and the mystery of its transmission to his descendants” (Messenger 1953, 163). Here Messenger again implied that, if polygenism should prove to be true, theological adjustments may have to be made in the traditional understanding of original sin and its transmission. However, he was not willing to simply consign the issue to scientific inquiry. “Science, on the other hand, does not finally settle the question one way or the other, and a Catholic scholar should experience no very great difficulty in accepting the monogenist hypothesis suggested to him by considerations arising from a different branch of knowledge, i.e. Christian theology” (Messenger 1953, 163). A similar but slightly more conservative position was taken by Marie-Michel Labourdette. He agreed that monogenism could not be theologically assessed in isolation from the defined doctrine of original sin, which of course was why polygenism was ruled out in *Humani generis*. Scientific assertions of polygenism are not only fallible but pertain only to physical phenomena rather than the spiritual domain of salvation history in which monogenism has been revealed. On this point, “our faith is more affirmative than our science” (Labourdette 1953, 165).

In 1951 the American Jesuit Gustave Weigel wrote a bibliographic survey article in which he summarized the first eighteen months of the published literature on the encyclical. Unfortunately, he conflated the two categories of polygenism cited in *Humani generis* in his introductory definition. As to the meaning of the word “polygenism” in the encyclical there was unanimous agreement: the origin of the human race that we know on this our earth, not from a single couple but from an indefinite number of original pairs, unrelated among themselves and directly produced by evolution (Weigel 1951, 544).

In spite of his less than ideal starting point, Weigel did accurately observe that polygenism was not the primary concern of most of the early commentators; much more attention was given to *nouvelle théologie* and...
the reasons for the Vatican’s disapproval. For example, writing in Études, Robert Rouquette emphasized the encyclical’s positive tone concerning evolutionary research and added only a brief comment that, “according to the polygenic hypothesis, the human race would have appeared simultaneously within a multitude of individuals. This is only a hypothesis that, contrary to evolutionism, does not arise from a consideration of observable facts. Under these conditions, the magisterium considers that this pure hypothesis should not be held by the theologian” (Rouquette 1950, 115). As had been the case during the modernist crisis a half century earlier, the status of Thomism as the metaphysical structure for theology was once again in question. Henri de Lubac was frequently singled out by commentators and accused of arguing both that theological truths are subject to changes in philosophical expression and that theology should adopt the language of modern philosophy, especially existentialism (Greenstock 1950).

In those cases where polygenism was discussed at length, attention was sometimes given to improving terminology. Guy Picard defined monogenism as “the doctrine according to which the modern human species only had its origin in a single couple.” Although he then gave a less precise definition of polygenism as “the contrary opinion, which affirms several initially independent couples” (Picard 1951, 65), he did qualify it by distinguishing between polygenism “in the strict sense,” where multiple human couples would be the initial descendants of a single ancestral non-human species, and polyphyletism, the convergent evolution of distinct human populations from several ancestral non-human species. As had been argued by many others, Picard agreed that comparative anatomy gave no support to polyphyletism but did give limited confirmation of polygenism in the strict sense. Picard also presented what he called a “probability argument.” Scientific analysis yields no expectation that the origin of a new species would include a bottleneck of two individuals; there is no empirical reason to expect such a small population during the transitional stage. The relevant mutations take place by chance and would be equally probable for a large number of

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3 By simply equating polygenism with polyphyletic polygenism, Augustin Bea’s claim that scientists had abandoned polygenism was seriously misleading (Bea 1951, 52–54).
individuals. However, Picard also felt that philosophically there was reason to see in the orderly pattern of evolution an imposition of intelligence, God’s creation of an “immense work of art.” From this perspective, “the arrival of a new species is monogenist or polygenist according to the intention of the Author of nature” (Picard 1951, 87). Picard’s conclusion, if not his rather trite philosophical argument, was widely shared by theologians in 1951; monogenism could and should be accepted because it was not absolutely ruled out scientifically and because it is known through “revelation” or, more specifically, the revelatae veritatis et acta Magisterii Ecclesiae (revealed truth and the documents of the Magisterium of the Church) referred to in Humani generis.

The divergence between scientific and theological reactions to the encyclical’s prohibition was inadvertently expressed in an article co-authored in two independent sections by the Louvain anatomist Georges Vandebroek and the Jesuit theologian Léon Renwart (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951). The two parts of the article were not tightly synthesized and the resulting discordance reflected a widening gap between science and orthodox theology. For this publication, Vandebroek revised his earlier 1950 essay and did not include his definitional comments. Recall that Vandebroek’s formulation of polygenesis was not that all humans are descended from one ancestral population, but rather that “the various human races derive from parallel lines that separated from a common stock before attaining the human level” (Vandebroek 1953, 140; Hofmann 2020b, 133). Even if one of these lineages had Adam as its origin, this form of polygenism would assert the existence of other human lineages not descended from Adam. This is presumably the primary version of polygenism Pius XII had in mind when prohibiting the idea that “there existed on this earth true men who did not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the first parent of all.” Secondly, Vandebroek’s broad sense of monogenism was that “all the hominids derive from a single stock that had already attained a human level.” In Renwart’s section of the article, he pointed out that Vandebroek’s notion of monogenism was not how the term was used by theologians unless Vandebroek’s reference to a “single stock” of human
ancestors was restricted to a single couple (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951, 348). Vandebroek also included a long footnote in which he commented that from a scientific perspective the descent of all humans from a single couple was “almost inconceivable” (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951, 341). The resulting message of this co-authored article was highly ambivalent. As a scientist, Vandebroek considered the narrow sense of monogenism to be “almost inconceivable,” while Renwart the theologian held it to be precisely the one dictated by Pius XII. Renwart’s serenely optimistic recommendation was that Catholic scientists should have no reservations about incorporating monogenism into their understanding of human origins. Even though the genetics of large populations is central to the study of evolutionary change, scientific methods cannot detect the defining characteristic of the first humans, the human soul, and scientific research cannot unequivocally refute the monogenetic hypothesis even if it has no parallel in the origin of any other species (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951, 351). In the immediate aftermath of *Humani generis*, Renwart’s conclusion was a typical example of the pervading message from theologians not subject to censorship: in spite of its scientific shortcomings, monogenism must be accepted due to theological doctrines associated with original sin. As Dominique Dubarle commented a few years later, adherence to the pope’s directive in *Humani generis* did not rule out hope that future scientific and theological progress would alleviate any immediate psychological “tension” (D. Dubarle 1957, 90).

2. Pre-Adamite Hypotheses prior to Vatican II

One set of responses to the challenge of *Humani generis* relied upon combinations of biological polygenism and theological monogenism. That is, while sizable populations of individuals biologically equivalent to modern humans might have preceded and coexisted with Adam, he could still be thought of as the first individual to be both human and capable of sin. There were several variations of this idea. In some cases, “pre-Adamites” were thought to be only biologically equivalent to humans and Adam was the first to be ensouled. For other authors, the predecessors were thought of as
ensouled humans who either were not granted the gift of sanctifying grace or who had not reached the state of psychological development needed for the moral responsibility exercised in the first instance by Adam. In all these options, the shared insight was that, by giving Adam a distinct spiritual status within the co-Adamite population, theological monogenism might be preserved by postulating that lineages unrelated to Adam all go extinct.

Although pre-Adamite populations are not mentioned in Genesis, speculation about them is not prohibited by any Catholic doctrine. In a 1911 volume of *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Anthony Maas warned that conflict with doctrines of original sin and the unity of the human race would be avoided as long as no fully human descendants of hypothetical pre-Adamite forebears were thought to survive into the time of Adam and thereafter. In his 1935 article on pre-Adamites for the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, Émile Amann was less assertive and considered the duration of these descendants’ survival to be a complicated open question (Maas 1911; Amann 1935, col 2799).

One of the first reactions to *Humani generis* that relied upon pre-Adamites came from Canon Camille Muller, a botanist at the University of Louvain, who insisted that he wrote as a Catholic scientist without any claim to theological authority. In an earlier 1949 essay, reissued in translation in 1962, Muller had considered the possibility that human groups might have existed “before the one to which Jesus Christ belonged” (Muller 1962, 25). He did not identify these populations with any scientific nomenclature and he argued that the existence of these people would not necessarily contradict the doctrine of the universal scope of the redemptive power of Christ. He did so by drawing upon the elevated state of a human soul when granted the benefit of sanctifying grace. In general, sanctifying grace acts as an infused *habitus*; a sanctified soul is given a disposition or receptivity to the divine will over and beyond natural propensities and is thereby raised to the supernatural order.⁴ Although pre-Adamites were human insofar as they were ensouled, Muller speculated that they may not have been called

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⁴ For an example of contemporary discussion, see Michel 1941.
to the supernatural order (*appelée à l’ordre surnaturel*) through the gift of sanctifying grace. If not, then they could not fall from this order through sin and were not in need of salvation. He noted that their ultimate fate would present a theological puzzle but not one as pressing as that posed by unbaptized children from our own era (Muller 1962, 26). Muller also prudently acknowledged the theoretical possibility of human monogenesis for “our group” of humans: “we could strictly speaking just say that its origin from one pair is not altogether impossible and that the believer may therefore reasonably admit designs of a higher order without attempting to determine it scientifically” (Muller 1962, 26).

In his 1951 commentary on *Humani generis*, Muller interpreted the encyclical as an encouragement for scientists to pose new theological questions based upon the modern understanding of human evolution. He repeated a long passage from his 1949 essay and again considered possible “human groups” existing prior to the “definitive humanity” that began with Adam. He acknowledged that it is a matter of faith that Christ died for all of sinful humanity, a single genealogy descended from the initial sinner. He then cited Robert De Sinéty’s 1928 article on “Transformisme” to point out that at Trent the Council Fathers could not have foreseen the scientific investigation of ancient life; they necessarily thought of human unity within the restricted scope of modern humans (De Sinéty 1928). Muller considered it plausible that God bestowed sanctifying grace upon a single couple within a larger population of co-Adamites and he then offered for consideration a hypothetical “less strict” form of monogenism.

Through the successive unions of the descendants of several primitive couples (including the initial couple of *Genesis*), a very limited number of generations would be enough for all men to be descended from the first man of which *Genesis* speaks (without requiring marriages between brothers and sisters), and, just as likely perhaps, for all modern humanity (the only ones the Fathers of the councils would have considered) to be tainted by original sin and saved by Christ. Would not this still be monogenism, less strict, but equally efficacious? (Muller 1951a, 304).
Under this scenario, interbreeding between the direct descendants of Adam and Eve would take place with their human contemporaries. After an indefinite period of time, all lineages stemming from “primitive couples” that did not include this interbreeding could be presumed to die out. After that point, all humans would be able to trace their ancestry back to Adam and Eve and would have inherited the results of original sin. This state of affairs would have been reached well before the time when the Council Fathers at Trent proclaimed that all humans are descended from Adam. Because the genealogical descendants of Adam would include all living humans “after a limited number of generations,” Muller’s hypothesis could be considered a “less strict” form of theological monogenism. However, there would be a period of time during which some human lineages existed that were not descended from Adam and this would appear to violate the prohibition in *Humani generis* against that category of polygenism. Muller’s succinct expression of theological monogenism was not widely discussed by theologians; most were more inclined to reassess the doctrine of original sin than to try to make monogenism compatible with evolutionary biology. For example, André-Marie Dubarle took note of Muller’s expansive interpretation of *Humani generis* but did not mention his efforts to preserve monogenism (A.-M. Dubarle 1964, 228).

Muller also was quite assertive in complaining that Pius XII had understated the status of evolution among scientists; he admitted that arguments continued about evolutionary lineages and causal mechanisms, but the scientific world “is convinced of the fact of evolution” (Muller 1951a, 301). Although accurate, this declaration contradicted high-profile statements by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, who still insisted upon calling evolution an unproven hypothesis (Garrigou-Lagrange 1948, 200). Furthermore, in a speech in September of 1953, Pius XII seconded Garrigou-Lagrange’s view and added that “if most researchers present the doctrine of descent as a ‘fact’, this constitutes a hasty judgment” (Pius XII 1953). This point of contention may have been one reason why the pamphlet reprint of Muller’s

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5 Muller did not invoke Adam’s longevity to speculate that he survived past the expiration date of these lineages.
1951 essay was placed on the *Index of Forbidden Books* in December of 1953 (Muller 1951b).

