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On the Opposite Sides of the Iron Curtain? Bilateral Political Activity of Poland and Japan after 1957

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ABSTRACT  
After World War II Japan and Poland found themselves on the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. Japan became an ally to the West and Poland to the East. How did the bilateral diplomatic relations of our two states form after reestablishing them in 1957?  
The authoress has decided to tackle in more detail problems connected to organization, personal, propaganda and ideology issues which took place in the first years after the normalization of the relations, since she has arrived at the conclusion that focusing on this period of few years will enable to understand how difficult the beginning of Polish-Japanese bilateral relations were and what matters and to what extent were most important and attainable to both governments.

KEYWORDS: Poland, Japan, bilateral relations, Cold War, The Embassy of Polish People's Republic in Tokyo, The Embassy of Japan in Warsaw  

Introduction  
For years, I have been conducting research on the history of Polish-Japanese contacts, mostly in relation to the prewar period. However, a few years ago, because the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the official relations was approaching – they started on 6 March 1919, when the government of Japan recognized independent Poland after World War I (Pałasz-Rutkowska, Romer 2009a: 75-8; Pałasz-Rutkowska, Romer 2009b: 65-69) – I started research concerning our bilateral contacts after the World War II. Besides, in the year 2017 we celebrated the 60th anniversary of re-establishing official Polish-Japanese relations. So, because of these two important reasons I have decided to present the main problems in our bilateral political and diplomatic activity after 1957.
I have decided to tackle in more detail the organization, personal, propaganda and ideology issues in the first years after the normalization of the relations, since I am convinced that focusing on this period of just a few years shall enable understanding of how difficult the beginnings of our bilateral relations were and what matters and to what extent were most important and attainable to both governments.

Our bilateral relations were officially broken off on 11 December 1941, three days after Japan engaged in the Asia-Pacific War. Poland, just as its allies Great Britain and the United States of America, declared war on Japan (Pałasz-Rutkowska, Romer 2009a: 214-218). Finally, in August 1945 Japan lost the war and had to accept the terms of unconditional surrender, specified in the Potsdam Declaration (Pałasz-Rutkowska, Starecka 2004: 180-218). The occupation by Allied Forces, (practically by American forces) under General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, began in September 1945. But as the division between the two factions – capitalist and communist/socialist – was becoming more and more visible and deeper in Europe and Asia, and the “Iron Curtain” was setting deeper between the East and the West, Japan and Poland found themselves on the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. Japan became an ally of the West, mainly of the USA, while Poland – of the East and the USSR.

As a result of the war and the Red Army entering Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria found themselves in the Soviet sphere of influence. In 1949 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Rada Wzajemnej Pomocy Gospodarczej) was established, enabling the USSR to utilize the economies of the Eastern Bloc. The Red Army stationed in all countries of the Eastern Bloc. All areas of life, including culture (cf. Socialist realism), were subjected to the process of Stalinization. In 1947 Bolesław Bierut (1892–1956), who was sent from Moscow, became the President of Poland. A year later the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) was formed and Moscow’s political indoctrination and influence became stronger (Łaptos, Mania 2010: 279-430).

In 1948, in order to limit the escalation of the Soviet influence in Europe, the United States of America gave millions of dollars in economic support to European states as part of the so-called Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Program). This aid was also to be targeted at the Eastern Bloc countries, including Poland, but Moscow declined the aid. In 1949, two German states were created - the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Their
area corresponded to the previous occupation zones - American, English and French zone and Soviet zone. Soon, the West established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose main goal was military defense against the threat of the USSR and its satellite states. The East-West division also pertained to Asia, with China divided into the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1949, pro-American Republic of Korea and pro-Soviet People’s Republic of Korea in the Korean Peninsula and a similar situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Indonesia.

Therefore, Washington decided to change policies towards Tokyo. After the first years of deep reforms dealing with democratization, demilitarization and decentralization introduced intensely since the beginning of the occupation, in 1949, the so-called Reverse Course was introduced. Japan was supposed to gradually assume the role of American ally and due to its geographical location become the anti-communist beachhead during the intensifying Cold War. The US decided to end the occupation (Hatano 2013: 19-44; Pałasz-Rutkowska, Starecka 2004: 208-228). On 8 September 1951, 49 countries signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan in San Francisco. USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia did not sign the treaty (Pałasz-Rutkowska 2016: 152-154).

In an interview for the Polish Press Agency, a Polish representative to the conference, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Wierbłowski (1904–1977) explained that the treaty had gone far towards creating new sources of tension in Asia and contributed towards “rebuilding a defeated militarism in the service of American imperialism” (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych [ed.] 1951: 1972-1979).

The Treaty of San Francisco went into effect on 28 April 1952 – Japan regained sovereignty but was still tightly connected with the USA. At the same time, Eastern and Central Europe were subject to increasing Stalinization and the influence of Moscow. The center of power in Poland was the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party and its Politburo. The name “Republic of Poland” (Rzeczpospolita Polska) was changed to “Polish People’s Republic” (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa). The Stalinization process in Eastern and Central Europe started to weaken slightly after the death of Joseph Stalin (1887–1953); however, this did not mean any significant changes in politics or in the division of the world. The Iron Curtain still divided the NATO-controlled West from the East,

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2 Treaty of Peace with Japan in:
which was bound since 1955 by political and military Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Układ o Przyjaźni, Współpracy i Pomocy Wzajemnej), known as the Warsaw Pact (Układ Warszawski). Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), Stalin’s successor as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, executed a policy of mitigation in accordance with the principle of peaceful coexistence and also decided to restore bilateral relations with Japan. Official negotiations began in 1955, though the conclusion of the peace treaty was stifled by the controversies surrounding territorial claims to four islands (Shikotan, Habomai, Etorofu or Iturup, and Kunashiri or Kunashir), which according to Russia are part of the Kuril Islands and as such since the end of WW II have belonged to Russia, while Japan claims that they are an integral part of its territory – the Northern Territories (Shimotomai 2013: 97-116). Finally, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō (1883–1959) agreed to adopt the so-called “Adenauer formula” and to separate the normalization of bilateral relations from the treaty (and territorial disputes). On 19 October 1956, in Moscow, a Joint Declaration between Japan and the USSR was signed. It provided for the end of the state of war, and for the restoration of diplomatic relations (in Japanese Nihonkoku to Sovieto shakai shugi kyōwakoku renrō to no kyōdō sengen and in Russian Совместная Декларация СССР и Японии)

At the same time, in Poland, the de-Stalinization process started. The forerunner to the changes was the Fifth World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship (held in Warsaw from 31 July to 15 August 1955), with nearly 30 000 guests from 114 countries, including 86 from Japan and 150 000 Polish participants (Krzywicki 2009: 304, 305). The Festival influenced the changes in the awareness of Polish people, which were also affected by the death of President Bierut and the army and militsiya’s bloody repression of the protests of workers in Poznań in 1956 (known as “Poznań June”, or the Poznań protests of 1956). Władysław Gomułka (1905-1982), a moderate, gained power (this marked the so-called “Polish October” or “Polish Thaw”) and managed to avoid the intervention of the Red Army forces in Poland. A short period of “thaw” began in Poland, which meant changes in the apparatus of government, rehabilitation of political prisoners and clergy, and strengthening the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite the fact that the Politburo and the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the

3 Joint Declaration in Japanese:
Polish United Workers’ Party, dependent on Moscow, still had a major influence on Poland’s relationships with other states. The situation also contributed to the negotiations between Poland and Japan to re-establish official relations (Pałasz-Rutkowska 2015: 65-69; Pałasz-Rutkowska 2016: 147-164).

Finally, on 8 February 1957, in New York, the Japanese Ambassador to the UN, Kase Toshikazu (1903-2004), and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the Polish delegation to the 11th session of the UN General Assembly, Józef Winiewicz (1905-1984), having authorization from their superiors, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishi Nobusuke (1896-1987) and Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz (1911-1989), signed the Agreement between Japan and the Polish People’s Republic concerning the re-establishment of normal relations (in Japanese Nihonkoku to Pōrandō Jinmin Kyōwakoku to no aida no kokkō kaifuku ni kansuru kyōtei and in Polish Układ o przywróceniu normalnych stosunków między Polską Rzecząpospolitą Ludową a Japonią) 4. The exchange of ratification documents took place on 18 May 1957 in Warsaw (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan, 2: 17-66). The Polish side was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rapacki (1909–1970), and the Japanese side by the Ambassador Extraordinary at Large, Sonoda Sunao (1913–1984) (AMFA 1954-1957: 23). Minister Rapacki expressed the belief that the Agreement marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Poland-Japan relations, in which the political, economic and cultural relations would prosper. Ambassador Sonoda made a statement saying that:

“Our countries were connected in the past by ties of cordial friendship that were broken during World War II, bringing great harm to both nations /…/ Our nation and government /…/ are convinced that our friendship will tighten in the best interests of Japan and Poland.”

**Establishment of Diplomatic Posts and First Diplomatic Representatives**

Soon after the Agreement was signed, both parties embarked on the preparations necessary to open their diplomatic posts in Tokyo and Warsaw as well as on the selection of candidates for their ambassadors.

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The Embassy of Polish People’s Republic in Tokyo

The groundwork started in Warsaw in February 1957. However, the assembly of personnel and preparation of the post proved difficult (AMFA 1957 a: 1-9). Edward Słuczański, Director of the 5th Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (East Asia, the Middle East and Africa), submitted to his superiors a very ambitious project of the organization of the Embassy in Tokyo, which was not attainable at the time. The staff were to include: the Ambassador, First Counsellor, Culture Counsellor, Press Attaché, First Secretary of Economic Affairs, Second Secretary, Embassy’s Attaché, five Referendaries, employees of the Commerce Counsellor Bureau, administrative and technical personnel. He proposed Tadeusz Żebrowski (1902–1986) for the post of the Ambassador, but since Żebrowski had not been working in diplomatic service for a while then, Słuczański thought that a more experienced Józef Góra, a former worker at the Embassy of Polish People’s Republic in Beijing and Pyongyang, should be appointed Deputy Ambassador. Góra, however, had already been appointed as Consul General in Stockholm.

In May, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marian Naszkowski (1912–1996) asked Jerzy Michałowski (1909–1993), Permanent Representative of Polish People’s Republic to the UN in New York to inquire the Japanese side for an agrément for Żebrowski, a leftist activist, member of the Polish United Workers’ Party (AMFA 1957, 1963: 4). His short biography mentioned that he was a Doctor of Philosophy, after studies in France and the USA (1931–1933) became a geography lecturer at the University of Warsaw (1933–1939); during World War II he was held in a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany, and after the war, until 1955, he worked for the MFA, i.a. as a Department Director. He also participated in sections of the United Nations General Assembly, and later worked as lecturer at the Warsaw School of Foreign Service, the Institute of Geography at the University of Warsaw, and the Polish Academy of Sciences. The Council of State (Rada Państwa) of Poland nominated Żebrowski as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on August 17. This nomination was announced in an official document to Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989) on August 25 (AMFA 1957, 1963: 10).