Andrew Alexander offered a defense of monogenism that was more theologically acceptable than Muller’s but was premised upon an improbable genetic hypothesis (Alexander 1964). He speculated that the final stage in the transition from the non-human to the human physical body transpired through a single genetic mutation in one individual out of a larger population, a scenario that René Lavocat would pointedly reject as scientifically unrealistic several years later (Lavocat 1967b). Alexander imagined that one novel gene made Adam suitable for ensoulment and hominization and that this crucial gene could then be passed on to offspring who would in turn become human upon introduction of souls. Ensoulment would also be granted to the offspring of interbreeding between direct descendants of Adam and non-human co-Adamites; all humans would necessarily be genealogically descended from Adam while purely non-human lineages went extinct. Alexander managed to preserve theological monogenism but only at the cost of a scientifically improbable genetic hypothesis.

Another brief discussion of pre-Adamites published in the immediate aftermath of *Humani generis* was provided by Charles Journet, a long-standing professor of dogmatic theology at the diocesan major seminary in Fribourg. His extensive contributions to apologetics were informed by his relatively conservative Thomism and his concern for papal authority. In his 1951 *Petit Catéchisme sur les Origines du Monde*, Journet used a question-and-answer format to explain how monogenetic human origins might be integrated into an evolutionary perspective. One possibility was that, out of a pre-existing non-human population, one couple was ensouled and became the first humans from whom all subsequent humans descend (Journet 1951, 41). Another option would involve ensoulment of an entire preexisting non-human population prior to the choice of one couple to play a role in subsequent spiritual development. “It is from these men that God, in order to inaugurate on earth the order of grace, would set aside one couple. He would form them in his image and bestow upon them original justice. Only the descendants of this group would survive the catastrophes.
of prehistory” (Journet 1951, 42). By postulating appropriate extinctions of all lineages other than that of Adam and Eve, either scenario could be scripted to preserve theological monogenism. The Petit Catéchisme was not a venue where an extensive discussion was to be expected and Journet did not address any of the relevant scientific issues. In response to the question of whether polygenism should be rejected as irreconcilable with revelation, he simply quoted the relevant section from Human generis and repeated the truism that science could not unequivocally prove either monogenism or polygenism. Journet later participated in one the pre-conciliar theological commissions for Vatican II and was appointed Cardinal by Paul VI in 1965. Shortly thereafter he would serve on the commission of Cardinals responsible for an evaluation of the controversial New Catechism, an investigation that would result in a Supplement in which polygenism was presented as a legitimate possibility.

Giovanni Blandino was relatively unconcerned about the importance of monogenism and placed more emphasis on the process of sin’s transmission. Trained in philosophy, theology, and biology, Blandino was a prolific author who taught for many years at the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome where he accepted the plausibility of the human body’s evolution from non-human ancestors. In a 1962 essay on original sin, he presented for theological consideration two “hypotheses” involving a pre-Adamite population. Blandino reserved the term “human” to refer only to individuals in which human souls have been introduced and he considered both pre-Adamites and co-Adamites to be human in this sense. However, he also proposed a time period of indefinite duration during which human mental capacity developed to the point at which it became capable of understanding revealed truth and moral injunction. Although the Genesis text does not distinguish between the initial production of humans and a subsequent infusion of sanctifying grace, Blandino argued that the conflation of separate events for expository purposes is not uncommon in biblical literature. Furthermore, to refer to Adam as “the first man,” as is the case in the Trent documents, “may be only a repetition of biblical expressions, without any intention to define that the first couple elevated
to the supernatural state had no human ancestors” (Blandino 1962, 4). With this understanding of human development in mind, Blandino proposed his first “hypothesis”.⁶

Perhaps the human couple that was the first to receive sanctifying grace from God, as well as other preternatural gifts, and that committed the original sin and from which the entire human race descends, was not the first human couple to live on earth, but was engendered by pre-existing humans (Blandino 1962, 1).

Blandino added that, when Adam and Eve failed the test set for them by God, they lost the supernatural gifts they had been accorded, both for themselves and all their descendants. Although he agreed with the tradition that all modern humans are descended from Adam and Eve, it would have taken some time for unrelated lineages of co-Adamites to die out. The extent of this time period would depend upon whether or not the direct descendants of Adam and Eve interbred with co-Adamites and their offspring. The case in which this interbreeding did take place was the second of Blandino’s hypothetical scenarios, and the one he preferred. Even though pre-Adamites and co-Adamites were human and left some offspring who were not descended from Adam and Eve, Blandino calculated that, after approximately ten thousand years of interbreeding, all humans would have either maternal or paternal ancestry going back to Adam and Eve. “In order to enter the world with original sin and to inherit the promise of salvation, it suffices to descend from Adam and Eve through a single branch, that is, either the paternal line or the maternal line” (Blandino 1962, 2).

Both of Blandino’s two hypothetical scenarios appeared to conform to Catholic doctrine insofar as original sin was depicted as a sin by one couple transmitted through generation to all humans existing after approximately the time of Abraham. However, prior to that point in time, the existence of human descendants of co-Adamites not subject to the effects of original sin was problematic. As was the case for Muller, because Blandino considered co-Adamites to be human, both of his hypotheses at least nominally

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⁶ Blandino noted that Charles Journet had mentioned this idea in his 1951 *Petit Catéchisme.*
included polygenism and stood in apparent conflict with the *Humani generis* prohibition. Blandino was never publicly sanctioned; whether he was ever delated to the Holy Office might be determined when relevant archival records are subject to research.\(^7\)

During the 1950s and early 1960s few theologians were willing to make a serious commitment to the existence of pre-Adamites. The German Jesuit Karl Rahner commented that, even though the idea is not prohibited, “this is not to say that a theologian may not hold that Pre-Adamitism is a theory which is scientifically speaking arbitrary, as well as being absurd and dangerous theologically” (Rahner 1961, 233). The admission of human pre-Adamites “would imply a divine decree in which not all spiritual creatures were called to the vision of God by grace” (Rahner 1969, 105). Contrary to Muller and Blandino, Rahner considered it unacceptable to imagine that, prior to original sin, God would withhold sanctifying grace from any individuals who could legitimately be referred to as human (Rahner 1962, col. 561; Rahner 1970, 187). Nevertheless, in spite of Jean Levie’s comment that pre-Adamite theory had had its “hour of celebrity” (Levie 1950, 789), the idea survived and would be discussed more widely after Vatican II. Meanwhile, although prior to 1950 German theologians had not published as profusely on monogenism as had the French, they now became more engaged with the issue. In particular, Karl Rahner gave an influential argument that, although monogenism is theologically certain, it does not have a secure basis in scripture. His complex argument contributed to concern over how original sin doctrine should be included in a broader understanding of the relationship of scripture and tradition to revelation, an inquiry that would intensify during the Vatican II years.

\(^7\) According to Henri-Marie Guindon, Blandino submitted his ideas to a Vatican II theology commission in 1962 (Guindon 1979, 107). He also reprinted his 1962 essay in the 1977 first volume of his three-volume collection of essays, *Questioni dibattute di teologia* although by this later date he no longer ascribed to his earlier views.
3. Pre-Conciliar Developments and Vatican II

Two events bracketed the decade between 1954 and 1964, a period of uncertainty in which a significant turning point was reached. In 1954 Karl Rahner supplied an argument against polygenism that ratified the *Humani generis* prohibition and affirmed monogenism as theologically certain. Ten years later, a chapter of a Vatican II preliminary schema that would have targeted polygenism as contradictory to Catholic doctrine was not considered worthy of discussion by the council and was not incorporated into *Dei Verbum*, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. This decision in effect marked the end of concerted effort by anti-polygenists within the Roman Curia to mandate the acceptance of monogenism.

When *Humani generis* was issued in 1950, Karl Rahner was a Professor of Dogmatics at the University of Innsbruck. Despite the interruption of World War II, he had begun to assert himself as an independent thinker with a philosophical penchant for drawing subtle distinctions in the exploration of hypothetical premises and their contingent implications. His zeal for sustained theological argument and his relentless stamina for lecturing, public speaking, editing, and prolific publication would make him one of the most influential German theologians during the 1960s. His nuanced analysis of monogenism first appeared in 1954 and was reprinted in English translation in 1961 (Rahner 1954 and 1961; McMahon 2002a). Although his argument that monogenism is theologically certain temporarily supported a conservative reading of *Humani generis*, Rahner would reverse his position in 1966. His initial discussion is an important example of theological reluctance to abandon monogenism during the years between *Humani generis* and Vatican II.

Rahner began by explaining the sense in which he was using the category “theologically certain:”

... by theologically certain we mean anything of which on the one hand it cannot be said with absolute certainty that it is revealed by God and is indubitably taught as such by the Church; and which on the other hand can legitimately claim our interior assent, in such a way that a contrary doctrine is not tolerated by the Church (Rahner 1961, 234).
The *Humani generis* prohibition of polygenesis certainly proclaimed that it was not to be tolerated.

What is said of polygenism formally and substantially characterized in this way is that it is not a free opinion in the Church, it cannot be held. Thus it is not permitted positively to defend polygenism even as a possible theory or scientific hypothesis, the grounds of this inadmissibility being of course theological and not derived from natural science. Quite intentionally, a more precise theological qualification (for instance, ‘This opinion is heretical’) is not given. Thus the only theological qualification of monogenism which may be derived from the encyclical just by itself is that it is theologically certain (Rahner 1961, 233).

Rahner’s goal was to provide a detailed explanation of how polygenism contradicted doctrine, an argument that *Humani generis* had not included. While avoiding any direct engagement with scientific issues, his discussion was three-pronged: exegetical, doctrinal, and more briefly, metaphysical. From an exegetical perspective, Rahner was convinced that although the author of Genesis asserted the unity of humanity using a monogenetic narrative form, this did not mean that monogenism itself was also being taught. Furthermore, Saint Paul simply repeated the wording of the Genesis source and should not be attributed independent significance on this score. Rahner placed more weight on indirect arguments in which the assumption of polygenism leads to a contradiction with doctrine that thereby confirms monogenism.

The indirect proof of monogenism consists in the demonstration that it is an indispensable presupposition of the doctrines of redemption and original sin as these are contained in Scriptures and in its interpretation by Tradition and the Church’s *magisterium*; and that in this sense it is taught in Scripture. That this proof must be regarded as the most important of all may also be seen from the arguments with which ‘Humani Generis’ justifies its rejection of polygenism, though with the utmost brevity (Rahner, 1961, 268).

Rahner first considered the most commonly used indirect proof in which the assumption of polygenism is said to conflict with the Tridentine doctrine of
original sin as a singular historical event with effects transmitted through *propagatione*. Rahner noted that although the term *propagatione* must be contrary to *imitatione*, it might not have to be restricted to direct physical descent. He then offered for consideration a polygenetic hypothesis in which direct descent would not be necessary for the initial transmission of sin’s effects to all co-Adamites.

The first man created in the state of original justice is nominated by God as the trustee, in respect of the justice compulsorily intended by God for all men, for all the men who follow him, whether they descend from him physically or not. This first man loses original justice for himself and all other men. Thus all are subject to original sin. The universality of original sin and its unity of origin are preserved. It is through Adam that all are subject to original sin, the other first pairs not indeed *generatione*, but *per inoboidentiam primi hominis, non imitatione*. Soon, one could go on, all these men become so mixed that there was no longer a single man left who did not go back to Adam *generatione* as well (Rahner 1961, 270–271).

This polygenetic scenario would conform to the requirement that original sin was a unique event with universal effect. To make the indirect argument for monogenism compelling would require ruling out this hypothetical counterexample through an additional argument that the correct understanding of *propagation* must be limited to direct physical inheritance. Rahner had reservations about that train of thought; in 1966 he would explicitly reject it and also drop his objections to polygenism. For the present, he considered a second indirect proof to be more promising. He insisted that the doctrine of universal salvation requires that Christ be of common human “stock” and he cited numerous New Testament references to the incarnation that go beyond mere symbolic expression to make this point.