Approximately at this time, a working group tasked with establishing a diplomatic post flew to Tokyo. It was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Jerzy Bryn (born Izrael Alter Bryn, 1916–1978) as First Secretary. On 21 August, he presented introductory letters to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fujiyama Aiichirō (1897–1985)⁵. This date is recognized as the day of the

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⁵ Asahi Shinbun, 15.08.1957, p. 2 and 22.08.1957, p. 2; Trybuna Ludu, 2.09.1957, p. 2.
official opening of the Embassy of the Polish People’s Republic in Tokyo after bilateral relations were restored and of the beginning of the activities of the Head of the Mission. Until the Ambassador’s arrival, Bryn represented Poland as chargé d’affaires ad interim.

On 24 August, daily newspapers *Yomiuri Shinbun* (p. 1) and *Asahi Shinbun* (p. 1) published notes about Tadeusz Żebrowski’s appointment as the first Ambassador to the Polish People’s Republic in Japan. Included, there was also information about commerce treaty talks that were started in Tokyo by the Commercial Counsellor Stanisław Gall, previously the Chair of the Polish Foreign Trade Chamber. The talks were concluded in Tokyo on 26 April 1958 with the signing of the *Treaty on Commerce between the Polish People’s Republic and Japan*.

It was the first post-war commerce treaty between the two countries.

Bryn took charge of both organizing and heading the post and Jerzy Starecki, who on October 2 informed the MFA that the Embassy is located in a rented building at 39 Yakuojichō, Ichigaya, in Shinjuku Ward (AMFA 1957 a: 9; The Gaimusho 1957: 73), headed the administrative department. According to what Ambassador Żebrowski wrote to the Deputy Minister Naszkowski (AMFA 1957 b: 7), Bryn maintained continuous contact with the Japanese MFA, which helped him in finding a suitable place for the embassy. He established contacts with diplomatic representatives of other states, mostly those belonging to the Socialist bloc. He held a party for Polish writers who attended PEN International 29th International Congress (with Antoni Słonimski among the guests), and also in October organized a visit to Poland for a group of MPs from the Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō) – the former Prime Minister, Katayama Tetsu (1887-1987), was supposed to be the leader of the group. The visit came to fruition, and talks with Polish Prime Minister Cyranlewicz, Deputy Minister Naszkowski, Polish MPs were held. Peaceful use of nuclear power, collective security in both Asia and Europe, and the extension of cultural and economic relations between Poland and Japan were among the main topic of the talks.

Żebrowski arrived in Tokyo on November 13 and officially assumed his post on November 25 after he submitted letters of credence to Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989) (AMFA 1957, 1963: 11; Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych 1984: 102). In February 1958, the Embassy employed Aleksander Leyfell (1911–2006) as First Secretary. Żebrowski wrote via diplomatic cable to Director Słuczański about the working conditions:

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“I arrived in a country on which, as you know, no information could be gained in Warsaw. Neither did I receive any introductory information pertaining to both persons and the situation after arrival. Even at first glance, it is clear that the political relations in Japan are very complicated and contacts which could bring instant advantage difficult.

One of the factors contributing to this situation is the complex structure of the political life in Japan, the vast number of competing factions and cabals not only in all political parties but also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (...). This specific nature of political life in Japan calls for our caution both in talks with political activists and in assessing the information gained. Even the classical left-right divide is blurred due to personal connections and group interests. (...) Language difficulties and specific customs are also issues that hinder and delay the establishing and maintaining of ordinary relations.” (2.04.1958) (AMFA 1958 a: 1)

Żebrowski complained about the lack of an apartment, which inhibited closer relations both with the Japanese and with other diplomats. Based on further correspondence, the MFA finally agreed to rent a place in a residential area in Den’en Chōfu (Ōta Ward). Because of low safety conditions, the residence was burgled two times in September and October 1958, clearly with the purpose of robbery (AMFA 1958 a: 2, 5, 9-11).

The work of the Embassy was described as insufficient in a letter of 14 June 1958 to Naszkowski, written by Witold Rodziński (1918–1997), the next Director of the 5th Department (AMFA 1958 a: 5, 6). The superiors in Warsaw above all expected the Ambassador to provide information on and analysis of the current political situation in Japan.

In the middle of 1958 Żebrowski came to Poland, where he reported about his activities but also received the *Guidelines for the Embassy of Polish People’s Republic in Tokyo*, specially prepared by the MFA (AMFA 1958 b: 6-10). It was advised that the Embassy’s activities should be conducted in accordance with Poland’s national interests and should develop bilateral relations (Item 1). This required a thorough understanding of the situation in Japan and of both domestic and foreign policy of the Polish People’s Republic (Item 2). Both countries’ concurrence of opinions was also emphasized regarding current political problems, e.g.: the ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction and thermonuclear bomb tests, the
question of peaceful coexistence of states with different systems, respecting the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Item 3). It was also advised that gaining knowledge about the true balance of power in Japan is essential (Item 4) together with informing about the domestic situation in connection with the pro-American policy (Item 5). The recommendations also included the following: issuing an information bulletin about Poland, establishing and maintaining contacts with different communities, as well as inspiring articles in the Japanese press. The importance of economic relations described as “strongly prospective” was also underlined (Item 6). Item 7 pertained to cultural relations, i.e. the necessity to organize mass events (e.g. motion picture exchange), the need for more translations of Polish literature, scientific cooperation, and sports exchange. Not surprisingly, the Head of the Embassy was to be responsible for reaching all these aims. His role was to create circumstances which would enhance the creativity and initiative of the Embassy’s staff (Item 8). The study of foreign languages, including Japanese, was encouraged as well. The Head of the Embassy was also obliged to send two political reports and one organizational report annually. The MFA was to be promptly informed about the situation in Japan but also about “responses to the situation in Poland and on the international arena”. Since MFA was aware that the Embassy in Tokyo had only lately started it activities, the following areas of MFA’s interest were suggested:

“1. Japan’s internal situation:
   a. The balance of political power/the course and development of class struggle, (…) the Japanese Communist Party; opposition activities, especially the Japan Socialist Party, labor movement (…).
   b. Economic development issues,
   c. Agrarian issues,
   d. Educational, cultural and scientific issues,
   e. The issue of the remilitarization of Japan,
   f. Developing profiles of members of the Japanese government and of other important persons.
2. Japanese foreign policy:
   a. Japanese position in the balance of powers in the Far East,
   b. Political and economic relations between Japan and the USA,
   c. Japanese political and economic expansion in neutralist countries in Southeast Asia,
d. The attitude of official circles in Japan towards the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and issues connected with commodity exchange between these countries and Japan.” (AMFA 1958 b: 9, 10)

The first extensive political report (48 pages), prepared together with Leyfell, was sent by Żebrowski to the next Director of the 5th Department, Marian Stradowski, on 18 October 1958 (AMFA 1958 b: 4-53). The report contained information about Japanese internal situation (e.g. May 1958 election results; political parties; Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and his government; trade unions; the issues connected to amendments to the constitution and the armed forces) and international affairs (e.g. Japan and the USA, China, the USSR, and the countries of Southeast Asia). Unfortunately, there was no detailed account of the relations between Poland and Japan, though in the conclusion to the report Żebrowski wrote:

“(…) I believe that Polish diplomacy has a limited scope of possible action in this country. However, we can, with some due mistrust, try to take advantage of some aspects of Japanese foreign policy, e.g.: the fear of armed conflict and the need to maneuver with respect to the Asian nations. (…) Of course, there is also a fairly wide range of activities in the area of economic and cultural relations, although also limited because of the geographical distance and cultural differences. There are also significant possibilities, hitherto untapped, of deepening relations with the democratic portion of the Japanese society, which has a favorable attitude towards Poland and especially towards the Polish People’s Republic. However, despite this attitude, the distance often hinders interest in Polish political issues (e.g. the issue of the western border). There is support for general activities for peace.” (AMFA 1958 b: 52, 53)

It can be inferred that the Embassy did not initiate any specific activities in order to establish closer relations with Japanese people and to promote Poland in Japan. Director Stradowski criticized Żebrowski’s report for its size and the unnecessary amount of “historical material which did not benefit the issues of current affairs”, and for analysis and opinions which were too short (AMFA 1958 b: 56-58). He also mentioned that MFA still lacks information about Japan.
The first organizational report (for 1958) was sent by Żebrowski on 21 February 1959 (AMFA 1958 a: 6-11). This document is analysis-worthy because it provides important information on the situation of the Embassy of the Polish People’s Republic in Tokyo after the bilateral relations were restored and on the characteristics of the Embassy. The Ambassador devoted a large portion of the text to the premises of the Embassy. The building in Shinjuku had been rented before his arrival in November 1957 for the duration of four years, with a possible extension for two more years. The building was sufficient for current personnel but should there be more people hired, for instance for security, it would not be enough. According to Żebrowski, the building was also ill-equipped, too modest, and located in an “unsuitable neighborhood”. The search for a new residence lasted until June 1958, and until that moment the Ambassador had been living at the Matsudaira Hotel in Shinjuku Ward (4 Minami Motomachi, Yotsuya). Because of the financial situation and the delay in shipment from Poland the residence was not fully equipped until December. Żebrowski complained about the location of the residence in Den’en Chōfu, far from the Embassy and other facilities, from the city center which made communication difficult and increased transportation costs. The residence was rented only until May 1960 and the extension of this period seemed impossible, also because of the increasing costs. The Ambassador warned the MFA that the real estate costs in Tokyo would be growing and suggested dealing with the problem of the Embassy building and of the residence as soon as it was possible. He also mentioned that the Czechs and the Yugoslavs, just as e.g. the Swedes or the Belgians, are considering building embassies. Such enterprise, although costly, would provide a solution to the problem of quarters for staff, all of whom (except for the cryptographer and the janitor) were renting apartments in the city. This would also improve the security, which was very poor. Żebrowski warned that the Embassy was not safe from potential “penetration of foreign intelligence and different types of provocations”, as well as from burglary and natural disasters.