The emphasis laid upon the identity of origin and on the assumption of a human nature precisely as historically incriminated ... shows clearly that Christ’s brotherhood with us can be neither a mere community of disposition or of grace, nor one based purely upon the specifically human nature. Rather, he enters
redemptively into our one common history of guilt, which is one because it is the history of our physically real common stock (Rahner 1961, 276).

At this stage in Rahner’s thinking, although he suspected that the required universal transmission of the effects of original sin might be construed in such a way as to allow polygenism, he could not imagine an analogous compatibility with his understanding of the incarnation and redemption. “All we have said about the situation of salvation and damnation may be summed up as follows: Scripture knows of such a common situation of salvation and ruin only in so far as men are of one stock” (Rahner 1961, 279). Furthermore, “A universal situation of damnation is only conceivable, supposing it to be based upon the community of a stock, if it is historically established at the origin of this community,” that is, with the first two individuals of the Genesis narrative (Rahner 1961, 281). Consequently, the prohibition of polygenism in *Humani generis* was appropriate and requires adherence to the theological certainty of monogenism “with inner (but not in itself irreformable) assent” (Rahner 1961, 234).

Hans Küng, more reliant upon scripture rather than doctrinal tradition as a basis for his theology, once gave an apt description of Rahner’s deft theological skill that applies to his defense of monogenism: “As a master of theological dialectics he transforms his historical no into a dogmatic yes” (Küng 2008, 332). Rahner added a more succinct metaphysical argument using a principle of parsimony; since it would suffice to initiate humanity through a single couple, polygenesis would be superfluous. But in 1954 he primarily maintained that monogenism was appropriately ruled theologically certain due to an indirect argument that polygenism contradicted doctrines of salvation, the reasoning he believed was the best motivation for the *Humani generis* prohibition.

As might be expected, Rahner’s argument was seconded by those who agreed with his conclusion. Nevertheless, during 1957 and 1958 several theologians also alluded to the disturbing incompatibility between scientific support for polygenism and theological commitment to monogenism. Johannes Feiner, a Swiss professor of fundamental theology at the Chur...
seminary, contributed to a collection of essays originally published in 1957 and reissued in the United States in 1965. For Feiner, “Monogenism is an important instance in the encounter between the Church’s teaching and the scientific concept of the world,” a situation in which Feiner alleged that “as yet no final certainty has been reached on either side” (Feiner 1965, 54). Feiner held that polygenism would require “an essential change of the Church’s teaching concerning original sin and redemption,” a change he was not willing to condone (Feiner 1965, 54–55). He agreed with Rahner that scripture alone could not resolve the issue and he also commended Rahner’s indirect argument against polygenism, that is, that the universal redemptive intercession of Christ is based upon membership in the human race, “a true community of flesh and blood ‘from one’” (Feiner 1965, 55). Feiner also agreed with Rahner that this understanding of Christ’s lineage is a revealed doctrine of the New Testament. “This Christological truth requires that the unity of race be understood in a strict sense, as a fact dependent on a first man who establishes the totality of the race in its historical origin” (Feiner 1965, 55). Consequently, monogenism must be accepted, even if contrary to “our modern habits of thinking” (Feiner 1965, 56).

The growing malaise associated with the topic of monogenism during the 1950s was clearly articulated by the Dubarle brothers, André-Marie and Dominique Dubarle, both French Dominicans. André-Marie published his first book on original sin in 1958; during Vatican II he would thoroughly revise it for an American edition in which he contributed to the new perspectives of the early 1960s (A.-M. Dubarle 1964). In 1957, Dominique Dubarle acknowledged that with respect to monogenism, “We therefore find ourselves, for the moment, in the presence of a certain tension between the more or less spontaneous intellectual tendency among certain believers and a determination maintained by theologians, with the sanction of the magisterium authority, in a matter of faith” (D. Dubarle 1957, 89). Dubarle advised that the “psychological difficulty” of this tension should be accepted as part of an active spiritual life; adherence to monogenism as a point of faith did not rule out hope that scientific and theological progress would eventually clarify the situation.
While Dominique Dubarle included in his discussion a conventional summary of the Catholic doctrine of the divine introduction of human souls, Rahner was at that time proposing a more innovative account of hominization. In his *Das Problem der Hominisation*, Rahner concentrated on how the human soul might originate without miraculous divine intervention. In his references to “Adam” and the “first man” he seemed to tacitly assume monogenism, although he did not make this explicit, and he affirmed that the biblical account is silent about how humanity originated, informing us only that it received a unique spiritual status. With respect to evolutionary theory in general, Rahner wrote that he detected a new consensus forming “behind the facade of printed theology” (Rahner 1965, 29). Furthermore, “the change of view has taken place more rapidly in the oral teaching of lectures (which are much more numerous and livelier than printed textbooks), than in printed books, which are few and always voice the views of only a small number of theologians” (Rahner 1965, 30). Nevertheless, in his 1962 article on monogenism for the *Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche*, Rahner reaffirmed the conservative position that polygenism cannot be scientifically proven and that “On theological grounds, monogenism must be maintained in any case” (Rahner 1962, col 562). So it certainly was not Rahner’s position on polygenism that resulted in the warning he received in 1962 that he would need to submit future writing to a preliminary Roman censorship. His views on ensoulment, Mariology, and concelebration of the Eucharist were more likely to have been in question. Later that year Pope John XXIII appointed him *peritus* for Vatican II and the threat of censorship was lifted in 1963 (Vorgrimler 1986, 92–93). Rahner’s acceptance of polygenism later in the 1960s would contribute to the new theological climate of that period.

The death of Teilhard de Chardin on the evening of Easter Sunday in 1955 was followed by a new phase in the impact of his work. Collections of his writings now were systematically published in response to extensive interest in his legacy. The Jesuit Edouard Boné was one of a new generation of Catholic paleontologists who explicitly drew inspiration from Teilhard’s example. In the year of Teilhard’s death, Boné began a prestigious career as a paleontologist and theologian at the University of Louvain. He wrote
an assessment of the Piltdown fraud shortly after it was revealed (Boné 1955), and his celebration of Teilhard’s life appeared in the *Revue des questions scientifiques* (Boné 1956). Boné was fulsome in his praise for Teilhard’s scientific work and his efforts to achieve a philosophical and theological synthesis with Christianity; he did not mention the strained relationship Teilhard had endured with his religious superiors. During 1959 Boné completed a review of the polygenism issue in which he wrote from a scientific perspective and did not introduce theological issues (Boné 1960). He accurately noted that, while nineteenth century debate had concentrated on the question of human races arising from one or multiple ancestral human lineages, twentieth century theologians had shifted attention to the alleged origin through a single couple. In addition to Teilhard, Boné credited Henri Vallois for appropriately using the terminology of monophyletism and polyphytism to analyze the nineteenth century issue of the unity of the human race. Boné retained this usage and reserved the distinction between monogenism and polygenism for discussion of whether human origins took place within a population or by means of a single couple. He then compared two approaches to speciation, either rapidly due to a crucial mutation, or more slowly through the gradual fixation of multiple mutations subject to natural selection. In neither case is monogenism at all scientifically probable. In this respect, Boné cited Teilhard and the Bouyssonie brothers approvingly, as well as geneticists who were accomplishing the neo-Darwinian synthesis: George Gaylord Simpson, Ronald Fisher, Sewall Wright, and J.B.S. Haldane. The scientific arguments against monogenism had become far too strong to simply ignore or dismiss as uncertain. Boné returned to the issue in 1962, again quoting Teilhard extensively and using him and Robert de Sinéty as support for the conclusion that monogenesis had no standing from a purely scientific perspective (Boné 1962). There was no scientific reason to doubt that humanity had the same type of polygenetic origin as other animal species and the best available theory of speciation included a slow process of mutation and natural selection, the population genetics of Neo-Darwinism. Boné acknowledged that the theory still had its detractors, but it was the best
one available and any forthcoming objections to polygenism could only be expected from theological quarters.

Conservative theological voices were of course still in evidence. When the American Jesuit Cyril Vollert contributed an essay on Genesis and evolution to a symposium held at Duquesne in 1959, his reading of *Humani generis* was that it decidedly ruled out polygenism, albeit not because of direct scriptural revelation, but because of the doctrine of original sin enshrined in tradition.

Pius XII states that polygenism is incompatible with the dogma of original sin. The supposition of a collective Adam is untenable because it is out of joint with what the sources of revelation and the acts of the magisterium of the Church proclaim about original sin, which stems from a sin truly committed by an individual person, Adam. This declaration of the Holy Father decides the question and closes discussions, formerly engaged in by some theologians, on the reconciliation of the polygenist hypothesis with faith (Vollert 1959, 116).

Jean de Fraine drew more nuanced conclusions similar to those of Rahner. Although at Trent the bodily transmission of original sin from Adam was not declared doctrine, it certainly was presumed. “If we deny theological monogenesis, the transmission of original sin is in danger of being denied too. Therefore we consider the denial of the descent of mankind from one single couple as at least temerarious” (De Fraine 1962, 74). Nevertheless, de Fraine concluded that Pius XII’s stance against polygenism was not irrevocable and he expected further theological investigation of the issue.

Meanwhile, on June 30 of 1962, just prior to the opening session of Vatican II, the Congregation of the Holy Office issued a “Monitum” concerning Teilhard de Chardin. This admonition asserted that Teilhard’s writings “abound in such ambiguities and indeed even serious errors, as to offend Catholic doctrine. For this reason, the most eminent and most revered Fathers of the Holy Office exhort all Ordinaries as well as the superiors of Religious institutes, rectors of seminaries and presidents of universities, effectively to protect the minds, particularly of the youth, against the dangers presented by the works of Fr. Teilhard de Chardin and of his followers” (Congregation of the Holy Office 1962). No specific doctrines or followers
were mentioned. Publication of Teilhard’s collected works, including his discussions of original sin, continued amid a high demand indicative of the disparity between the closed perspective typical of the Roman Curia and the more receptive mentality of many working theologians on the eve of Vatican II.

Although the council would not result in any new doctrinal definitions, this was not a foregone conclusion in 1959 when John XXIII announced his intention to convolve it. Only after extensive debate and negotiation would the Council Fathers decide to reaffirm general principles for the sources of revelation rather than define new doctrines of original sin, for example. Trent had of course left a legacy bearing upon both of these topics. In addition to its canons on original sin, it had decreed that the truths of the gospel are preserved in written books and in unwritten tradition. It was well known that this formulation replaced an earlier proposal using the wording “partly in written books and partly in unwritten tradition,” a formula that some parties found objectionable because it implied that scripture and tradition each was incomplete and only partly conveyed the truths of the gospel (Schelkens 2010, 85). Josef Geiselmann had revived this issue during the 1950s and Stanislaus Lyonnet further complicated the situation by pointedly arguing that the Tridentine contributions to original sin doctrine were not supported by scripture.\(^8\) Given the complexity of this context, it is not surprising that the composition of the council’s Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation became contentious.

During 1960 and 1961, the Preparatory Theological Commission, headed by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, Secretary of the Holy Office, drafted several initial schemata concerning the sources of doctrine and its preservation. Among these schemata, \textit{De fontibus revelationis} (On the Sources of Revelation), especially emphasized a broadly understood concept of tradition as a more extensive source of revelation than scripture (Baum 1967; Schelkens 2010). Another schema, \textit{De deposito fidei pure custodiendo} (Defending Intact the Deposit of Faith), included specific material pertaining to original sin,\(^8\)

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\(^8\) See, for example, Geiselmann 1958 and Lyonnet 1955 and 1956.
particularly in its Chapter VIII, “Original Sin in the Children of Adam.” As might be expected from a commission predisposed to emphasize tradition more than scriptural exegesis, the wording of Humani generis was expanded in De deposito fidei to include the assertion that acceptance of polygenism would be to “contradict Catholic doctrine.” 9 During 1962 the preliminary schemata were pre-circulated to the Fathers of the Council who in many cases sought commentary from theologians before submitting their assessments to the Papal Secretary of State, Amleto Cicognani. For example, critiques of De deposito fidei were provided by Karl Rahner for Cardinal Franz König, Joseph Ratzinger for Cardinal Joseph Frings, and Pieter Mulders for Archbishop Giuseppe Beltrami. These responses were generally very critical. The document was considered too reminiscent of the “syllabus of errors” approach to doctrinal uniformity. It condemned positions still under debate among Catholic theologians and had the negative tone of an admonition from the Holy Office rather than the celebratory affirmation of Catholicism called for by John XXIII. Ratzinger, for example, concluded that De deposito fidei was “in no way suitable but is so faulty that as it stands it cannot be proposed to the Council” (Wicks 2008, 267). During the first session of Vatican II, De deposito fidei was not considered worthy of discussion and was never put to a vote; the topics of evolution, monogenism, and original sin would not be addressed in detail in any conciliar documents.10

9 An English translation of the schema De deposito fidei pure custodiendo has been provided by Joseph Komonchak. One passage of Chapter VIII pertained directly to monogenism: “The sacred Synod, therefore, rejects the views of those who assert either that after Adam there have been here on earth true men who did not derive by natural generation from that one first parent or that Adam represents some multitude of first parents; such views contradict Catholic doctrine. For it is not at all apparent how such views are compatible with what the sources of revealed truth and the acts of the Church’s Magisterium present about original sin, which proceeds from the sin truly committed by the one Adam and which is transmitted to all by generation, and which is in each person as his own.” https://jacomonchak.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/defending-the-deposit-of-faith.pdf. Jared Wicks attributes the editorial composition of the document to Luigi Ciappi (Wicks 2018, 53).

10 For full citations to brief references to Adam or original sin in the relevant documents, see Vandervelde 1981, 46–47. For example, Gaudium et Spes included an allusion to Saint Paul’s oft-cited correlation: “For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord” (Gaudium et Spes, ¶ 22). For the procedural history of De deposito fidei and De fontibus revelationis, see Wicks 2001, Wicks 2018, and Schelkens 2010.
Based upon similar widespread dissatisfaction and lengthy debate, the more foundational schema *De fontibus revelationis* was removed from the council’s agenda through an intervention by John XXIII and a reconstituted committee was assigned to rewrite it. Ultimately, on November 18th of 1965, Pope Paul VI approved the final version of Vatican II’s *Dei Verbum*, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. Although the fraught relationship between scripture and tradition was not resolved, *Dei Verbum* did not include the preference given to tradition in *De deposito fidei* and it encouraged exegetes to apply modern analytic techniques to scripture.

To search out the intention of the sacred writers, attention should be given, among other things, to “literary forms.” For truth is set forth and expressed differently in texts which are variously historical, prophetic, poetic, or of other forms of discourse. The interpreter must investigate what meaning the sacred writer intended to express and actually expressed in particular circumstances by using contemporary literary forms in accordance with the situation of his own time and culture (Paul VI 1965).

The import of *Dei Verbum*, and Vatican II more generally, for the issue of monogenism thus was important but muted. The effort by representatives of the Holy Office to have polygenesis declared contradictory to Catholic faith was forestalled and historically based scriptural exegesis was encouraged. On the other hand, theological discussion of original sin had in practice already shifted focus from biblical sources to the implications of tradition; *Dei Verbum* offered little guidance for this endeavor. As John Thiel has recently argued, “*Dei Verbum*’s clear teaching on the legitimate role of historical criticism in the interpretation of Scripture provides the proper precedent for addressing the role of historical criticism in the interpretation of tradition” (Thiel 2020, 231). Edward Yarnold had already clearly expressed this point in 1971. “It has rightly been pointed out that it is inconsistent to reject fundamentalism in the exegesis of the Bible while insisting on a fundamentalist interpretation of the Church’s definitions of dogma. The same interpretive techniques apply in both areas” (Yarnold 1971, 88). In the specific case of original sin, elucidation of the distinction between the substance of doctrine
and its historical formulation through a particular means of expression was pursued with new enthusiasm during the years immediately after the Council. The abandoned schema *De deposito fidei* would be one of the last efforts by members of the Roman Curia to invoke tradition to insist that polygenism be excluded from Catholic doctrine. The contrast between the generally positive outlook of *Dei Verbum* and the prohibitive strictures that had been proposed in *De deposito fidei* indicates that a crucial turning point had been reached and that concern for the preservation of monogenism as at least theologically certain had decidedly waned.

4. Post-Vatican II Developments of the 1960s

During the Vatican II years, and throughout the 1960s, publications on the topics of original sin and polygenism increased exponentially. The elimination of the *Index of Prohibited Books* in 1966 was symptomatic of the fact that the Holy See was no longer capable of efficiently monitoring the sheer volume of modern publications. At the end of 1965 Paul VI also reconfigured the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office as the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF). The pope himself became the Prefect of the CDF with Alfredo Ottaviani, the former Secretary of the Holy Office, now serving as CDF Pro-Prefect. In 1968 Paul VI withdrew from the CDF, Ottaviani resigned, and Franjo Šeper became Prefect until 1981. During the two decades after Vatican II Ottaviani and Šeper thus were the two most influential members of the Roman Curia with respect to determination of doctrinal orthodoxy. Two generalizations characterize developments during this period. Theological discourse featured novel presentations of original sin that either pushed monogenism to the periphery as irrelevant or explicitly incorporated polygenism. Secondly, the CDF did not raise objections to polygenism even though, on a straightforward reading of *Humani generis*, it should not have been acceptable.

Terminology had finally stabilized by this point and polygenism was rarely confused with polyphyletism, the racial polygenism of the nineteenth century. For example, Pieter Smulders articulated this distinction in a re-
freshingly clear analysis, initially written in 1963 (Smulders 1967). He also argued that the essential doctrine of original sin does not necessarily include monogenism, even though this is the narrative form in which the doctrine has traditionally been presented. The methodology of Neo-Darwinism obviously relies upon polygenism, but, as had been pointed out by so many others, Smulders agreed that empirical evidence alone could not absolutely rule out monogenism, the longstanding preference of the magisterium.

While Smulders’ point was commonplace among conservative theologians, more innovative thinkers took the theology of the 1960s in directions where a defense of monogenism rarely arose. In his historical analysis of this period, George Vandervelde used the terms “situationalist” and “personalist” to refer to two general approaches (Vandervelde 1981). Largely inspired by the Dutch Jesuit Piet Schoonenberg, the situationalist school included variations later developed by Karl Rahner, Karl-Heinz Weger and André-Marie Dubarle, among others. Influential personalists included Alfred Vanneste and Urs Baumann. In addition to taking a Christocentric orientation, these theologians shifted emphasis to *peccatum originale originatum*, the present reality of the fallen human condition, as opposed to *peccatum originale originans*, the origin or cause of this condition. Using this scholastic distinction introduced by Augustine, the discussion of monogenism and polygenism pertains primarily to original sin *originans* and only indirectly to original sin *originatum*. In both the situationalist and the personalist approaches, monogenism was not so much refuted as it was ignored as a scientific issue irrelevant to the discussion of *peccatum originale originatum*. As is frequently the case in the history of philosophy, some unresolved questions are simply left behind by a change in focus, a change in the topic of conversation. Some

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11 This distinction is generally preserved linguistically in English, French, and Italian by expressing *peccatum originale originans* as originating original sin, péché originel originant and peccato originale originante respectively. Similarly, *peccatum originale originatum* becomes originated original sin, péché originel originé, and peccato originale originato. In German, the distinction is sometimes expressed by using Ursünde for *peccatum originale originans* and Erbsünde for *peccatum originale originatum*. See Gutwender 1967, 433.

12 See McMahon 2002b, 202.
details of this process are worth consideration as an important transitional phase in the disengagement from monogenism.

Piet Schoonenberg provided pivotal inspiration for the situationist school of thought in which original sin is understood as a collective state of sin, the “sin of the world.” Here Schoonenberg adopted the phrase used by John the Baptist in John 1:29, “Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world,” emphasizing that John referred to the sin of the world, not the sin of Adam. He characterized original sin as the “being in situation” (Situiertsein) of each person within a spiritually hostile environment. Recognizing that traditional theological discussion of original sin had concentrated on the sin of Adam, Schoonenberg set out to refocus attention on the present human condition, as in his only direct allusion to monogenism in his 1962 essay.

Did the first sin of humanity also change our human nature biologically? If so, it still also embodied our situation for the “death of the soul.” If not, it is merely the terrible beginning of the dominance of sin which clearly expresses itself in the personal sinning of each person. The answer to this question, which also is closely tied to the question as to whether monogenism is postulated by the Church’s doctrine of original sin, still appears unclear to us (Schoonenberg 1962, 68–69).

Schoonenberg considered the origin of the sin of the world, and the issue of monogenism in particular, to be relatively unimportant and he gave much more attention to an analysis of the consequences of sin, the debased state of humanity in need of redemption. Schoonenberg’s ideas became widely accessible through his 1965 book *Man and Sin*; after discussing at some length his conception of the sin of the world, he analyzed the history of the magisterium’s teachings on original sin.

An influence of more than one ancestor – that is, polygenism – is not envisaged by the Fathers of Trent. But since they did not intend to say more than that the unity of original sin consists only in its origin, they do not propose as an article of faith the image which they held of that origin. ... We do not find in Trent any direct reason for making monogenism a doctrine of faith (Schoonenberg 1965, 175).
Schoonenberg admitted that the most difficult issue for his approach is the origin of the sinful situation. Instead of using the scholastic terminology of *peccatum originans* and *peccatum originatum*, he simply asked “Does that origin lie in ‘Adam’ or in ‘the world’? Should Adam perhaps be equated with ‘the world’; that is, with sinful humanity?” (Schoonenberg 1965, 187). Here it was crucial to separate the issue of monogenism from the central core of original sin doctrine, or, as Schoonenberg put this point, “the theological question can only be whether that descent from one couple of first parents is or is not contained in the dogma of original sin. If this is not the case, the question whether we descend from one couple matters only (if at all) for biology or paleontology” (Schoonenberg 1965, 188). Schoonenberg’s interpretation of *Humani generis* was that although polygenism has not been shown to be compatible with the traditional theology of original sin, investigation of this issue might eventually resolve it. Granting the universal effect of original sin, “from this point of view there is no need to admit one sinning couple of first parents – or, to put it positively, on this last point, too, there is not any difference between original sin and the sin of the world” (Schoonenberg 1965, 190–191).

Critics such as Anthony Padovano found shortcomings in Schoonenberg’s account, but not solely due to a failure to require monogenism. In analyzing the Tridentine formulation of the unity of original sin, Padovano commented:

Original sin is “one by origin.” This phrase militates less against the possibility of polygenism than it does against Schoonenberg’s quasi-identification of original sin with sin of the world. The latter theory seems too diverse and too gradual to assign unity of origin with any real meaning. The progressive, non-universal sinfulness of our history before Christ, which Schoonenberg depicts, seems to contradict “one by origin” (Padovano 1967, 114).

This criticism raised the most obvious problem for Schoonenberg. While the sin of the world may be a valuable description of *peccatum originatum*, it is problematic to also equate it with *peccatum originans*.
We must acknowledge the uniqueness of original sin. I would find it, therefore, difficult to equate original sin with “sin of the world.” The latter may be a result of the former; the latter may have a much closer relationship to the former than we realized; the latter and the former are, however, distinct from each other (Padovano 1967, 120).

Acceptance of Schoonenberg’s approach was generally correlated with the degree to which monogenism and peccatum originans were not considered to be central issues to original sin theology. Supporters such as Karl-Heinz Weger and André-Marie Dubarle were primarily interested in advancing the idea of original sin as the “sin of the world.”

We see original sin now as a truly tragic and actual situation: no longer merely the loss of wonderful gifts at a great remove from our day and condition, but the moral and religious perversion in which every man finds himself inevitably plunged by reason of his birth into a perverted environment: ignorant of God, or idolatry and a more or less profound corruption (A.- M. Dubarle 1964, 244).