In the further part of the report, the Ambassador discussed the organization of work and staff. Aleksander Leyfell, the First Secretary, was responsible for diplomatic issues (e.g. applications to MFA), political reporting, maintaining relations with middle-rank political activists, and for taking care of cultural issues and contacts connected to art and culture. Attaché Stanisław Pawlak (born 1933) was in charge of consular and press matters (e.g. Polonica in Japanese press), establishing contacts with Japanese journalists, and of taking care of the documentation and the protocol.
Referendary Roman Glanowski was responsible for both the classified and non-classified office, register and handling of propaganda materials (radio, television, film, sports columns in the papers), as well as for Japanese foreign policy-related calendar of events. Referendary Jerzy Starecki took care of Embassy’s administration and bookkeeping. Translator-correspondent Ewelina Adamowska was responsible for mail in English and Japanese, translation of conversations, typing Polish and English texts, and also for creating a file of personalities. Cryptographer Marian Rodek was responsible for the register and the library, and also operated the teleprinter. Zygmunt Staniszewski, who had arrived in Japan as a driver, because of the Tokyo’s terrain, was tasked with janitorial duties and security. Also, six Japanese were hired: the Ambassador’s secretary Taguchi R., a translator for talks Hijikata Y., who was responsible for reviewing the press and other publications in Japanese, two drivers, a driver-messenger, and a telephone operator who was also a cleaning lady. Żebrowski mentioned in the report, that Jerzy Bryn had left Tokyo, but he did not write any explanation. Other sources state that Bryn was removed, after the Ambassador’s intervention at the end of August 1958, as he was unable to cooperate with the Ambassador and Leyfell (Pawlikowicz 2004: 116-150). This issue is worth a longer mention as it is connected to the intelligence, which is usually present in diplomatic relations, and it was especially so when the world was divided between the East and West. Bryn was born in Poland, to a Jewish craftsman family. In his youth, he was a supporter of the left wing of the Zionist movement. In 1935, he left for Palestine and two years later took part in the Spanish Civil War in the International Brigades. During World War II he resided in France and Palestine. In 1947, he returned to Poland and quickly began working in the 2nd Department (Oddział II; from 1951 2nd Directorate/Zarząd II) of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, i.e. the military intelligence: he was i.a. the Head of the French Section in the Operational Department, an illegal resident spy, a lecturer in the Staff Academy (Akademia Sztabu Generalnego) in Rembertów, a military adviser to a Representative of Polish Delegation in the International Control Commission in Vietnam. In 1957, he started work in the MFA and was quickly sent to the diplomatic post in Tokyo, despite the fact that his previous superiors in the General Staff did not agree to this assignment, as with his past and a reputation stemming from it, Bryn could not take an official position in foreign missions.

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7 She in 1968, as Ewelina Tchórzewska-Adamowska graduated from the Japanology at the University of Warsaw. She translated into Polish novels of Abe Tomoji.
Bryn left Tokyo on 30 August 1958 but never reached Warsaw. Intelligence services conducted a search but it was fruitless. Suddenly, in April of the next year, he appeared in Tokyo at the house of Commercial Counsellor Gall, claiming that he had been kidnapped by the American intelligence and held in Okinawa for almost half a year. He was sent back to the country and subsequently arrested. By the sentence of the Warsaw Military Circle Court of 30 July 1962, he was found guilty of committing espionage and sentenced to death. This fact was mentioned in *Asahi Shinbun* (8.08.1962, p. 11). After an appeal, the sentence was changed to life imprisonment, and after changes in the Criminal Code (1970), which eliminated life sentence from Polish law, he was sentenced to a 25-year imprisonment. He was proven to have cooperated with the American intelligence and to have divulged information classified as state and military secrets and pertaining to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Directorate and the network of spies in France he was responsible for (Pawlikowicz 2004: 147). This story is a definite proof that there are many temptations waiting for those who have access to state secrets, and that past connections, relations and political games are important, and were especially important during the Cold War, when countries on one side wanted to gain whatever information possible from the other side.

In the last part of the report for 1958, in which he discussed the basis of the functioning of the Embassy, Żebrowski also provided his opinion about the fact that the Tokyo Embassy was qualified by MFA as “small”. The function of the Embassy was technically limited to “the observation of the main trends in politics” without “a wider cultural and political expansion”. However, he believed that the fulfillment of these goals was not easy, especially because of the differences between the two cultures. He also aptly described the differences in responsibilities of a “small” diplomatic post in small and large countries:

“It is clear that a small post in a smaller country after a short while is able to “understand” such a country in a relatively exhaustive and accurate manner, however, in a larger country, a “small” post will have more difficulties with such a task.” (AMFA 1958 a: 10, 11)

This situation was further complicated by the lack of any “back up”, such as the Polish Diaspora living for a longer time in Japan or the press correspondents. There was also no tourist traffic from Poland and no Japanese who would have any connections with Poland over a significant
period. According to Żebrowski, cultural and scientific propaganda was also important, and many countries, such as the USSR and Czechoslovakia, but not Poland, were using it to their advantage.

“In conclusion, I am forced to state that even after improving our work methods and gaining more experience, the Tokyo Embassy with its current staff will not be able to significantly increase the scope of its activity and to utilize all its possibilities.” (AMFA 1958 a: 10, 11)