While situationalists did not emphasize direct confrontation with the scriptural narrative of the origin of sin, Alfred Vanneste inspired a more radical personalist school of thought by insisting that genuine sin must always be a freely chosen individual act. For Vanneste, the terminology of original “sin” is simply a conceptual proxy for the universality of both personal sin and the need for redemption. In short, “Original sin is the need of every man for redemption by Christ” (Vanneste 1967, 209). From this perspective, the mythological embellishments relied upon in scripture have lost their utility.

First, our aim is to free the theology of original sin from the insurmountable difficulties of the traditional historical framework. How many hypotheses have tried to explain how a sin can be inherited! Nor should the explanation of original sin be tied to some other scientific or pseudo-scientific theory – monogenism, polygenism, even evolution. Original sin is concerned only with salvation history (Vanneste 1967, 213).
As had Schoonenberg, Vanneste swept aside concerns about monogenism as irrelevant. “It is our opinion that the *peccatum originale originans* has only a symbolical significance left” (Vanneste 1975, 180).

From a less iconoclastic perspective, Zoltán Alszeghy and Maurice Flick, Jesuits at the Gregorian University in Rome, co-authored two influential publications that were widely discussed in the literature of this period (Alszeghy and Flick, 1965 and 1966). They accepted biological polygenism in the sense that Adam and Eve would have descended from human pre-Adamites and lived within a large human population of co-Adamites. They also proposed, as had Blandino, what they considered to be a more important theological monogenism. That is, Adam and Eve were postulated to be the first humans to reach a stage of psychological development appropriate for the reception of sanctifying grace and prerequisite for moral judgment and potential sin. However, unlike Blandino, Alszeghy and Flick did not accept the necessity of the doctrine that the effects of Adam’s sin always propagate through physical procreation. Instead, they considered the initial solidarity and unity of humanity to be such that all members would be affected by Adam acting as their “corporate personality,” a concept they appropriated from H. Wheeler Robinson (Alszeghy and Flick 1966, 223–224). Although James Mackey tried to discredit corporate personality as a simplistic reification, and John Rogerson criticized Robinson’s reliance upon questionable anthropology (Mackey 1967, 111–114; Rogerson 1970), the idea did gain some traction among theologians interested in combining biological polygenism with theological monogenism (Yarnold 1971, 36).

At the invitation of Paul VI, concentrated discussion of these issues took place during a July 1966 symposium on the mystery of original sin. Under the direction of Edouard Dhanis, the thirteen participants included Alszeghy, Flick, and Rahner, as well as Marie-Michel Labourdette and Charles Moeller, the Secretary of the CDF. Alszeghy and Flick had just published a digest of their polygenism hypothesis in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, so it must have been familiar to both the pope and the symposium participants (A.-M. Dubarle

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13 In an earlier paper, Flick had explicitly rejected polygenism as “impossible” to reconcile with the dogma of original sin (Flick 1947, 557).
1966). In his opening address, Paul VI placed the topic in historical context and acknowledged the relevance of recent scientific progress. However, he also upheld a prohibition on polygenism if it precludes attribution of the first sin to the individual Adam.

It is evident, therefore, that the explanations which some modern authors give of original sin will seem to you irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine. For these authors start with the presupposition of polygenesis, which has not been demonstrated. They deny, more or less clearly, that the sin committed at the very dawn of history and which originated such an avalanche of evils in mankind, was first of all the disobedience of Adam, the “first man” and figure of him who was to come. ... Consequently, such explanations are not in accord with the teachings of Sacred Scripture, of Sacred Tradition and of the Magisterium of the Church (Paul VI 1966, 81).

It is not clear whether the pope had Alszeghy and Flick in mind when he referred to “some modern authors.” They did attribute the first sin to Adam although by accepting biological polygenism they did not posit him as the “first man.”

In a commentary on the pope’s speech, Robert Rouquette noted that subtle changes had been made for the published version. The initial press release description of the status of polygenism was that it is “anything but firmly demonstrated;” the Osservatore Romano publication read simply that it “has not been demonstrated.” The press release version also ascribed original sin to “a single first man, Adam, progenitor of the entire human race,” while the published version referred to “Adam, the ‘first man’ and figure of him who was to come” (Rouquette 1966, 382). Rouquette surmised that the changes in wording indicated that there was still uncertainty on how the doctrine should be understood and that the pope had not ruled out research on the topic. As Rouquette cautiously remarked, “We restrict ourselves to confirming that, between the first and second version of his discourse, Paul VI mitigated the affirmation of the unicity of Adam, and, in the definitive edition, the qualifier of first man applied to Adam is placed in quotation marks” (Rouquette 1966, 388). For Rouquette himself, the tension
between personal responsibility and the idea of inherited guilt made the entire topic of original sin problematic.

Karl Rahner was not deterred by the pope’s introductory warning and in fact used the ensuing symposium as the occasion to report that he had changed his mind and no longer considered polygenism to be theologically objectionable. He summarized his new perspective in a 1967 essay and expanded it for a 1970 publication in which he commented that Paul VI’s speech had not prevented the symposium participants from considering polygenism compatible with original sin doctrine. As he wrote in December of 1967:

The question of polygenism within Catholic theology may with all due respect for the interpretation of Humani Generis be treated as still open. There is certainly no dogma of monogenism. Cautious theological reflection enables us to show today that Trent’s dogma of original sin does not exclude polygenism. The two can coexist. On this point I have reappraised my own earlier view (Rahner 1967a, xii).

Rahner presented his new position as a thesis to be defended.

In the present state of theology and natural science, it cannot be demonstrated with certainty that polygenism is incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of original sin. Therefore, it is preferable and more prudent that the magisterium refrain from censuring polygenism (Rahner 1970, 185).

Rahner explained that he used a negative formulation because polygenism is a scientific hypothesis that cannot be deduced theologically. He offered two polygenetic hypotheses as legitimate settings for the occurrence of original sin. One possibility was that a single individual sinned and thereby blocked “the grace-transmitting function” of the entire human population. This was essentially the process he had hypothetically discussed in 1954 and then discarded as incompatible with the teachings of Trent unless the propagation of sin transpires in a manner other than through physical descent, a possibility he now accepted. Rahner also suggested another
option that would involve a collective sin so that Adam represents “the concrete expression used for that one group,” the population that caused “the consequences which traditional teaching attaches to this sin” (Rahner 1967b, 71). By introducing these two versions of polygenism as theologically legitimate, Rahner unapologetically departed from the strictures of Humani generis. In 1969 he reiterated that “in spite of Humani Generis, some form of polygenism may be prudently maintained” and that “it does not matter whether ‘Adam’ was an individual or a word for humanitas originans. It does not matter whether the sin which set up a situation of blight from the beginning was committed by an individual or by many among this humanitas originans. It follows that monogenism is not a necessary element of the dogma of original sin” (Rahner 1969, 107). Rahner abandoned his earlier indirect argument in support of monogenism by accepting that universal redemption through Christ requires only the biological and historical unity of the human race and does not require the additional restraint of monogenism (Rahner 1967b, 66–67; 1970, 196–199). The presence of Charles Moeller of the CDF at the 1966 symposium where Rahner initially presented these ideas should not be overlooked. In light of the unsuccessful effort to place a stricture on polygenism through the Vatican II preliminary schema De deposito fidei, the fact that no proceedings were initiated against either Rahner or Alszejghy and Flick is a confirmation that a turning point had been reached.

1967 was also a noteworthy year due to publications by Francisco José Ayala and René Lavocat as well as new contributions from Blandino and Henri Rondet. Ayala had been ordained a Dominican priest in 1960, although he immediately reached an agreement with his order that he would leave the priesthood five years later. During that interval he studied genetics at Columbia University and received his doctorate in 1964 under the supervision of Theodosius Dobzhansky, author of the 1962 volume Mankind Evolving. As a research geneticist, Ayala followed Dobzhansky in rejecting Carleton Stevens Coon’s polyphyletic speculations and found the idea of monogenism simply untenable.
That all living men are derived from a single evolutionary line of development, what is called monophyletism, is strongly supported by the available evidence and the understanding of evolutionary processes. Most evolutionists reject the opinion that the developments leading from non-human ancestors to the races of modern man occurred independently in several lines of descent. If monophyletism is strongly supported by the evidence from the natural sciences, monogenism certainly is not (Ayala 1967, 14).

Ayala warned that theologians such as John O’Rourke (O’Rourke 1965) were inadequately informed about the consensus among geneticists concerning polygenism and that “from the point of view of the natural sciences only polygenism makes sense. Evolution does not happen in individuals, but in populations.” Furthermore, “There is no known mechanism by which the human species might have arisen by a single step in one or two individuals only, from whom the rest of mankind would have descended” (Ayala 1967, 15). Ayala concluded that Catholic theologians are confronted by a difficult dilemma.

I can see only two possible alternate solutions for the Catholic theologian. One, to find an explanation which would make polygenism compatible with the doctrine of original sin – an explanation that, according to Pius XII, does not appear likely to be forthcoming. Two, to bring additional theological hypotheses in support of monogenism. Such hypotheses are not available from, and are consistently opposed by, the natural sciences (Ayala 1967, 16).

Although Ayala did not venture a theological solution of his own, he commended theologians who attempted what Pius XII declared difficult, the adjustment of original sin doctrine to allow polygenism, the approach Ayala clearly preferred.14 Among those Ayala mentioned was Robert North who noted that polygenism had become such an integral aspect of evolutionary science that there was no scientific reason to expect any radically different process for the transition to Homo sapiens. North was a strong advocate of

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Teilhard’s ideas and credited him for helping to shift theological attention away from skepticism about polygenism to a more fundamental reconsideration of original sin doctrine (North 1963). Furthermore, the theological status of monogenism was unclear. “Is it a truth of revelation? Is it a fact of partially human knowledge, yet genuinely certain and therefore of itself unalterable? Is it a reformable decree of authority? No one can claim a consensus of experts for his answer today” (North 1967, 57).

Abbé René Lavocat was sympathetic to North’s assessment. As Director of the Laboratoire de Paléontologie des Vertébrés at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Montpellier, he agreed with the scientific consensus that human origins took place through gradual genetic changes in a population and not due to an “exceptional mutation” in one or two individuals (Lavocat 1967a, 584). Lavocat speculated that human ensoulment could have happened as long ago as *Homo habilis* and he shared the view of Blandino, Alszeghy, and Flick that ensoulment preceded the gradual development of the moral consciousness prerequisite for sin. He also interpreted *Humani generis* as an invitation to investigate how polygenism might be compatible with innovative theological understanding of original sin. Perhaps Adam was the conduit through which God granted humanity an elevated state of grace, a status Adam initially conveyed to all members of his species. The effect of Adam’s sin might then be a termination of this condition throughout the species. This disastrous spiritual effect would subsequently be shared by all humans but would not need to be transmitted through physical propagation (*per generationem*), that is, it would not necessarily take place through direct physical descent. As had Alszeghy and Flick, Lavocat combined biological polygenism with *monoculpisme*, assignment of responsibility for the initial sin to a single individual (Lavocat 1967a, 593).

Schoonenberg’s conception of original sin as “the sin of the world” had a significant impact on Giovanni Blandino. Although in 1962 he had relied upon the role of an historical Adam, upon further consideration, his calculation of the time required for Adam to become an ancestor of all surviving human lineages now struck him as having an “artificial rigor,” and to have God choose to sanctify only Adam’s descendants seemed too
arbitrary (Blandino 1977b, 74). In 1967 he took a very different approach.\(^{15}\) He now characterized the Catholic doctrine of original sin as the assertion that all humans are born in a physical and spiritual state of “dying” caused by personal sin. From Blandino’s new perspective, “the originating original sin would not only consist of the sin of the first man, but also the sins of all other men” (Blandino 1977b, 62), or, as he later expressed this point more fully, “the originating original sin would be constituted, *in the first place and in an emblematic way*, by the first grave sin (that with which sin entered into the world), but it would *also* be constituted, *and not any less*, by the sins of all the other men” (Blandino 1989, 161). Blandino conceded that this interpretation was contrary to the constraint Paul VI had urged in his 1966 speech but he nevertheless denied that the deposit of the faith includes “the uniqueness of the originating original sin” (Blandino 1977b, 60; 1989, 159). This starting point allowed him to deny that revealed doctrine includes attribution of original sin to the single sin of Adam and the transmission of the effects of that sin to all humans through physical descent. Rather, “the sin which caused the ruin of man was not the sin of a single man, but *the sins of all men in general* (Blandino 1977b, 65; 1989, 164). Understanding original sin from this perspective “requires neither monogenism nor polygenism, but follows as equally valid in any form of natural evolution” (Blandino 1977b, 70; 1989, 169). For scientific reasons, Blandino clearly preferred the polygenism option; he denied that monogenism was revealed doctrine but he also was careful to include a caveat that he could be in error (Blandino 1977c, 90). To his critics, Blandino’s emphasis on God’s foreknowledge of the inevitability of human sin overshadowed his articulation of the sin of the world. André-Marie Dubarle found that aspect of his presentation excessively “artificial” (A.-M. Dubarle 1969, 102).

\(^{15}\) Originally published as a short pamphlet (Blandino 1967), his 1967 essay was included in a later collection (Blandino 1977a) and partially incorporated into a 1989 English version (Blandino 1989). Blandino acknowledged the merit of Schoonenberg’s “sin of the world” approach but added that “the sin of the world has influenced the very structure of human nature. And the sin of the world which has influenced a given man is not constituted by the sins of the others (of the surrounding environment), but is constituted by all the sins of humanity and *also and above all* by the sins of that same man” (Blandino 1989, 172).
That Rahner, Lavocat, and Blandino were not unusual in their disengagement from monogenism was thoroughly demonstrated in James Connor’s 1968 survey article. He agreed with many other commentators that the Council of Trent had not directly addressed the choice between monogenism and polygenism. The point of emphasis at Trent was that all humans acquired the effects of original sin through *propagatione* from the initial perpetrators, traditionally referred to as Adam and Eve; this literary expression of monogenism was simply assumed without supportive argument and was never intended to be taught as doctrine. After noting how Rahner had withdrawn his earlier argument that monogenism is theologically certain, Connor gave detailed attention to the work of Alszeghy, Flick, Schoonenberg, Rondet, and Vanneste, as well as Pierre Grelot, Ansfridus Hulsbosch, and Engelbert Gutwenger. For example, Grelot proposed a “mitigated polygenism” in which, even if Adam and Eve are assumed to have initiated sin, they would have done so within a tightly integrated population in which the effects of sin were realized. Connor’s sympathetic conclusion was that:

> there has been a progressive change of focus in the doctrine of original sin from man’s solidarity in sin with Adam to the human condition as not-yet-in-Christ. To be in “original sin” is simply to be outside of Christ prior to the possibility of free personal decision for or against Christ (Connor 1968, 238–239).

During the 1940s, Henri Rondet had foreseen and encouraged this reorientation of original sin theology (Hofmann 2020b, 127–128). In the immediate aftermath of *Humani generis*, he had been removed from his position as Prefect of Studies at the Lyon-Fourvière Jesuit house. Allowed to return to teaching at the end of the 1950s, he once again wrote extensively on original sin after Vatican II, using an approach quite similar to Blandino’s. Praising the Bouyssonie brothers as “far-seeing theologians” due to the questions they had broached in 1935 (Hofmann 2020b, 123–124), Rondet offered his own “working hypothesis.”

> Without denying that chronologically there may have been a first man, without raising any question on the subject of monogenism or polygenism, the thesis
affirms, from the start, that *Adam is Man*, mankind taken as a whole, which, in a second dialectical epoch, appears in the sight of God as separated by sin from this Christ whose role will be to make it one with him (Rondet 1967, 315; 1972, 263–264).

This *Adam is Man* perspective required theologians to transcend the linear human chronology explored by scientific research. “Original sin in us has as its cause an actual, but collective, sin, formed by the sum of the personal sins of men of all times” (Rondet 1967, 321; 1972, 270–271). Connor welcomed these innovations as a collective indication that theologians were approaching a new basis for consensus.

Finally, all must agree that it is most gratifying to read theologians of such stature who, with their characteristic scholarly humility, have attempted in their tentative hypotheses to free the doctrine of original sin from a structure which had proven too narrow to embrace the fundamental Christian doctrine of sinful man’s need for salvation in Christ (Connor 1968, 240).

With publications reliant upon polygenism becoming so extensive, it is remarkable that during this period they did not generate any high-profile cases of intervention by the Holy Office or the CDF. In a 1968 lecture, Rahner was confident that:

we may surely say that the development of Catholic theology since ‘Humani Generis’ has made such advances (advances that have been tolerated by the Church’s *magisterium*) that the opinion that polygenism is not irreconcilable with the doctrine of original sin is no longer exposed to the danger of being censured by the authorities of the Church (Rahner 1974, 252).

The secrecy maintained for Congregation proceedings of course means that archival research may eventually reveal cases where pressure was privately brought to bear upon polygenist authors during the 1960s just as had been the case for Teilhard during the 1920s. However, it is safe to tentatively conclude that this did not happen, especially since polygenism was not the point at issue when the Holy Office or the CDF did raise issues about original sin doctrine. For example, in 1961 the French Jesuit Stanislaus Lyonnet was
temporarily suspended from his position at the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome where he had taught since 1943. As part of his widely cited research into Paul’s letters to the Romans, Lyonnet had published a 1956 article in which he sought to explicate the nature of sin between the time of Adam and that of Moses, a period in which neither the initial justice of Eden nor the law of Moses was in effect (Lyonnet 1956). There obviously was sin and death throughout this period and Lyonnet’s paraphrase of Paul’s text was that, although death entered the world due to Adam’s sin, it also perdures because all men sin. The topic of polygenism never arose in the article in question and could not have initiated the decision to suspend Lyonnet. Based upon his study of this case, Brian Harrison concluded that the Holy Office apparently thought that, in his interpretation of Paul, Lyonnet gave too much weight to the effect of personal sin (Harrison 2012, 4). Toleration of polygenism clearly had become commonplace in the midst of concern about other innovations in original sin doctrine; this adjustment was especially striking during the CDF’s response to *A New Catechism* and the proceedings enacted against the biblical scholar Herbert Haag.

5. The Supplement to *A New Catechism* 
and the Investigation of Herbert Haag

Two 1966 publications involving original sin provoked aggressive reactions by the CDF. The first was *De Nieuwe Katechismus (A New Catechism)*, issued on behalf of the Bishops of the Netherlands and due largely to the efforts of Piet Schoonenberg and the Dominican theologian Edward Schillebeeckx. The other was a short volume by Herbert Haag, a prominent Tübingen professor of the Old Testament, who argued that Catholic original sin doctrine does not have a scriptural basis. The CDF responded to *A New Catechism* expeditiously but the Haag investigation dragged on into the 1970s and never was fully resolved. The two cases provide ample evidence that polygenism was no longer a serious point of concern to the CDF.

Published just three months after Paul VI’s symposium on original sin, *De Nieuwe Katechismus* was produced through the Higher Catechetical Institute
Schoonenberg had been associated with the Institute since 1957 and also taught dogmatic theology with Schillebeeckx at the Catholic University of Nijmegen beginning in 1964. Designed for adults, the catechism had an expository format rather than the question-and-answer structure often used in catechisms for children. The book was enormously popular and an English translation was quickly released in the United States (A New Catechism, 1967). The section on “The Power of Sin” included a relatively short discussion of the initial chapters of Genesis. Although polygenism was not directly mentioned, the topic of original sin was introduced through some telling comments on Paul’s references to Adam in Romans 5.

At first sight it seems that his intention is to stress the fact that it was through one man that sin came into the world. But the repetition of the word “one”, occasioned by the view of the world history as it existed in Paul’s time, is only part of the literary dress, not the message. What this difficult passage teaches is that though sin and death ruled over mankind, grace and eternal life, the restoration, has come in greater abundance through Jesus (A New Catechism 1967, 262).

In the pages that followed, the most important passage devoted to original sin showed an obvious imprint from Schoonenberg’s approach; the unity of humanity and the “oneness” of sin can be understood without reliance upon the traditional inheritance narrative that is not part of revealed doctrine.

They looked to “human nature” which was propagated by bodily generation since sinful Adam. But this explanation of the collectivity or “oneness” of sin is not something that has been directly revealed. It is not part of the direct intention of revelation (what is per se revealed). The unity of the human race, according to scripture, is not based on propagation (“Greek, barbarian or Jew”) but on the call by the one Father. The oneness of sin is to be sought on the same level, though here in man’s refusal. It reaches us, not merely by way of generation, but from all sides, along all the ways in which men have contact with one another. The sin which stains others was not only committed by an
Adam at the beginning of man’s story, but by “Adam”, man, every man. It is “the sin of the world” (*A New Catechism* 1967, 266).

Furthermore, the traditional causal linkage between death and sin is not essential.

There is a very special and mysterious connection in our minds between sin and death. Holy Scripture sometimes expresses this by saying that through sin death came into the world. But since the beginnings are obscure to us, the beginning of biological death is also obscure. What we do see, when we look at the course of the history of salvation, is that along with sin death lost its sting (*A New Catechism* 1967, 269).

Although published with the *Imprimatur* of Cardinal Bernardus Alfrink, *De Nieuwe Katechismus* was immediately delated to the CDF by a Dutch group of lay Catholics who generated considerable publicity in the popular press. A commission of Cardinals was appointed to assess the book and, following some unproductive meetings with Dutch representatives, on 15 October of 1968 a “Declaration” was issued in which ten issues were listed as needing clarification. The second of these judgments addressed “The Fall of Man in Adam” and warned that:

in the New Catechism the doctrine of the Church is to be faithfully proposed, that man in the beginning of history rebelled against God (Cf. Conc. Vat. II, Const. *Gaudium el Spes*, n. 13, 22) and so lost for himself and his offspring that sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted, and handed on a true state of sin to all through propagation of human nature. Certainly those expressions must be avoided which could signify that original sin is only contracted by individual new members of the human family in this sense that from their very coming

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16 A published letter addressed to Paul VI and objecting to *De Nieuwe Katechismus* included the assertion that “As regards original sin, the book denies that we contract it as a sin inherited from one original ancestor and transmitted to us by physical reproduction” (*Herd-er Correspondence* 1967, 94).

17 The commission consisted of Cardinals Joseph Frings, Joseph Lefebvre, Lorenz Jaeger, Ermenegildo Florit, Michael Browne and Charles Journet with Pietro Palazzini serving as Secretary.
into the world, they are exposed within themselves to the influence of human society where sin reigns, and so are started initially on the way of sin (Frings et al. 1968).

Although this guideline included no references to Adam and Eve as a monogenetic first human couple, it did insist that the effect of sin was passed down through “propagation.” It also clearly cautioned against giving the impression that original sin could be thought of as solely the result of exposure to sinful society, no doubt because of references in A New Catechism to “the sin of the world.” During the next few months it was decided that, instead of revising A New Catechism, future editions would simply include as an appendix a copy of The Supplement to A New Catechism, a booklet that provided expanded discussion of the Declaration points of emphasis.18

Published in 1969, The Supplement listed Edouard Dhanis and Jan Visser as authors on behalf of the Commission of Cardinals. It is not clear who actually wrote the lengthy section on original sin. Among the Cardinals on the Commission, Charles Journet may have been consulted since he had included a hypothetical example of polygenism in his 1951 Petit Catéchisme. The Supplement preserved the core of a traditional account of original sin and emphasized the inheritance of the effect of sin through physical descent. However, it did not insist upon monogenism and strikingly even presented a hypothetical example of how polygenism could be adopted as a legitimate alternative. The stated intention was “not to invite the faithful to give up the doctrine of monogenism, but to ease their minds in the midst of the various questions which their faith has to undergo today,” particularly due to the scientific consensus in favor of polygenism (Dhanis and Visser 1969, 21). From the proposed polygenetic perspective, “Adam and Eve” would represent an “Adamite population.” Original sin took place within this population and the effects were spread through descent so that, after either one or perhaps several generations, there would no longer exist any innocent human couple capable of transmitting the state of original justice; all humans would then be in a state of sin.

18 For some minor changes in wording for the English translation, see Ratzinger 1971, 750.
Consequently, all the descendants of the “Adamite population” which would have been the equivalent of the “sinful Adam” have been burdened at birth with original sin. They would all have “sinned in Adam” (Dhanis and Visser 1969, 22).