These were bitter words, but they were true, and Żebrowski was well aware of the “limitations” of the Embassy, knowing that in these circumstances it is not possible to fulfill what he was tasked with. Poland was a relatively poor country and, despite the “thaw”, could not have a fully independent foreign policy. MFA did carefully look into what Żebrowski had written and even though the question of delegating a Counsellor was postponed, it was decided that an Attaché shall be delegated in the place of Referendary Glanowski. On 29 June 1959, Andrzej Jedynak was chosen for this position (AMFA 1958 a: 13, 15, 16). Judging by the number of notes sent from Tokyo to the MFA in 1959 it can be inferred that with time, the Embassy staff, especially Żebrowski and Leyfell, were increasingly active, they established new contacts, more frequently met with the Japanese and foreigners in Tokyo (AMFA 1959 b: 1-65). As early as on January 22, at the MFA, Żebrowski visited the Director General of the Europe and Asia Bureau (Ōakyoku) at the Foreign Office, Kanayama Masahide (1909–1997). Among other topics, they discussed the Rapacki Plan, which was at that time crucial for Poland. The Rapacki Plan, named so after Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki (1909-1970), was an initiative whose aim was to create a nuclear-free zone in Eastern and Central Europe (Tebinka 2010: 468-480). Kanayama thought the plan had limited chances of success because of “the great mistrust between the two blocks”. He avoided providing a straightforward answer, despite the fact that Żebrowski explained that Poland does not want “the Federal Republic of Germany to be armed with nuclear missiles”. They also discussed Japan’s potential neutrality, which was also deliberated on internationally. Kanayama, however, repeated the words of the Prime Minister and stated that it would not be possible, especially because of Japan’s two neighbors: the USSR, which had nuclear weapons, and the People’s Republic of China, which had a vast army.
A few days later, Żebrowski discusses the Rapacki Plan with Suzuki Mosaburō (1893–1970), the Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party (AMFA 1959 b: 10-12). Żebrowski also asked about the current situation in Japan, which, just as the neutrality issue, was a recurring topic in his conversations with different party leaders. Similar issues were also tackled by the other members of the Embassy staff, who mostly met with representatives of the Left and the opposition; however, they would also meet with the members of the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū Minshutō; LDP). In February, Leyfell informed the MFA about the meeting with the Treaty Bureau (Jōyakukyoku) Chief Takahashi Michitoshi, on which he discussed the progress on the new security treaty between the USA and Japan and also asked about the US-controlled islands of Okinawa and Ogasawara (AMFA 1959: 5, 6). In other notes, he wrote about meetings with journalists interested in Central and Eastern Europe. On February 9, Pawlak and Glanowski informed the MFA about a conversation with Watanabe Zen’ichirō, Head of the Foreign Affairs Department in Mainichi Shinbun (AMFA 1959: 7). The journalist was not at all interested in the Embassy materials on politics and economy, finding the information on science, culture and sports (e.g. about Polish gliding) more interesting.

In March, the Ambassador took part in a rally on the 5th anniversary of American hydrogen bomb testing at Bikini Atoll. The nuclear fallout from the test contaminated Japanese fishermen who had not been warned about the test (Trybuna Ludu, 03.03.1959). In his speech during the rally, Żebrowski mentioned the Rapacki Plan again and also spoke about Poland’s involvement in efforts to ban the use of nuclear weapons. On October 24, the 15th Session of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was opened in Tokyo. Polish delegation, headed by Deputy Minister of International Trade Franciszek Modrzewski (1902-1985), participated in the session (Trybuna Ludu, 25.10.1959). The year before, Żebrowski met with Minister Fujiyama in the MFA and asked him for Japan’s support, so that Poland would be admitted into GATT. The Minister promised to look into that issue (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9.10.1958).

It is noteworthy that at this time, approximately until the end of 1958, the Embassy also took care of the development of research on Poland and of teaching Polish in Japan. In connection with these activities, Leyfell met several times with representatives from the University of Tokyo and Hokkaido University, Slavic studies researchers, mostly representing Russian studies. It turned out that the libraries of both universities have a

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8 See also Yomiuri Shinbun, 3.02.1959.
very small collection of Polish literature and that there are no educational materials either. Soon the National Diet Library in Tokyo and the National Library of Poland in Warsaw began to exchange publications. Wiesław Kotański (1915-2005) (Pałasz-Rutkowska 2007: 21-24), who from 1 December 1957 to 31 August 1958 stayed in Japan as the first Japanese Studies scholarship holder from Poland, was chosen as the consultant of the Polish side.

The Embassy of Japan in Poland
The Embassy of Japan in Poland did not start its operation until 15 December 1957, when Dōshō Hisashi (Second Secretary) took the position of chargé d’affaires (Gaimushō [ed.] 2007: 295; AMFA 1957, 1959, 1960: 13; Shokuinroku 1939: 31). He was a MFA intern in the Embassy of Japan in Poland in 1939, spoke Polish, and so did Hashizume Mitsuo, who accompanied him as a Secretary, and Kobayashi Kuniharu, who also came to Warsaw before the war as interns. First Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary after the war, Ōta Saburō (1905–?) arrived in Warsaw two weeks later. On 10 January 1958, in the Belweder Palace, he submitted letters of credence to Chairman of the Polish Council of State, Aleksander Zawadzki (1899-1964) (AMFA 1957, 1959, 1960: 7-13) 9. Ōta became a diplomat after graduating from the University of Tokyo in 1928 (AMFA 1957, 1959, 1960: 7; AMFA 1957 c: 3, 4; AMFA 1958 b: 4) 10. He was the Attaché of the Embassy of Japan in London, Vice-consul in Sydney, the Third Secretary to the Embassy in Moscow (1937–1939), he spoke Russian. Until the end of the war, he held various posts in the MFA. At the beginning of the occupation, he headed the 3rd Department of the Central Liaison Office in General Headquarters of Allied Powers in Tokyo, after that he worked in the Liaison Office in Yokosuka and in 1947 he became the Mayor of the city. In 1949 he began work in the Ministry of Telecommunications. Five years later he returned to MFA as an Adviser to the Minister and in 1955 he assumed the post of the Ambassador in Burma.

Soon after he assumed the post of the Ambassador, he met with Deputy Minister of International Trade, Czesław Bajer (1900-1979) and with the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Council in Warsaw, Zygmunt Dworakowski (1905-1971) (Trybuna Ludu, 14.01.1958), and on January 31, with Prime Minister Cyranekiewicz (Trybuna Ludu, 1.02.1958). On

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10 See also: Asahi Shinbun, 27.09.1957, p. 1.
February 8, i.e. on the 1<sup>st</sup> anniversary of Poland and Japan resuming their relations, <i>Trybuna Ludu</i> also published a statement from the Ambassador on the subject of Polish-Japanese relations. In the statement, he said that both countries had suffered greatly during World War II and because of that, “the effort to eliminate the danger of war” should be their common goal.

The main problem that the Japanese faced was the lack of premises for the Embassy, as written by Władysław Tykociński (1921–1967), the Head of the Polish People’s Republic Military Mission in West Germany in a note to the MFA from May 1958 (AMFA 1958 c: 7, 8). The note was created after the meeting with Ambassador Ōta, which took place during the dinner organized by Hōgen Shinsaku (1910–1999), the Consul General there. Ōta was worried because of no perspectives to find a suitable place soon. He also complained about the staff in the Polonia Hotel and the Bristol Hotel in Warsaw and common problems with the supply of hot water. He said that his main mission was to intensify the trade between Poland and Japan, but he saw little chance of success because due to the lack of suitable goods in Poland. He praised Gall’s activities, but he suspected that his superiors in Warsaw rejected his idea of trilateral cooperation of Poland, Japan and the People's Republic of China. He also spoke very well of Minister Rapacki and Ambassador Żebrowski, referring to the latter a man of “high intellectual level”.

In his letter to Deputy Minister Naszkowski (22.05.1958), Director Rodziński complained that the matter of the building had still not been solved (AMFA 1958 d: 1-3). Unfortunately, the Zug Place (named after Szymon Bogumił Zug, a classicist architect) near Dzierżyński Square (now Bankowy Square), offered to the Japanese and renovated by the state, became a subject of dispute, as Evangelical Reformed Church laid claims to its ownership. In July, a new possibility appeared and the Embassy and Ambassador’s residence were to be located at number 7, Willowa Street. In September, however, the building was still not handed over to the Embassy. From the note of October 14 from the meeting with the Third Secretary of Embassy of Japan, Hashizume Mitsuo and Attaché Shunaga Genshirō, written by Attaché Stanisław Pawlak, it can be inferred that the building at Willowa Street was supposed to be handed over to the Japanese side in six months at the earliest and that their offices had already been located at the Grand Hotel for a year (AMFA 1958 c: 11, 12). The Ambassador was still living at the Bristol Hotel.

Moreover, Pawlak confirmed that both men knew Polish and had begun their work in diplomacy before the war as interns at the Embassy of Japan.
in Warsaw. During the conversation, they stressed the fact that in Japan news about Poland were rare, and that it was necessary to publish information about the country. They also talked about the plans to send the “Mazowsze” folk group to Japan and about inviting a classical Japanese theater to Poland. Hashizume left Poland in September 1959. Kawade Ryō, Third Secretary, was delegated in his stead. Before leaving Tokyo, Kawade met with Pawlak at the Embassy of the Polish People’s Republic (AMFA 1958 c: 59). Kawade graduated from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tokyo, and he also studied at the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard University. He spoke English and Russian and was studying Polish. The documents indicate that in June 1959, First Secretary Okada Akira arrived in Poland. He had been employed as an expert on China in the MFA before that and he wanted to establish contacts with the Chinese in Poland; he also underlined that he was a supporter of normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China (AMFA 1958 c: 60, 61).

In line with what Ambassador Ōta told Tykociński in Berlin about developing economic relations, a delegation headed by Nagano Shigeo (1900-1984), Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and General Manager of a steel manufacturer Fuji Seiitetsu (Fuji Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.) visited Poland on October 5-9, 1958 (AMFA 1958: 1-3; AMFA 1958 e: 1-5). Nagano Shigeo was accompanied by three employees from the company and a representative from the Eastern Europe Department at the MFA. The delegation met with the Head of the Planning Commission Stefan Jędrychowski (1910–1996), Trade Minister Witold Trąmpczyński (1909–1982) and Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Przemysław Ogrodziński (1918-1980). They discussed economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. Apart from Warsaw, the delegation also visited Nowa Huta and Cracow.

In the following months, there were other similar visits. On 23 November 1958, during his brief visit in Warsaw, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeuchi Shinkichi met with Deputy Minister Winiewicz (Trybuna Ludu, 30.11.1958). In August 1959, while on an inspection of Japanese posts in Europe (which included Moscow), Deputy Minister Yamada Hisanori met with Winiewicz (AMFA 1959: 1, 2). Ambassador Ōta was also present at the meeting, and he announced to the Polish side that he was in the course of negotiations in Warsaw with Romania and Bulgaria with a view to establishing diplomatic relations.