Reliance upon the awkward phrase “sinned in Adam” may have been out of deference to Paul VI’s preference for this language. Since the sixteenth century, English translations of Romans 5:12 typically read “Therefore as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned.” The fourth century Vulgate Latin translation of Saint Paul’s original Greek had been relied upon throughout the Middle Ages and used the phrase in quo omnes peccaverunt (in whom all have sinned) instead of the more accurate quatenus omnes peccaverunt (because all have sinned). The Vulgate version of Romans 5:12 was not questioned until Desiderius Erasmus published a new translation just prior to the Council of Trent (Coogan 1986). Although the Vulgate continued to be the preferred edition for the Western Church, Erasmus’ rendition of Romans 5:12 with the phrase “because all have sinned” certainly prevailed. Numerous scholars, including Stanislaus Lyonnet, engaged in further philological discussion of the passage just prior to Vatican II. Although some variants of “because” were proposed, such as “insofar as,” the rejection of “in whom” was not in question. More controversially, the improved translation now was often incorporated into a theological argument that Saint Paul did not teach a doctrine of original sin that included an inheritance of Adam’s sin. For example, Lyonnet wrote that personal sin, while precipitated by Adam’s initial sin, was a contributing factor to the need for redemption, “a genuine causality but subordinated and not simply juxtaposed to that of the sin of Adam.”

This train of thought did not align with Pope Paul VI’s assessment of the import of Trent. In his address to the 1966 original sin symposium, after noting that the eighth chapter of the schema De deposito fidei had not been included in Dei Verbum, “for reasons you know,” the pope claimed that other documents of the council fully confirmed the original sin doctrine

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19 Lyonnet 1955, 456; also see Lyonnet 1956, 73.
formulated by earlier councils. For example, he quoted from the only reference to “Adam” in *Lumen Gentium*: “Fallen in Adam (*lapsos in Adamo*), God the Father did not leave men to themselves, but ceaselessly offered helps to salvation” (Paul VI 1966, 77). Paul VI’s attachment to the wording “in Adam” continued in his “Credo” of June 30, 1968, a creed he issued in hopes of quieting doctrinal controversies during the post-Vatican II period.²⁰ It was based upon a draft provided by Jacques Maritain that had included an insistence upon monogenism.²¹ This passage was dropped from the final version in which the relevant section on original sin read: “We believe that in Adam all have sinned (*Credimus in Adam omnes peccavisse*), which means that the original offense committed by him caused human nature, common to all men, to fall to a state in which it bears the consequences of that offense … We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is transmitted with human nature, ‘not by imitation, but by propagation’ and that it is thus ‘proper to everyone’” (Paul VI 1968). This insistence upon the transmission of original sin solely through propagation from Adam was shared by the CDF and may well have contributed to the decision to temporarily suspend Lyonnet from his teaching position.

Nevertheless, according to the authors of *The Supplement*, although the warning about polygenism in *Humani generis* and the “traditional formulas” promulgated by Paul VI certainly safeguard the faith, they do

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²⁰ Paul VI’s “profession of faith” was issued in the *motu proprio* *Solemni Hac Liturgia*. Section 16 stated: “We believe that in Adam all have sinned, which means that the original offense committed by him caused human nature, common to all men, to fall to a state in which it bears the consequences of that offense, and which is not the state in which it was at first in our first parents—established as they were in holiness and justice, and in which man knew neither evil nor death. It is human nature so fallen, stripped of the grace that clothed it, injured in its own natural powers and subjected to the dominion of death, that is transmitted to all men, and it is in this sense that every man is born in sin. We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is transmitted with human nature, ‘not by imitation, but by propagation’ and that it is thus ‘proper to everyone.’” (Pope Paul VI, 1968)

²¹ See Cagin 2009. Maritain’s draft was conveyed to Paul VI by Charles Journet. It included the assertion that “all men and all races that today populate the earth descend from a first human couple that emerged from the peak of the animal world and ... were the first beings to receive a spiritual and immortal soul” (Cagin 2009, 30).
so “without closing the door to questions which are raised by scientific findings.” Furthermore, “the Church allows theologians to continue their investigations and to go on with their dialogue with the students of the natural sciences” (Dhanis and Visser 1969, 23). Inclusion of the wording “sinned in Adam” notwithstanding, the entire Supplement discussion was characterized by a remarkably receptive attitude toward polygenism as a viable possibility. The other aspects of original sin doctrine stated in the Commission’s Declaration and Paul VI’s creed clearly were considered more important to mandate than monogenism.

These CDF priorities were also evident during its investigation of a publication by the Swiss biblical theologian Herbert Haag. Haag had been called to the Catholic Faculty at the University of Tübingen in 1960, the same year as Hans Küng, who became his colleague and close friend. An internationally renowned scholar and Professor of the Old Testament, Haag published a 1966 monograph in which he argued that the doctrine of an original sin inherited by all mankind from Adam is not taught either in the Old Testament or by Saint Paul (Haag 1966). The book quickly went through four German editions and an American translation (Haag, 1969). Haag apparently was delated to the CDF shortly after the initial publication; in February of 1968 he was informed by Undersecretary Charles Moeller that the CDF had reservations about several propositions concerning original sin that allegedly were advanced in his book. These assertions were conveyed to Haag in Latin translation and he was asked to explain how they were in conformity to Catholic doctrine. Haag initially complained that the propositions had been taken out of context and inaccurately expressed in Latin; when he did not comment more specifically, a slightly revised second set of propositions was sent to him in April of 1971. Following some additional correspondence, Haag finally responded in detail the following August. After providing what he considered to be more accurate Latin expressions of his published statements, he argued at length that his views were indeed a legitimate reading of scripture and its bearing upon tradition.22 By this

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point Haag felt his book was slightly out of date and he had also written a series of trenchant review articles critiquing many recent discussions of original sin as too timidly adhering to traditional formulas.\textsuperscript{23}

It is noteworthy that none of the propositions ascribed to Haag and brought into question by the CDF made any mention of polygenism. Instead, the Congregation asked for resolution of other methodological and substantive issues. For example, did Haag propose that in modern explanations of original sin theologians should explicate dogma in the light of scripture rather than explicate scripture in the light of dogma? Did he assert that the concept of hereditary sin was not found in either the Old Testament or in the thought of Saint Paul? Haag certainly had expressed himself on these issues. For example, he had written that "The concept of sin or death as \textit{inherited} is not mentioned at all by Paul" (Haag 1969, 97), and "For the same reason, it is impossible to agree in finding here a teaching of 'inherited death'" (Haag 1969, 121). Similarly, he wrote that "In reality, the idea of the passive participation of all Adam's descendants in the sin of Adam is far from Paul's mind, and it is not permissible to read this idea into verse 12 by understanding 'because all have sinned' in the sense of 'because all (in Adam) have become sinful'" (Haag 1969, 99). "No man enters this world a sinner" (Haag 1969, 107).

The CDF judged Haag's responses defending his position on these points to be unsatisfactory and he was told to abjure the assertions at stake and desist from advancing them in any manner. Haag ignored this order and the affair was never resolved.\textsuperscript{24} Although the Congregation did not include monogenism in its inquiries, Haag had in fact been quite explicit in arguing that it is not supported by scripture and should not be considered a theological issue. “Whether mankind originated in monogenism or polygenism is a question which only science can answer; it is not a theological question.

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, Haag 1970.

\textsuperscript{24} Hans Küng mentioned that in 1977 a last attempt by Bishop Georg Moser to get a response from Haag was unsuccessful (Küng 2008, 273). From Haag's perspective, "The proceedings – while saving face for the Romans - went in my favor and I can attest that since then in theological textbooks and catechisms 'original sin' has been treated differently than previously" (Haag 1991, 76–77).
The thesis of polygenism cannot be rejected on the basis of original sin” (Haag 1969, 107). Furthermore, in his correspondence with the CDF, Haag noted that recent developments in theological discussion of original sin did not rely upon monogenism. “A not unimportant role is played therein by the scientifically supported fact that a monogenetic origin of humanity appears to be excluded. Even Karl Rahner, counter to his earlier assertions, has expressly recognized the compatibility of “Erbsündenlehre” with polygenism .... As a matter of fact, however, with the abandonment of monogenism the diffusion of an original sin by means of descent is fundamentally ruled out” (Haag 1973b, 188).

So, while Haag pointedly rejected both monogenism and the inheritance of the effects of sin, the CDF did not object to his acceptance of polygenism. Haag was undeterred by the investigation and continued to write predominately negative commentary on original sin publications. He labelled the efforts in The Supplement to hypothetically combine inheritance of sin with polygenism “absurd” (Haag 1973a, 263), and added that “one is also tempted to ask if it would not have been more consistent to drop the term ‘original sin’ and thus to eliminate all the problems consequent on the use of the term” (Haag 1973a, 269). By this point the CDF was also investigating Haag’s 1969 book, Abschied vom Teufel (Farewell to the Devil), and the 1970 Infallible? An Inquiry by his Tübingen colleague Hans Küng. Haag was not intimidated and proclaimed that “a farewell to original sin will not come too soon. The doctrine of original sin is a test case, serving to focus more sharply the question of whether traditional Church teaching is binding and infallible—a question which dogmatic theologians have long oversimplified” (Haag 1973a, 288).

Although Küng did not cite the doctrine of monogenism in his polemic against infallibility, Francis Sullivan has argued that it can serve as a relevant case study. Vatican I had of course been the occasion for the proclamation of papal infallibility, but it also brought new attention to the potential power of the ordinary universal magisterium, a topic that resurfaced at Vatican II and was asserted in Lumen Gentium.
Although the individual bishops do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they nevertheless proclaim Christ’s doctrine infallibly whenever, even though dispersed through the world, but still maintaining the bond of communion among themselves and with the successor of Peter, and authentically teaching matters of faith and morals, they are in agreement on one position as definitively to be held (Paul VI 1964).

Necessary and sufficient conditions for invoking the infallibility of magisterial teaching have been difficult to establish and Sullivan uses monogenism as an example of how the criterion of universality is not satisfactory. At Vatican I, draft documents included proposals to define monogenism as a dogma of faith; they encountered no opposition from the Council Fathers prior to the premature interruption of the council by political developments. One century later, the lack of consensus offered a stark contrast.

Here we have an instance of a consensus that seemed strong enough in 1870 to justify defining a doctrine as a dogma of faith, but which has not remained constant and is no longer universal. It would hardly seem reasonable to argue that since the former consensus had fulfilled the conditions required for the infallible exercise of ordinary universal magisterium, the subsequent lack of consensus could not nullify the claim that the doctrine had already been infallibly taught (Sullivan 1996, 349).

Mindful of the gradual acceptance of polygenism during the century after 1870 and its relevance to arguments against infallibility, Haag took broader exception to the entire doctrine of original sin. In contrast to his sharp critiques of many authors, he was more sympathetic to the position taken by Charles Baumgartner. Due to the posthumous publications of Teilhard’s essays on original sin, Baumgartner could quote approvingly from the explanatory note Teilhard had written just after Humani generis. Although he granted that the best argument for monogenism was an indirect one showing that it seemed to be presupposed by the Tridentine doctrine of original sin, Baumgartner denied that monogenism truly is a necessary prerequisite; “what is certain is that the dogma of original sin, as well as that
of redemption, necessarily postulate the unity of the human race, a unity which is also a direct teaching of scripture itself” (Baumgartner 1969, 129). While earlier theologians could only conceptualize this unity by invoking monogenism, modern science strongly encourages other possibilities. As long as the central idea of an initial free human choice of sin is preserved, detailed depiction of attenuating circumstances, including the choice between monogenism and polygenism, “no longer directly concern the substance of the faith.” If this is the case, then, along with the motion of the earth and its age, “monogenism and polygenism would be problems relevant to the domain of the natural sciences and exclusively within their competence” (Baumgartner 1969, 130). Baumgartner argued for a decisive disengagement from presuppositions such as monogenism that in the past were considered essential but now have become impediments to acceptance of the essential Catholic doctrine of original sin, namely, “the theological condition of humanity bereft of Christ” (Baumgartner 1969, 165).