A delegation from Japan took part in the 48th Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in Warsaw, held between 15 August and 4 September 1959.
Koyanagi Makie from the upper house of the National Diet and Waseda Ryuemon from the lower house of the National Diet were among the delegates. On August 26, Ambassador Ōta organized a party and invited the President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union Giuseppe Codacci-Pisanelli, Vice-Marshal of the Sejm Jerzy Jodłowski and members of the Polish group in the Inter-Parliamentary Union Julian Kadlof, Jan Karol Wende, and others (Trybuna Ludu, 27.08.1959). In mid-September 1959 Miki Takeo (1907–1988), future Prime Minister, member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and a member of the Diet visited Poland with a delegation. In a note from September 11, a staff member (no signature) of the 5th Department of the MFA wrote that Miki represented “the most liberal party-line” within LDP and that he had left the government of Kishi in December 1958 because of differences in views (AMFA 1959 a). The author of the note also emphasized the importance of the visit, as it was the first time for a high-ranking official of the LDP to visit Poland. On September 18, Miki Takeo met with Prime Minister Cyranekiewicz and the previous day – with Deputy Minister Naszkowski. Ambassador Ōta organized a party in his honor on the same day (“Trybuna Ludu”, 18.09.1959). From Warsaw Miki went to Budapest, he also visited the USSR and during these visits he talked about establishing closer cooperation.

According to a note verbale from 23 May 1959, which was sent by the Embassy of Japan to the Diplomatic Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, at the end of April the Embassy was already located at 7 Willowa Street, where also Ambassador Ōta resided (AMFA 1957, 1959, 1960: 14-16). The staff included Okada Akira (First Secretary), Dōshō Hisashi (First Secretary), Hashizume Mitsuo (Second Secretary), Shunaga Genshirō (Attaché), and Kobayashi Hideyo (Official). The Polish staff consisted of eight employees. Interestingly, they included Japanese speakers, Czesław Miszkiewicz (Polish Secretary), who worked at the Embassy of Japan before the war, and also Karol Antoniewicz (Official), who had been a student-translator at the Embassy of Poland in Tokyo and had worked there until it was closed in October 1941 (Pałasz-Rutkowska, Romer 2009a: 129, 217, 225, 232). There were also cooks, chambermaids, and the personnel hired by the Japanese – in total seven people. The aforementioned Kawade Ryō and Tamaki Kōichi (Attachés) arrived in the second half of 1959 (AMFA 1957, 1959, 1960: 17-19). Thanks to following notes verbales sent by the Embassy of Japan to the Diplomatic Protocol of the MFA about the Embassy staff, it is known who worked there. In October 1960, Shimizu Kuniharu was listed as First Secretary.
Secretary Dōshō was subsequently removed from the list, as in the spring of 1960 he had been accused of espionage by the MFA and as persona non grata thrown out of the country (AMFA 1957, 1959, 1960: 20-24). Both Ōta and Żebrowski met with the officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw and Tokyo to discuss this issue. Both sides agreed that this incident would not have influence on the general Poland-Japan relations. The press also reported on this situation. “Trybuna Ludu” (27.04.1960) wrote that Dōshō “had regular contact with particular Polish citizens, who, in exchange for a remuneration in US dollars, provided him with information and documents which were state secrets”. The Japanese press gave a different account of the story. As Japan Times suggested, the authorities were displeased that Dōshō had many friends in Poland from before the war, while Mainichi Shinbun wrote that collecting documents was one of a diplomat’s tasks.

Conclusion
Ambassador Ōta ended his mission on 29 March 1961 and left Warsaw. Until the arrival of the new Ambassador in June 1961, Okada Akira represented Japan as Chargé d'affaires ad interim (AMFA 1962-1963: 1-4). Ambassador Żebrowski stayed in Japan for a much longer period, until April 1964. Both Ambassadors, being the first ones after the re-establishment of relations between the two countries, did not have an easy task to fulfill. They were working in countries of adverse political blocks. They were obliged to formulate policies in accordance with those of their allies – the USSR and the USA respectively. Establishing and organizing posts was not an easy task, but also gaining experience in a new situation, which was different from the prewar era, when both countries had friendly relations, was difficult. It was especially challenging for Poland, where the political framework, government, and the diplomatic personnel all changed. There were not enough experts who knew Japan, its culture, and language. Among the first staff members of the Embassy of Japan in Warsaw, three spoke Polish. However, as it turned out, this could also (or maybe first of all) be used as a tool for political intelligence. Despite the fact that the beginnings were difficult, the relations between Poland and Japan intensified in the 1960s. In 1967, Poland was for the first time visited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and an official delegation from Poland headed by the Minister of Trade visited Japan. It was the economic cooperation that started to develop rapidly. A similar situation can later be observed in the field of culture, where despite the East-West division, ruling ideologies became less important. Economy and culture
became two areas where the cooperation between the two countries developed better than in other fields. This was compliant with the policies of both countries from the time they resumed relations, as seen in the statements issued by Adam Rapacki and Kishi Nobusuke, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Japan respectively, for the Polish Press Agency and Kyodo News (Kyōdō Tsūshin) after signing the Agreement between Japan and the Polish People’s Republic concerning the re-establishment of normal relations on 8 February 1957. The next day the reprinted statement could be found in Trybuna Ludu (p. 2) in an article entitled The perspective on the beneficial cooperation between Poland and Japan – the contribution to the work of world peace (Perspektywy korzystnej współpracy polsko-japońskiej – wkład do dzieła pokoju światowego). In different words both ministers expressed the same idea. Therefore I quote only Rapacki’s words:

“I am convinced that the development of relations between the Polish People’s Republic and Japan shall enable both countries to come closer, deepen understanding and create perspective for a mutually beneficial economic and cultural cooperation, this in turn, without a doubt shall contribute to a peaceful stabilization of international relations.”

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