Subsequent developments in original sin theology have to a large extent accomplished the disengagement Baumgartner recommended. Arguments over monogenism and polygenism have become less and less important in most of these discussions (McDermott 1977). In 1971 Edward Yarnold followed Schoonenberg’s lead in asserting that “One need not even argue that monogenism is false: it is simply irrelevant. We are all members of the same guilty race whether we have all descended from a single ancestor or not” (Yarnold 1971, 78). By 1981 Karl Rahner could comment that, just as it is common knowledge that Catholic doctrine now holds no objection to the antiquity of humanity, “To all appearances the teaching office has also abandoned its opposition to polygenism despite Paul VI’s original intention to adhere to monogenism” (Rahner 1988, 41). Pope John Paul II made no mention of polygenism in a 1996 discourse in which he famously asserted that, in reference to Humani generis, “Today, almost half a century after the publication of the encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis” (John Paul II, 1996). Later in John Paul II’s papacy, under the supervision of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future Pope Benedict XVI, the International Theological
Commission issued a lengthy document on the creation of humanity in the image of God and made only a passing and noncommittal reference to the distinction between monogenism and polygenism. “Catholic theology affirms that the emergence of the first members of the human species (whether as individuals or in populations) represents an event that is not susceptible of a purely natural explanation and which can appropriately be attributed to divine intervention (International Theological Commission 2004, ¶ 70).

It would appear that the Catholic magisterium has gradually arrived at approximately the same attitude toward polygenism that it maintained for so long toward the motion of the earth: nonassertive official disapproval combined with de facto acceptance. Nevertheless, as the historical record demonstrates, there is far more conceptual complexity to the monogenism issue than was the case for geostasis. In particular, in addition to its irrelevance for some schools of original sin theology, monogenism can be given a spiritual characterization in which it is immune to the scientific mode of refutation that made geostasis untenable. This capacity for a synthesis with biological polygenism means that there is reason to expect some form of theological monogenism to persist.

**Conclusion**

In 1992, 360 years after the trial of Galileo, Pope John Paul II brought some closure to the affair by agreeing with his investigative Pontifical Academy committee that exegetical and theological mistakes had been made. The initial arguments that the earth is in motion had been put forward just when the Reformation made Catholic ecclesiastical authority over biblical exegesis a point of contention.\(^{25}\) Under those confrontational circumstances,

\(^{25}\) In 1546, just three years after Copernicus’ *De Revolutionibus*, the Fourth Session of the Council of Trent decreed that “no one, relying on his own skill, shall, — in matters of faith, and of morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine, — wresting the sacred Scripture to his own senses, presume to interpret the said sacred Scripture contrary to that sense which holy mother Church, — whose it is to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the holy Scriptures, — hath held and doth hold; or even contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.” [https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/trent/fourth-session.htm](https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/trent/fourth-session.htm)
the Vatican Curia decided that the Copernican planetary model contradicted scripture and must be prohibited; noncompliant Galileo was found guilty of a vehement suspicion of heresy and Riccioli’s geostatic model received longstanding preference (Hofmann 2020b, 99–102). Although the Catholic magisterium gradually recognized the legitimacy of heliocentric models that included the motion of the earth, stubborn theological allegiance to geostasis persisted in many instances. When Robert de Sinéty defended Erich Wasmann’s acceptance of the evolution of systematic species, he compared reactionary theological concerns about Wasmann to those that had continued for so long over Copernicus and Galileo. He noted an example of theological preference for a geostatic model as late as 1764 (De Sinéty 1906, 238–239). William Wallace has cited other examples of not only geostasis but *geocentrism* in Catholic scholastic teaching manuals as late as 1783 (Wallace 1968, 74). To be sure, the 1741 publication of Galileo’s collected works received an *imprimatur*, the 1758 edition of the *Index of Prohibited Books* ended previous prohibition of “all books teaching the earth’s motion and the sun’s immobility,” and in 1835 books by Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler were finally dropped from the *Index*. However, in the absence of any summary and decisive Vatican directive, there were extensive objections and convoluted negotiations over every stage in this intermittent and piecemeal process (Finocchiaro 2005, 126–240).

How comparable is the Catholic Church’s lengthy commitment to monogenism? The nuanced triangulation of revelation, scripture, and tradition clearly has been at the heart of prolonged resistance to both the motion of the earth and polygenism. However, the central error of the Galileo case, the flawed reasoning that a scientific assertion was contrary to scripture, was not repeated when theologians questioned the necessity of monogenism. Instead, attention focused almost exclusively on doctrinal tradition as the potential source of conflict; debate over polygenism unfolded in conjunction with more fundamental disputes over the authority of tradition and its relation to scripture and revelation.

The nexus of scripture and tradition obviously was a central concern when documents responding to *sola scriptura* were composed at the Council...
of Trent. When the Council Fathers incorporated references to the Genesis narrative into what became the Tridentine teaching on original sin, they created an influential doctrinal formulation using wording that gave a strong impression that monogenism was a prominent component of Catholic tradition. During the second half of the nineteenth century, two theological issues related to human origins directed new attention to this teaching. On the one hand, the Genesis narrative gave a biblical grounding to Catholic support for the unity of mankind thesis, a position that stood in opposition to human polyphyletism, the hypothesis of multiple independent human racial lineages that was often misleadingly referred to as polygenism. Among many others, Clarence Augustus Walworth, Jean Guibert, Robert de Sinéty, Henry de Dorlodot, Henri Breuil, as well as Jean and Amédée Bouyssonie, all contributed refutations of polyphyletism, a collective effort that continued well into the twentieth century. By the 1960s, in spite of a belated retrograde effort by Carleton Stevens Coon, human polyphyletism in the crude racial form proposed by Hermann Klaatsch could be curtly dismissed as scientifically unviable.26

On the other hand, evolutionary research into monophyletic human origins prompted a wide variety of reactions from Catholic theologians who were allowed some latitude with respect to the evolution of the human body but were also expected to safeguard the unique spiritual character of ensouled humanity. It was in this context that concern arose over the much more scientifically plausible form of polygenism, the descent of humans from a single population but not from a single couple. When the 1909 Biblical Commission decree on Genesis 1–3 called for acknowledgment of the historical import of the Genesis narrative of Adam and Eve, insistence upon monogenism was included in anti-modernist reaction against “development of doctrine” theology. This pressure intensified when proponents of the nouvelle théologie reopened debate over the historically conditioned nature of doctrinal formulations. The result was that throughout the first half of the twentieth century monogenism was tenaciously upheld by a multitude

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of influential voices that included Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet, Francis Ceuppens, Émile Amann, Maurice Flick, Joseph Bataini, and especially Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Bolstered by institutional support that provided ready access to prominent publication opportunities, these adamant apologists thoroughly eclipsed the cautious doubts tentatively raised by the Bouyssonie brothers and Henri Rondet. Teilhard’s unpublished but clandestinely circulated rejection of monogenism became one of Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s primary examples of what he considered to be a dangerous tendency to deny the immutability of dogma, a conviction that contributed to Pius XII’s decision to prohibit polygenism in *Humani generis*. Widespread supportive response to the encyclical included unsympathetic assessments of polygenism in publications by Anthony Cotter, Charles Boyer, Augustin Bea, Guy Picard, Léon Renwart, Marie-Michel Labourdette, Karl Rahner, Johannes Feiner, Cyril Vollert, and Jean de Fraine. A less insistent set of commentators, including Ernest Messenger, Georges Vandebroek, Dominique Dubarle, Pieter Smulders, and Robert North, did express reservations about monogenism based upon scientific evidence but they deferred to ecclesiastical authority pending further theological development, progress that was difficult to achieve under the threat of Vatican censorship.

During the years immediately prior to the convocation of Vatican II, historical research by Josef Geiselmann and Stanislaus Lyonnet contributed to renewed debate over how the truths of the gospel have been preserved in scripture and tradition, the crucial issue for the acceptability of polygenism. The 1965 proclamation *Dei Verbum* that excluded a proposed prohibition of polygenism was an important turning point and a defeat for the conservative position represented by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani and Paul VI. At this point Zoltán Alszeghy and Maurice Flick published their polygenetic analysis of original sin and Karl Rahner announced that he no longer saw any convincing theological barrier to polygenism. Shortly thereafter *The Supplement to A New Catechism* sent a clear signal that theologically judicious use of polygenism was not objectionable to the highest levels of the Roman Curia. Acceptable examples would include reliance upon an Adamite
population that either engaged in a collective sin or collectively suffered the immediate consequences of an individual sin.

Of course by this point numerous Catholic theologians were no longer interested in explicitly synthesizing the scientific idea of polygenism with the theology of original sin. Situationalists such as Piet Schoonenberg, André-Marie Dubarle and Edward Yarnold found the choice between monogenism and polygenism theologically inconsequential and irrelevant to their understanding of original sin as the “sin of the world.” By assigning the Genesis narrative a primarily historical significance as a familiar but nonessential representation of doctrine, they relegated analysis of ancestral human population structure to the scientific domain.

A more conventional approach that retains a role for Adam and Eve is to recognize that acceptance of biological polygenism does not rule out theological monogenism based upon a spiritual demarcation. As explored by Camille Muller, and René Lavocat, as well as in the early work of Giovanni Blandino, for example, monogenism in this guise does not conflict with the polygenetic scientific analysis of species change via population genetics. If Adam and Eve differed from their biologically human contemporaries in a purely spiritual manner, there are no prohibitive scientific implications. Francisco Ayala’s argument, that the high degree of genetic diversity in modern humans rules out an ancestral population of a single human couple, would only be pertinent under the assumption that theological monogenism requires the initial existence of just two biological humans, presumably Homo sapiens (Ayala et al 1994). Both Kenneth Kemp and Joshua Swamidass have recently pointed out that arguments in this vein do not apply if a spiritual condition distinguishes the first two humans from a larger population of their contemporaries (Kemp 2011; Swamidass 2019). Furthermore, additional distinctions between human ensoulment and subsequent spiritual and psychological development to the point of moral discernment have been invoked by Blandino, Lavocat, Alszeghy, and Flick, among others. In general, those who reconceptualize monogenism in an exclusively spiritual sense can choose to designate Adam and Eve as
the first ensouled or sanctified humans while also accepting the biological polygenism of a larger population.

It would be premature to expect that progress within any of these frameworks will prompt a new pronouncement on polygenism from the Vatican. In 1992, the same year as John Paul II’s resolution of the Galileo affair, discussions of original sin in new publications of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* included multiple references to Adam and Eve.

How did the sin of Adam become the sin of all his descendants? The whole human race is in Adam “as one body of one man”. By this “unity of the human race” all men are implicated in Adam’s sin, as all are implicated in Christ’s justice. Still, the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully understand. But we do know by Revelation that Adam had received original holiness and justice not for himself alone, but for all human nature. By yielding to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this sin affected the human nature that they would then transmit in a fallen state (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, n. 404).

Among theologians, this reliance upon the biblical narrative does not have the implications that it had a century ago. As Stephen Duffy confidently remarked in 1988:

> Obviously Christology eliminates the need for the supplementary hypothesis of monogenism to ground the assertion of sin’s radical and universal sway. Biological descent of the race from Adam as its historical progenitor yields to the unity of human finality revealed in the second Adam and is reflected in the saga of the first Adam only as its antitype (Duffy 1988, 618–619).

In conclusion, when a contrast is drawn between geostasis and monogenism, the historical record supports two fairly straightforward generalizations. First, theological commitment to monogenism has been more deeply rooted in historically conditioned doctrines of Catholic tradition than was the case for geostasis. Secondly, monogenism has been much more amenable to nuanced conceptual development than geostasis was. In particular, monogenism can be given a purely spiritual characterization;
it is difficult to imagine an analogous role for “theological geostasis.” The combination of these two historical factors provides some explanation for the persistence of monogenism. As Teilhard perceptively observed in 1950, “monogenism and polygenism are in reality purely theological notions, introduced for dogmatic reasons” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971, 209). To the extent that dogmatic reasons traditionally associated with original sin continue to be perceived as both compelling and authoritative, it can be expected that theological monogenism in some form will persist as well.

References


